


ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ **ВИКТОРА СУВОРОВА**

ТРЕТЬЯ МИРОВАЯ ВОЙНА СТАЛИНА




КЕЙСТУТ
ЗАКОРЕЦКИЙ

ВТОРАЯ МИРОВАЯ ВОЙНА



ВЫРВАННЫЕ СТРАНИЦЫ



KEYSTUT
ZAKORETSKY

THE THIRD WORLD WAR OF ST



MOSCOW
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2009

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A direct continuation of Viktor Suvorov's bestsellers!

The development of the ideas of the most popular modern
historian!

Proof that immediately after the Victory over Nazi Germany, Stalin
began preparations for the Third World War - now against the United
States. However, the new "Day-M", the date of the start of the operation
"Groza-2", for technical reasons, had to be postponed from 1950 to
1954, which Stalin did not live to see ...

**Viktor Suvorov not only approved this publication,
but he also wrote a preface to it - an urgent recommendation to
his entire huge audience: "READ
NECESSARILY!"**

**UDC 94
BBC 63.3(0)**

ISBN 978-5-9955-0048-3

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IRREVERSIBLE MIRACLE

(Foreword by Viktor Suvorov)

The battle for the Imperial Chancellery was long and stubborn. By that time, the Reichstag had already been taken. But the Reichstag is only a symbol. And the symbol is empty. The Reichstag is a parliament, and Hitler hated parliaments of all stripes. He even began his rise to power by setting fire to the Reichstag. Then the building was restored, but the parliament did not play any role in Nazi Germany. It was our command that gave the Reichstag

of great importance, because its building is crowned with a dome. It is important for us to set the Red Banner at a good height. The symbolic dome of the Reichstag became the last height on which we hoisted our flag. There were no other reasons to storm the Nazi parliament. No secrets in it

ty was not foreseen: decisions were not made here. Decisions were made at a meeting - in the Imperial Chancellery, where Hitler's office was. In purely spectator terms, the Imperial Chancellery was losing - there were no domes or towers above it, there was no point above it, that pin that could be crowned with the Red Banner. But documents...

It was assumed, of course, that Hitler's office had long since been cleared, the papers burned, the treasures taken away, but Everyone knows that devils are jokers...

A surprise awaited the Soviet infantry right in the lobby. When they knocked out German machine gunners from a huge
th marble hall with rectangular columns, which
When the dust settled a little, the eyes of the Soviet soldiers under the rubble of brick and a layer of lime dust appeared to be a transparent box made of three-inch impenetrable glass, under the glass - an unknown sample of weapons. The machine gun is not a machine gun, but something with a barrel, something clearly designed to shoot. The machine gun must have a machine on a tripod or on wheels. It wasn't. The machine gun must have some kind of trigger mechanism with a hook or trigger. This would not have happened either. If this is a light machine gun, then he does not need a machine gun, but there should be a butt and a bipod to keep the barrel horizontal to the ground. But this was not the case either. Beneath the strange weapon was a plate with a short engraved inscription. What was written on that plate, the Soviet soldiers did not know, but the signature did not cause doubts. The signature was recognized at a glance: "*Adolf*

Hitler."

The fight continued. Everything was seething around. Worked artillery, dust fell from the ceiling, roofs, shells exploded, walls fell, everything that could burn, and even that which could not, burned. drag
there was no way to get a translator to this hell, much less an armaments specialist. Where to get them during a grand assault, what ways through the flaming city

kind of transport to the very first attacking chains of penal infantry? In the meantime, the news of the new weapons had already passed through the headquarters of the battalion and the headquarters of the regiment and rushed higher and higher. Capturing a German machine gun is a valor. Not everyone in the war had such a chance. Capturing a machine gun, a cannon, a motorcycle, a horse and cart is an honor, it is always important. The results achieved are judged by the captured trophies. The number of planes shot down, Germans killed, tanks destroyed can

but overestimate, even if without malicious intent. Who knows if a hundred Germans have been exterminated or only ninety? And trophies are something that can be counted exactly, this is what you can feel with your hand: here is a captured tank, here is a cannon, here are ten rifles. Capturing trophies has always been valued in war. The capture of new types of weapons is the highest valor. Immediately, not only a new, previously unknown type of weapon was captured, but captured right at Hitler's headquarters. Moreover, Hitler himself had something to do with this sample, he noted it with his attention. Therefore, from the very top to the very bottom, through the headquarters of the corps, division, regiment, battalion, there is a thunderous order to keep the hall in which they found an unusual weapon at any cost, not to give this hall back.

but into the hands of the enemy, to keep the Germans away from this weapon. And one more thing: do not open the walls - this thing can be mined.

Only two days later, when the fighting subsided, when the artillery fell silent when the last Nazis were smoked out of the cellars, translators and weapons experts were delivered to the Imperial Chancellery. And it turned out...

It turned out that this thing has a Russian name - "ShKAS": Shpitalny, Komaritsky, aviation, rapid-fire. The machine gun was adopted by the Soviet aviation in 1932. In 1938, in Spain, the Germans removed the ShKAS from a downed Soviet I-16 fighter and sent it to Berlin. Here ShKAS was subjected to comprehensive checks and tests, and then shown to Hitler. Hitler was furious: there was nothing like it in the arsenal of the German aviation. Even close to Hitler ordered the creation of an aviation machine gun that would be superior in performance or at least equal to the machine gun of Shpitalny and Komaritsky. In order to speed up the German designers, in order to shame the leaders of the German military

mentality, Hitler ordered the ShKAS to be displayed in the most prominent place in his official residence. Let the designers and bigwigs of the military pro minds blush up to their ears every time they visit Hitler's headquarters. The machine gun was supposed to stay in the Imperial Chancellery until the moment when the German aviation received, if not the best, then at least an equal model of weapons. This order of Hitler was stamped on the tablet.

But the desired moment for the German designers did not come. What was adopted by the Soviet aviation in 1932, the German designers could not create either by the beginning of the war, or during it, or at the very end. Even with a valid sample in front of them, they could not copy it.

It is clear that in 1945, Soviet submachine gunners could not identify a Soviet aircraft machine gun during the battle. How can the infantry know what a machine gun looks like hidden in the wing of a fighter? And who would head came up with the idea to meet in the Nazi bulletin the product of the Tula gunsmiths? Meanwhile, the news of the seizure of unusual weapons, and even close to Hitler's cabin, slipped through the headquarters of the army and the headquarters of the front and was reported to the very top. Comrade Stalin demanded to see him an unusual German contraption. I had to report that the contraption was not German at all... When everything cleared up and it turned out, the participants in the battle in the vestibule of the Imperial Chancellery were awarded exactly as they reward participants in the capture of a really very important weapon. Shpitalny and Komaritsky were not forgotten either.

"ShKAS" was by no means the only sample Soviet weapons, the equal of which neither our enemies nor our allies had. IL-2 was not only the best attack aircraft in the world, but also the most massive battle

the largest aircraft in the history of aviation, the only aircraft in the world with an armored hull. And again: what our designers created before the war, no one in the world it was not possible to repeat or copy even by the time it ended. Our BM-13 installations, the famous Katyushas, were not only the best in the world, but also unique. This system of extremely simple and extremely effective weapons is impossible with anything compare because it did not fit into any framework, did not fit under any foreign classification. They just didn't have anything like that.

Soviet artillery outnumbered Ia artillery of all the rest of the world combined, and had the best guns in the world. The guns and howitzers that the Red Army abandoned at the borders at the very beginning of the war were used by the Germans until its very end, and only in their best divisions. Now, many decades after the war, our cannons stand under the African sun in the museum near the Egyptian pyramids. With them, the Germans armed Rommel's tank army, which in Africa tried to cut the Suez Canal, cut off oil supplies and thereby bring Britain to its knees. Hitler's Minister of Armaments, A. Speer, considered and openly said: there is nothing better than the Soviet 76-mm gun in the world.

The T-34 tank was not only the best in the world, but also the most massive tank of World War II. What our designers had created even before the war, neither the Americans, nor the Japanese, nor the British were able to create or copy. So many hymns have been sung to this tank that there is no point in repeating them. I will add just one detail. During the grandiose tank battle on the Kursk Bulge, the best German SS Panzer Division "Reich" was armed with T-34 tanks, which the Red Army abandoned in 1941 during the border battles. Not "Panthers" and "Tigers" were the main shock

force of the Wehrmacht near Kursk, and ours is unsurpassed new tanks.

On June 22, 1941, Germany dealt a heavy blow to the Soviet Union. The Red Army suffered defeats, but in those days a miracle happened. The Soviet Union almost instantly rebuilt on a military footing. Factories, still yesterday releasing

sewing civilian products, switched to military production and produced it in huge quantities with the highest quality. Here is just one example: already on June 23, 1941, a garment factory in Kalinin began producing raincoats for the army. Imagine: June 22 - Sunday, the war began suddenly, during

no one expected a real attack, but right the next day, on Monday, the garment factory begins to produce what is called military products. It's a miracle! In order to start the production of even such a simple thing as a raincoat, it is necessary to bring the appropriate green material to the factory in advance. That was done. A lot of material is required. Let's estimate how much is needed at least for the production of a hundred tents. One tent, taking into account the bends, has a size of 2 x 2 m, i.e. 4 sq. m. For a hundred tents - 400 sq. m. But they needed not a hundred, but thousands! And the material was found. In addition, green threads are needed. A lot of. Found some threads! We need thin strong ropes, we found ropes. Raincoats have no buttons. Instead, they are short, strong wooden sticks with a groove in the middle. The thing is simple, but they need a lot and urgently. Found! These sticks must be painted in a protective color. Paint is needed. There is paint! Finally, you just need to know what a raincoat looks like, how to make it. It is not clear what is happening in the country, the enemy is bombing cities and airfields, the government has a vague idea of the situation, the General Staff does not understand anything. Where and how, under such conditions, to get those requirements that the cloak-chambers

who should answer? All this was found, the workers were explained what was required of them, and immediately went top quality induction.

And all over the country, factories that yesterday produced pots began to produce automatic machines today. The shipbuilding plant in Gorky began to produce tanks. The Chelyabinsk and Stalingrad tractor plants also became tank plants, as did the car building plant in Nizhny Tagil. In the moment! But armored hulls are not raincoats. The tank is the most complex product. Yes, there is a tank! A furniture factory in Moscow began producing LaGG-3 fighters. Then this aircraft, gradually improving, turned into La-5. They flew on them

our best aces.

Soviet factories in a matter of days rebuilt production to the surprise of the world. Who's to say it's not a miracle?

True, he had one oddity. Here's what. Behind a war was being waged, industry all over the world switched mainly to the production of peaceful products. Factories that yesterday produced fighters and submarines, began to produce civil aircraft and passenger ships. Germany was defeated and completely plundered, but gradually, little by little, her economy

began to recover and produce the world-famous Volkswagen Beetles, and then went to the export of Opel, BMW and Mercedes, sewing machines

and TVs, and so on and so forth.

And in the Soviet Union, industry does not wanted to rebuild in a peaceful way. Even if it was rebuilt, the quality of civilian products did not meet either world or European standards. Release the best tank in the world? No problem! What about a passenger car? There are problems. There are currently 88 types of passenger cars on the British market. In last place in all respects - growing

sian "Lada". If there were 150 models on the market, it would be in 150th place. "Lada" is the subject of ridicule and evil anecdotes. But in the USSR they failed to create it. Plant - imported, entirely bought in Ita

lines with all technological lines, with everything

equipment and drawings of the car, which was designed by the Italians. It should have been someone else's release and improve the model, trying to stay at least in the penultimate place. Does not exceed.

But what about Volga, Moskvich, Zaporozhets? There are more problems with them. These machines do not comply with European standards, and their sale in developed countries is prohibited. An amazing thing: almost half of the armed people in the world carry Kalashnikov assault rifles on their shoulders. But can the same factories produce a pot that someone in the developed countries will buy? No, they can't. Sometimes they say that they are still bought. But this is not entirely true - they do not buy, but take it for free, as a gift. For money, no one needs such a product. We bought Soviet hammers and axes. It's for meltdown. The steel is good, it is cheap, if you melt it down, you can make a good thing. The Japanese bought Soviet televisions. They cost a penny on the foreign market: the Japanese threw the stuffing out of the TV, and made beautiful things out of polished boards.

shelves.

So it turns out that miracles in the USSR were somehow one-sided. From a peaceful rhythm to a military one, they switched instantly, but the reverse process dragged on for decades, and there is no end in sight. A lot was said about the conversion, but they could not realize this idea. In the Soviet Union, the economic miracle turned out to be irreversible: it switched quickly in one direction, but in the other - continuous problems! And there is no need to recall the achievements of Soviet cosmonautics here - the launches of peaceful satellites and the flights of cosmonauts - this is a side effect.

the result of military developments of strategic missile
th weapon.

Therefore, is it not time to admit that there is no miracle in
1941 simply did not exist. All Soviet industry
laziness was created as a military industry in
counting on the mass production of weapons in incredible quantities. This was the
main goal.

But you can see that peaceful products were still produced. Yes, they released.
But firstly, it was contemptuously called "consumer goods" ("consumer products").
Secondly, the facilities for its production were usually located as auxiliary workshops
at the same military factories. And dual-use products (both military and civilian)
were immediately made so that, if necessary, they would fall into the ar

mission with minimal modifications.

Everything was prepared for the sake of quickly satisfying the combat needs
of the army and with the aim of starting mass military production at any moment.
Orders and patterns for overcoats and gym tunics were placed at garment
factories. Materials, threads, wooden sticks instead of buttons, etc. were brought
to their warehouses. On sudo

construction, locomotive, tractor, car building plants kept in stock equipment for
cutting and welding armor plates of unprecedented thickness and everything else
necessary for the production of tanks. But the civilian "consumer goods" in the
USSR has always been considered a second-class product. Moreover, in order to
reduce worries about its production, many peaceful goods were simply purchased
abroad.

In the 1930s, I wrote the book Den-M about the preparation of our industry
for war. The topic turned out to be inexhaustible. I managed quite a bit

just a few examples to show perfectly
an incredible amount of work carried out on the eve of the war in the Soviet Union.
This topic needs further

topics of study. I have to work on it for the rest of my life. I hope that other researchers will support me. But the deeper one plunges into the events of the prewar period, the more obvious the thought becomes that even after 1945 Stalin's policy remained the same. Even after the war, he continued to do what he had done before. After World War II, he continued to prepare for World War III.

Proof of this is the incredible power of the Soviet Army against the backdrop of queues for sausages made of who knows what. This is confirmed by rockets, satellites, astronauts against the backdrop of guys and girls who beg for money near the Intourist hotels.

bring down the foreigners' torn trousers.

Against the backdrop of grandiose achievements in the military industry in the Soviet Union, basic, vital skills were gradually lost. The country has forgotten how to grow bread. From a country selling it, the USSR turned into a buying country, having lost the ability to feed itself. The Soviet Union was the first in the world to create intercontinental ballistic missiles and the first to launch an artificial earth satellite. "We will bury you!" Khrushchev shouted to the Americans... and asked them for bread. If the Americans are buried, then who will feed them? Bread was paid for with gold, oil and gas. The bread of the Americans is growing new, and the given gold will not return back.

Giant aircraft carriers were being built in the USSR, but it did not have the funds to provide a decent life for the disabled and pensioners. We traveled through space, and our villages died out. We gave to countless "friends" tanks, missiles, planes, without getting anything in return. We deployed eight tank armies in Europe, while there was not a single one in the whole world. We had eight airborne divisions, and there was only one in the entire NATO bloc. And all this against the backdrop of regrets

Another fact is that the Slavic population of the USSR ceased to reproduce itself: the death rate in PEACE TIME exceeded the birth rate. Comparing these simple and well-known facts, we inevitably come to the conclusion: for the Soviet leaders, the destruction of the capitalists was a more important task than the preservation of their own people.

Having completed the Second World War, Stalin immediately set about preparing a new war. This topic is huge and interesting, like a detective story. She always attracted me, but I knew that I couldn't pick her up. I just don't have enough time. I plunged once and for all into the year 1941, which ten lifetimes would not be enough to explore. And it was a pity: really no one will study Stalin's preparations for a new world war?

But one was found. He wrote a great book on the topic "M-2". In spirit and intent, this is like a continuation of my book, the development of the same idea, but on the other hand, it is a study of a problem that no one has dealt with before. We have a lot in common with him. He is a former officer, I am also a former. He studied in Moscow and served alongside her, I went through that too. He served in the "court" division, and there is a similar line in my biography. I am glad that such a study was made not by a professor of history, but by our brother officer. His book undoubtedly deserves the most serious attention of both specialists and the general reading public. It opens another page of our past that no one has read before. I wish the author success. I'm sure he will write many more good books,

his talent as a researcher and writer was clearly manifested already in his first work.

*Victor Suvorov, June 1, 1997,
Bristol, England.*

THE METHOD OF SCIENTIFIC FALSIFICATION

(instead of intro)

When the USSR collapsed, I was over 30. And for the last 10 of them, I somehow felt in my gut that the country was going somewhere in the wrong direction. And in 1991, she reached the "wrong way". And I had to sign the oath for the third time. And not solemnly in front of the formation of his comrades, but almost on his knees, colliding in the corridor with the head of the personnel department. Seeing me and as if remembering something, he simply said that "to sign". "Good," I replied, and scribbled my signature on some text. But questions remain. Yes, as it were, not a question, but a kind of "worm", sharpening some part of what is usually called the "soul". What it is - science does not know. But for some reason it refers to objective reality. And sometimes some part of her "worries", demanding answers.

It is good to take an oath once in a lifetime to one system of government. "You swear on the cause...?" - "I swear!!!" And so on for life. Solemnly before the formation of their comrades. And you know that you are not alone. You are part of a large team that also has common tasks. And for their decision there is a higher management. Which should control the viability of all of us, figure out development options on the bu

future and take appropriate action in advance.

And now the country that you swore to, suddenly fell apart!

Like this? It appears that top management was the wisest? Or, on the contrary, did his highest wisdom manifest itself in this? Maybe. But then how to relate to what happened before 1991? Mistake? Everywhere? Or only in certain "moments"? In what? And it turns out that he swore in vain? Once solemnly before the formation. The second time "for the company" (the first lists were lost). The third time "on the knee" in the corridor is generally a different system and a different country. After such "pirouettes" in your relations with the society where you live, in your free time (not busy fighting for "daily bread"), you begin to draw on philosophy about the role and importance of those very "most important" "moments" in which I would like not to be wrong.

But how to find them?

And how to calculate?

Immediately sit down and evaluate it - is that the future? To try to prepare a "straw" for a possible fall? Too complicated and almost unrealistic. For ordinary people, the ability of the soul to read the future by the "parallel world" is blocked. Some are allowed - one in a million ... eleven. And what kind of life is it when you know in advance what will happen? But trying to "calculate" the whole thing is available to everyone. Another question - where to get the "manual"? They don't give it at school. More precisely, they give, but in a very "scattered" form. Yes, and then in the form of ready-made explanations. And if their author made a mistake, then what?

Here, for example, is the story of the tragedy of June 1941 in THE USSR. As long as the Union existed, there were also explanations that, as it were, completely explained everything. But here before its collapse, there was one who questioned them. And he was able to publish these doubts in the form of books. The first one was called "Icebreaker". I didn't read it in its entirety. Only in the form of individual chapters in the local weekly. These individual chapters did not prompt me to think. But

at the beginning of 1994, I saw a sequel, Den-M, on sale. Bought and read. And after reading it, I began to slowly think about what was missing in those school "manuals". As it turns out, there wasn't much there. Tons of details! And when a lot of details just "fall out", then the final picture can turn out to be of a quite definite form. What "understands" its author.

But on the other hand, in general, and technically not it is possible to squeeze into even the school curriculum, even into the institute curriculum, the most detailed history of everything, everything that happened in the past. Do you remember well what happened to you on Friday 6 months ago? And five years ago? And 2764 years ago, what exactly happened? And 10,552 years ago BC? Did something very important for the planet happen? They say it happened. But that is another story. To reflect on the "mistakes" and the correctness of the "oath", I would like more details, but something closer in time. And then

20

I have been reading and hearing about one thing for years, and now it turns out that there is "another option".

Indeed, at first they drove industrialization and collectivization for the sake of one goal - to correctly and carefully prepare for the inevitable enemy attack. And so it began on 06/22/1941!

Suddenly!

Like no one even noticed the threatening

danger.

But Viktor Suvorov in his books directly and frankly recalled the existence of the methodology of an ordinary intelligence analyst. Pay attention to details. And put them together. That's when the picture may turn out to be more interesting. And conclusions can

arise different from those that official historians have adhered to for many years, not only in

USSR, but also in other countries, including until the last his time.

The method turns out to be quite accessible to every reader. There would be a desire. Do you have the desire and time? Then forward to searching for and "gluing together" those very "moments" that were thrown out of the school curriculum (of course, solely due to lack of study time!). And if you are too lazy to do this, then you can read the results of others in this field. And no problem!

But as it turned out, there were problems. And from official historians. For some reason, they really didn't like the "nonsense" of the amateur who had arisen! Sharply and categorically! And there were attempts to refute.

The continuation of Den-M and a kind of response to the criticism that arose was another work by V. Suvorov - "The Last Republic", where he made an interesting conclusion about the presence of two methods of research among official historians: along with "normal scientific" (close to methods of intelligence) there is also the method of "sculpting" (in fact - "scientific falsification"). Why this happens is a long story. More precisely, this

can also turn out to be a separate conversation about various general "doctrines", etc. In this case, the mere fact of the inclination of some authors to simplifications is sufficient. With a corresponding deviation of conclusions in a certain direction. If you still have to "close your eyes" to a lot of details, then what's the difference on what? There would be only certainty in that very "direction". After 1991, the direction seemed to have seriously changed. But there is one oddity in relation to the events of the 30s - early 40s

dov. For some reason they are trying to leave it the same. And they get offended if someone suddenly decides to touch on the details.

Moreover, even in Soviet times, I noticed, to put it mildly, "dislike" for "details" and the end of the 40s - the beginning

50s. At school, I even had the feeling that until the end of the 1950s something "wrong" was happening, the details of which were somehow not accepted even to recall. "Yes, this happened" (in one paragraph). And two more paragraphs. And like enough. It seemed strange to me. But for a long time I did not try to figure out what was happening there strange. Until in the spring of 1994 I read the book Den-M.

And when I read it, I suddenly had a PURPOSE - to clarify some of my knowledge about 1946-1953. But where to look? They explained to me that two blocks from our house, in the corner of a residential high-rise building, there is a small microdistrict library. Found and signed up

began to look for books on individual issues that worried me

questions about that time. Something was. But not all. And on the bookshelves were found books about things that I had not yet thought about. But again, the explanations were not complete. The answers found gave rise to new questions. And my search began to expand, information on the topic grew. The idea arose to generalize it on a computer. I didn't think about databases then, I tried to "glue" the found "moments" in text form. As a result, a book began to take shape. Its main conclusion loomed the same as in the works of V. Suvorov devoted to 1939-1941.

By the way, to return Stalin to pre-war plans there is a hint in the book The Last Republic. In her V. Suvorov glimpsed that the construction of the Palace of Soviets (DS) in Moscow was tried to continue after the war. However, this thesis was not developed further. But how can one continue to build a DS without any hope of reaching goals that would make DS meaningful? So, there were some hopes (and plans). Only by the middle of the 1950s did they decrease to such an extent that the construction of the Palace of Soviets was stopped.

But here another question may arise - and
does it make sense to touch on all these details?

Maybe they were deliberately thrown out of different textbooks
so that all this did not look somehow not quite like it? Should we
stir up the past? The problem is serious. But firstly, without
knowing the details, it will not be possible to assess the essence
of the "mistakes" that can lead to the "wrong way". And secondly,
this problem was pondered by a man for whom the "wrong"
1930s-1950s turned out to be part of his own biography. And he
laid out his thoughts in the poem "By the Right of Memory", since
he was the great Soviet poet Alexander Tvardovsky. And he
wrote these lines back in the 60s. But the disintegration of the
country was required for them to be known to the public. And
there are these words:

Forget, forget they say silently
They want to drown in oblivion
Living reality. And so that the waves
Closed over her. Byl - forget!

Forget relatives and friends of the face And
so many fates the way of the cross,
All that be a long-standing dream,
Bad, wild fiction,
So and her - go, forget it.

.....
They order to forget and ask for
affection Do not remember - memory under seal,
So as not to embarrass the
Uninitiated with that publicity.

This is about the essence of what happened. So, it was not
in vain that I felt that the "correct" history of the USSR began in
the early 1960s. But what happened before that? How "secret" is
it? And is it really impossible to get acquainted with all this?

Twardowski you

said the opinion that it is possible and necessary:

And who said that adults can't read Other
Pages? Or our valor will decrease And
honor will fade in the world?

.....
Then it's not at all surprising, That the
voice of a true memory Would tell us
trouble in the future: Whoever hides
the past jealously, He is unlikely to be
in harmony with the future ...

.....
Others simply affirmed
What if we were talking about a rainy day Not all
of these were at court,
Casting a shadow on us.

But all that was is not forgotten,
Not sewn-covered in the world.
One untruth is at a loss to us,
And only the truth to the court!

*(1966-1969, published
in the magazine "BANNER", 1987, No. 2)*

And so, after a long period of study, 1946—
1953, I can make an unambiguous conclusion that Soviet
historians turned to him with a wide use of the “modeling”
method, in which three main methods can be distinguished.

1. If it is impossible to keep silent about the event, and for
some reason it is forbidden to indicate the exact date or details, then
his description was given in comparison with others so that the
course of events was implied differently. This method can be
called "shuffling" (according to the card term "shuffle").

2. Some facts were generally kept silent, and
so many. But if they could have a different interpretation, then
this led to an effect known in radio electronics as “positive
feedback” (when the amplified signal amplifies itself). That

there is if the event is not specifically indicated anywhere, then historians were free to interpret it as they please, including incorrectly. And then use the wrong conclusion in further reasoning. The "sculpting" method strengthened itself!

A special case of omissions is the "throwing out" of some years from the biographies of famous people. For example, they write: until 1946 a person held one position, from 1948 another. And between? Hint

that history is irrelevant.

3. In some cases, obvious falsification was used. For example, in a little-known highly specialized publication, the date is indicated: "04/17/1954". And in a very mass it turns into "04/17/1951". Or in the ass

Many years later, a regular publication writes about a man that he was arrested, spent many years in prison, and according to his official biography, at that time he "occupied positions of responsibility."

But the "sculpting" method has a strong drawback: it does not different people can "sculpt" in the same way, subject to varying degrees of accuracy and respect for connections with other events, especially if they are also "blinded". The truth is said that a lie is on one leg. But why has it been possible to "sculpt" quite successfully for so many years? The fact is that history must be considered at the same time.

precisely in two directions: to explore small details on one topic in different periods of time (vertical slice) and many different events in one period (horizontal slice), and this is difficult. I also faced this problem. In the end, I ended up with the main chapters written in the "vertical slicing" way. A "horizontal cut" was planned for the chapter "The Post-War Period". But then the

The idea was not to start with a "horizontal slice" in the form of a small "digest" of the "vertical slices" considered below. including as evidence

evidence that the period after 1945 is well worth a detailed study.

But before turning to concrete facts those years, here, in the introduction, I propose to clarify the questions: were those years somehow distinguished by official historians? Were there special names applied to them? And how should they be called, taking into account the newly discovered circumstances?

And although new circumstances are still ahead of us, the proposed discussion will allow not only more correctly understand the situation, but it will also be an incentive, a "guiding star" in the conduct of the entire conversation.

As noted above, the focus of the book will be on the period 1946-1953. Let us briefly touch upon some events after March 5, 1953, as well as before 1946. As for their names, not everything is clearly defined in official historiography. The time after March 5, 1953 is usually called "post-Stalin". But it doesn't say much. On the contrary, it requires additional clarifications. The period up to 03/05/1953 does not have any single name at all. Sometimes the term "post-war period" is applied to it. But this can only be understood a few years after the war. I propose to emphasize the period between 1946 and 1953. To call them all "post-war" is not entirely correct. Moreover, in the USSR, it is believed that the restoration of the destroyed part of the economy was completed by 1950.

A more appropriate name might be widely the term "Cold War" is used. But with him there was some confusion about the meaning and timing of the beginning and end. After 1991, primarily in the West, the end of the Cold War is associated with the collapse of the socialist camp in the late 1980s. But the attempted military coup in August 1991 in Moscow summed up not 45 years. It's quite logical here.

take the year 1917 as the beginning (remembering and predicted by Nostradamus 73 years and 7 months).

As for the start of the Cold War, not everything is clear here. Most official historians, especially in Soviet times, attributed it to March 5, 1946, to the famous speech of the retired British politician W. Churchill in the American city of Fulton. However, the cooperation of future opponents of that war in March 1946 did not stop. Real "battles" began to occur later. Therefore, it is logical to shift its beginning to a later date. But

can be done if you leave its meaning in the same understanding, which meant a set of measures taken by Western countries against the USSR and its allies. And at the same time, the question of the responsibility of the Soviet Union itself in the matter of expanding the confrontation was practically not raised. For many years it was assured that the USSR had always pursued only a constructive, peaceful foreign policy, especially since 1946 after such a devastating war. Therefore, with the term "Cold War" they tried to associate only external

non-political situation, the intra-union is called was called differently, for example, "post-war period" or "post-war restoration of the national economy".

And to reinforce this explanation, Soviet historians stubbornly pushed back the start of the Cold War until March 5, 1946, or even earlier. And besides, it was linked with another term - *"psychological warfare*

bloc of countries led by the USA against the countries of socialism . But this connection has not received a unified interpretation either. Judging **by** the "BRIEF POLITICAL DICTIONARY" (M.: 1988, 5th edition), "psychological warfare" is one of the elements of the "Cold War", which arose in the late 40s and continued in subsequent decades. And the Cold War existed for less

neck time and was replaced by "thaws", "detentes" and

attempts to return to increased tension. But

specific dates were not specified.

However, there is another option for linking these terms, shown in the book by Chernyak E. B. "CHIMERS OF THE OLD WORLD. From the history of psychological warfare" (M.: "Young Guard", 1970). In it, the author distinguishes two stages of the "psychological war", referring to the first about a decade after 1945, which he calls *"the time of the" cold war "*. And the second stage, in his opinion, began *"from the second half of the 50s... Its initial milestones chronologically coincided with the outstanding economic and technical achievements of the USSR, which received a clear expression for the whole world in the deployment of the Soviet program.*

we are space exploration...".

As will be clear from the text that follows, there are shuffles and silences in this conclusion, but the idea is interesting: by "Cold War" we mean only about 10 years after 1945. Not wanting to specify in detail the reasons for dividing the "psychological war" into stages, E. B. Chernyak nevertheless singles out the first 10 post-war years in particular. But he writes the Cold War with a small letter (however, not only he does this - it was customary). As if the USSR had nothing to do with its development. Say, all these are the problems of the American bosses who were plotting something there. And the Soviet Union was only forced

take into account their intentions and allocate certain means to counteract.

But further we will see that the role of the USSR in that "war" was not a third-party response, as they tried to prove Soviet historians for many decades, but actively-interested. Therefore, under the "Cold War" I propose to name only the period 1946-1953, write this name with a capital letter, thereby emphasizing the presence of TWO active

opposing sides (as in any other war). And meanwhile not only outwardly

political, but also the internal situation in the participating countries. Moreover, as in any other war, "Cold" had its own "post-war period". Here it is

duration has no clear boundaries, since the rejection of its main causes stretched right up to 1991 and

has not yet completely ended, although the main "after

military" measures were carried out over several years, starting from March 1953.

But on the other hand, all 38 years that elapsed from March 5, 1953 to the August 1991 coup in Moscow cannot be classified as "post-war". It is difficult to say now how to name them briefly; this requires additional analysis. For example, from the point of view of specialists from Western countries, all these are varieties of the Cold War, and in their own way they are right. But the policy of the Soviet Union in 1946-1953 still had the principle

pial differences from the subsequent period, in which

Although the confrontation between the superpowers continued, it was no longer as irreconcilable as before March 5, 1953. With the passage of time, it more and more takes on the features of "normal" competition based on commodity-money relations. And it is quite obvious that such a "rebirth" had to come into conflict with the intra-union economic system, which could not last long. And quite

Naturally, it ended with the rejection of the plan

howling economy based on total state ownership. But that's a topic for another discussion.

As for the period 1946-1953, one of the words of its name should be the word "war". But why invent some new terms, if there is already a well-known one - "Cold War". Prev

I suppose only to clarify its meaning and shift the acceptance

its start date is almost a month earlier (the reason will be discussed in a special chapter).

However, this hypothesis suggests that

In this case, the title of the book could be more succinctly: A History of the Cold War. But under such a name it is logical to discuss the actions of both opposing sides, while I consider in detail the actions of only one side - the leadership of the Soviet Union, headed by Stalin. Due to the fact that historians have not paid enough attention to them. The actions of the other side (the US and its allies) are known in more detail. Therefore, in the title, I decided to reflect the main goal of only Comrade Stalin: the destabilization of the international situation with the prospect of a new (third) world war with the probability of finally winning. Moreover, in this case, a new mobilization would have to be announced in the USSR - a new "Day-M", therefore, for brevity, I sometimes use another name for this topic - "M-2").

The first chapter on its disclosure really asks for a brief overview of the various events of those years (a kind of "digest"), which will also be, as it were, an introduction to the detailed chapters. They, in turn, will end with a generalizing conclusion, in which the main hypothesis will appear in a new, more detailed form. And in conclusion of the "introduction" I propose a few organizational and technical remarks.

1. A good method for proving unusual ideas is to use primarily "open", i.e. enough available sources. And almost all of this book is based on them. I almost never felt the need to visit any "special" archives. There are a lot of "open" materials.

But in this regard, there may be a fair question: why other authors do not interpret

do them the way I do? Does everything that is already known allow for some other interpretation?

As it turns out, it does. For example, the Moscow journal *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 1, 1993, finally published secret protocols to the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 (previously categorically denied, called fakes), as well as documents on the fate of Polish prisoners of war, 21 857 people of whom were shot by the NKVD in early 1940. The author of the introductory article, M. I. Smiryaga, drew the following conclusion: *"The published documents once again remind us of the need*

bridges for a serious revision of the concept of history

Soviet society, the coverage of which was especially heavily falsified by official historiography.

And here is another opinion, already about post-war events. It is presented in the article by S. Volovets "The FORBIDDEN WAR" (in the journal "RODINA", 1990, No. 5). First, I draw attention to how its author called the war in Korea. By the number of victims, he refers it to the third, bloodiest war of the 20th century. After presenting a number of previously unknown facts, the author writes: "We

lifted the veil of secrecy and misinformation over our history, although even here there remains a lot of edge of work. But we know practically nothing about Stalin's plans for the post-war order and the "reorganization" of the world. Did he consider Sleyalty's Europe to be the "final solution" or

did he have plans to spread popular democracies further west? Judging by the fact that in April

In 1949, the North Atlantic Alliance was created rather hastily, our former allies in the world

war was acutely felt threatened... (and more:) It would be wrong to think that Stalin simply agreed with Kim Il Sung's initiative (for war). Degree of rendering

his support shows that he (Stalin) was pursuing his own and, apparently, significant interests. Which?..."

But a serious revision of the concept of Soviet art torii is a complex business, and, as the process of preparing this book has shown, it is indeed a work of "no end." In particular, information about the events in the USSR in 1946-1953 turned out to be "scattered" into "thousands of fragments." Good and correct conclusions can only be drawn on the basis of a complete picture, for which it must first be "glued together". And practically nobody did it. Over the years of searching, I managed to collect a "picture" in some first approximation. Its actual dimensions must be much larger. And who knows what other "wild stories" and

unrecognized stories are waiting in the wings.

2. Quotations I use, as a rule, I highlight in the text *in italics*, and I enclose the explanatory text in square brackets ([]). I quote the names of the sources in the course of the presentation, which is much more convenient than placing them in footnotes. In addition, I give data on sources in a shorter form than is customary in the preparation of scientific papers. But my book is not a dissertation. I cared more about readability.

3. In the first version of the manuscript, it is widely used There were illustrations, but the text "with pictures" in some cases turned out to be inconvenient for publication. Therefore, we had to abandon the illustrations that can be found on the Internet, for example, on the site [http:// www.i.com.ua/~zhistoiy/index6.htm](http://www.i.com.ua/~zhistoiy/index6.htm).

4. The first version of the manuscript was prepared in 1997 and in one Kiev publishing house it reached the original layout. But then it did not work out with the circulation. And in the time that has passed since then, new materials have been discovered, in connection with which

some additions and changes.

DIGEST OF THE THEME "M-2"

As noted in the introduction, secrecy

I was interested in the post-war period in my childhood, which I spent in the city of Volgograd. We were accepted as pioneers in the spring of 1968 opposite the house named after Sergeant Pavlov (which held its defense during the war for 58 days). The memory of that war was still very fresh then. Father said something. In particular, he sometimes recalled how he led the "flirting" IS-2 tank into the attack. Their battalion had almost all tanks - T-34s or American Shermans and only one heavy IS-2. And there were cases when all the tanks went around, and the IS-2 was sent directly to the enemy to "make noise". And the Germans tried to get into the back of the tower, where the shells were stored. Then she, weighing 11 tons, took off into the air. My father also said that the place under the barrel of the IS-2

tankers called the "shell catcher", and when tank commanders went to the plant to receive cars, then they asked to weld additional armor on this place. But the IS-3, in his opinion, has a bash design didn't turn out much better.

But besides the war, my father remembered something else important. something from his point of view, but which was practically not explained in any way by professional historians and what before, I also did not attach any importance: he is from rarely, either with pride or with sadness, he declared that he had served in military service for 6 years. "So what?" I thought.

didn't even know how to react. But when he himself served 2 years in the guards tank regiment of the Kantemirovskaya division as a platoon commander and company commander, he began to think: how is it - 6 years of urgent service? *"And what was the TIME?"* - I once asked my father. *"But none!"* - he answered and added: *"Many were indignant, declared that we needed to study, start a family, and in response the bosses said: 'Serve, that's all!... You don't understand!!!... The situation!! !...'"* It's strange, any soldier knows what is the term of his service in peacetime. Any terms beyond the term are drawn up by a separate agreement and BY PERSONAL CONSENT. No one has the right to serve over the term under the LAW!

In short, as he explained, it was like this: guys born in 1925 were drafted in 1942 (except for the "older" ages), 1926 - in 1943, 1927 (my father was born in April 1927) — in 1944. And they were all fired from the spring to the autumn of 1951. Moreover, from 1945 to

There were no mass conscriptions in 1949. If we take into account that 18-19-year-olds were supposed to be called up, it turns out that when the call was resumed, they should have call two or three draft ages at once.

Once, while looking through the issues of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, in issue 168 of July 25, 1996, on page 3, I found the editors' answer to the reader's question: "I wonder if they serve in the *Russian army today participants in the Great Patriotic War?* The answer began with the words: *"Unfortunately, time is inexorable, and today to the youngest participant in that war, given that the last military conscription was people Born in 1926 - at least 70 years old ... "*

"Excuse me," I cried to myself, "but what about my father?" Shuffling again? Or a typo? Maybe the editors calculated the year 1926 as follows: the war ended in 1945, according to the law they had to

to call 19-year-olds, where it comes from: $1945 - 19 = 1926$. But firstly, they were called into the war starting from the age of 17. Secondly, the last mass military conscription was in 1944. It turns out: $1944 - 17 = 1927$.

While working on the book, one day my wife and I went to the grave of her father, whom I had never seen (he died about six months before we first met). I stand in front of the monument and read the date of birth: "29.V.1927". Remembering that his childhood was somehow connected with Sevastopol, I asked my wife: "Where was he in 1945?" "Jungoi in the Navy," she replied (but it must be taken into account that she is not interested in military ranks, although she is a lieutenant of the medical service of the reserve). And doba vila: *And then he was there for a long time... Well, how is your father!... They're the same age!* Here is another one of my meetings from 1927. I had several of them. But we digress.

Over the years, the sense of secrecy of the post-war period has not weakened (in fact, as well as the pre-war one). And after reading the book Den-M in the spring of 1994, my hobby somehow arose by itself - to collect information about 1946-1953.

To my surprise, the material flowed, although it turned out to be scattered over a very large array of sources. Which gave rise to this books.

Turning to a specific conversation, I can admit that the media sometimes did turn to a common solution to the problems of that period. However, mostly to prove an already existing opinion. For example, in August-December 1989, the Pravda newspaper held an international discussion on the topic: "WHO STARTED THE COLD WAR?" The first material prepared by Soviet historians cited many AMERICAN documents declassified in the 70s. An American historian remarked to this that it would be nice to make an analysis

logical and from the Soviet side. Soviet historians, in their turn, gave a deadly logic: yes, they admitted that the post-war period was "poorly" studied and still needs to be studied. But the actions of the Soviet Union were still correct!

And why not first study the period "strongly", and then draw conclusions? Who interferes? I also found this idea ("weak" study) in the journal "Technology for Youth", 1993, No. 4 in the article by Vadim Orlov "HEROES? PIRATES? OR ... "KRUZHKOVTS"? He writes: *"From a song you can't throw out a word: in our history there is a period (after the war?) When the manufacture of "solid" (i.e. entirely copied) structures erected almost to the level of public policy. It was a deliberately launched campaign, but the occasion was not beaten on propaganda drums, but did everything quietly, under the sly.* And he gives several examples. He also tries to explain, but the explanation is limited only by the need for "short timeframes" (and why?) and remarks that *"looking for an answer, historians have not yet come to a consensus"* and that *"for historians of technology, the post-war period is all palisade of questions."*

It's strange - there are whole institutions of historians, witnesses are still alive. And lots of questions! But excuse me, where did the "iron" conclusions come from then? One of two things: either history and conclusions, or no history, but no conclusions either. What was the country really doing in those years?

Here, for example, is the military parade on November 7, 1950. Should the head of state (i.e. Stalin) be present? Must! But it wasn't! (According to the photographs of the leaders of the party and government standing on Lenin's mausoleum in Moscow, it is clear that V. Molotov was exactly in the center of this group.) The parade was commanded by the commander of the Moscow Military District, and the commander of the cavalry and (simultaneously)

Minister of Agriculture for Horse Breeding Marshal Budyonny. (I wonder how many of those cavalry were in the Soviet Army that year - one division or one regiment? And they had an honorary commander? Well, at least not the Commander-in-Chief!) Maybe the USSR was so disarmed by that time that there was no defense minister? There were even two (from February 25, 1950 - land and sea, only the word "defense" was not in the name of these ministries, they were called: "War Ministry" and "Naval". And there were two general staffs (by the way just like in 1938-1946!) And in the Far East there was even a branch of the land ministry - the Commander-in-Chief of the Troops of the Far East (Marshal Malinovsky).

If you open the Soviet Military Encyclopedia (hereinafter referred to as "SVE"), then it says that the Commander-in-Chief can be either in the theater of operations (during the war) (hereinafter the theater of operations is the "theater of military operations"), or according to the branches of the military (in peacetime). And it is written that in the Far East he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Troops in 1945 (Marshal Vasilevsky), but for some reason not a word about the variant of 1947-1953! In general, in "SVE" confusion or understatement periodically comes across. For example, in the section on Polikarpov It says that he participated in the competition for the creation of the Ivanov aircraft, but in the section on Sukhoi there is no remark about who won it.

In addition, the fleets were also divided. Baltic - to the 4th and 8th Navy (February 1946 - December 1955) and Pacific - to the 5th and 7th Navy (January 1947 - April 1953). The numbers remained unused: 1, 2, 3 and 6. Exactly for the division of the Northern and Black Sea fleets. Question: why? Answer: for some dark deeds. If it were for the bright, then they would not make secrets out of it. Well, not exactly secrets (in "SVE" it is said about this), but, at least, in the "ordinary" information, information about the division of the fleets is, as it were, "lost". On

For example, once I saw a book about the Baltic Fleet, I leafed through it. Much has been written about the war. But I was looking section on the post-war years. Found. Whole paragraph. It said that by 1955 the Baltic Fleet had completed mine clearing of certain parts of the sea. And that's it. But what about the service at the Finnish base Porkkala-Udd? Yes, clearance is a tricky business. Is it possible that none of the commanders of the 4th or 8th Navy distinguished themselves?

Another example of the explicit concealment of the division of fleets is the biography of Admiral Kuznetsov. It is clearly written in SVE that from February 1950 to July 1951 he was commander of the 5th Navy. How is this reflected in other publications? But no way! They write something like this: *"was sent to the Far East"* or *"commanded the Pacific Fleet."* So, is there something to hide?

And what can be hidden if the division of fleets has only makes sense when a country has many ships and many naval bases. Is it possible,

if the economy is strong and there are some interests.

In The Last Republic, it is said about one stern turret of one Japanese battleship, that it weighed 2.5 thousand tons without shells and people. How much metal is needed for many fleets? What was the state of the Soviet Union? That's right, he healed his wounds after a brutal war. The village generally "lay", crushed by brutal taxes and the death of peasants. And here - almost a dozen ocean fleets, not counting any fleets. For what?

And what is the point of dividing the Black Sea Fleet if exit through the straits controlled by Turkey? It's a serious problem. Stalin began to solve it at the beginning

1945, breaking the friendship treaty with Turkey and making a number of claims against it. The Turkish leaders turned to Churchill for help, who, at the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, did not help Stalin in this matter. But in 1946 Stalin tortured

To solve the problem with the straits is simple and ingenious. That year, peace talks were held in Paris with Germany's allies, including Italy. Soviet historians, as a rule, do not want to discuss in detail the problems that were solved in them. The following scheme is more often proposed: the USSR firmly defended the interests of peace, while the United States and its allies "gnashed their teeth" to achieve their imperialist goals. For the longest time, the USSR fought under an agreement with Italy. And I rarely remember why. In particular, because of Stalin's desire to divide the Italian colonies in Africa. Now, if he managed to get at least a small plot of Libya and place his naval base there, then Soviet troops on the Dardanelles could appear by virtue of international rules: to ensure transport supply routes. Under this pretext, the Soviet troops remained in Hungary and Poland (to provide transport routes for the Soviet troops in Austria and Germany). With Italy, this trick failed. And Türkiye in the following years fell into the category of "vile accomplices of imperialism." There were also territorial claims. Later, they also did not like to remember this and argued that "we do not need the Turkish coast, and we do not need Africa"! And they were outraged why the US military bases appeared in Turkey!

And why divide the Northern Fleet? In general, he has only one way - to the southwest between Norway and Svalbard. The rest of the Barents Sea is covered by floating ice. It is possible, however, to deviate to the right, towards Greenland and the northeast coast of North America. (Just a few years after the most brutal war on your territory?)

As for the ships, they apparently gathered from everywhere. In particular, the return of those received under Lend-Lease was delayed. Trucks like

would give. My father once told how he participated in the preparation of the Studebaker echelon for the transfer. At first, I didn't quite believe his story. But he repeated it several times. It was in Germany in 1946-1950. My father's job then involved cars. And then one day he receives an order to prepare an echelon of Studebakers for the return to the former allies. He asked: "Worse?" He was told that "the best"! So he selected the "better" cars, drove them onto cargo platforms, took them to the seaport and handed them over to the representative of the Americans. He looked

documents, checked with availability, signed where necessary and started a conversation with a Soviet officer. He asked where he was from, how he was doing there now. The Soviet officer replied that after the occupation life is not easy, they are engaged in restoration. The American sighed and asked: *"Are the documents in order?"* And then he himself answered: *"In order! Take the train, I give!"*

The Soviet officer was surprised: "How is it?" What will he do with the train of Studebakers? According to the documents, he is obliged to give! And he can't take it back.

The American sighed again, expressed some phrase like "you can't argue against circumstances" and ordered the trucks to be loaded onto the ship. Then they sailed away for some distance, threw out "stu

tear" in the sea, and that was the end of it.

But this is about trucks, firstly, the production of which was also established in the USSR by the ZIS, GAZ, UralZIS, YaAZ models. Secondly, those received under Lend-Lease were already exhausting their resource and could require overhaul, which usually costs under 60% of a new one. But regarding the return of the ships in the diplomatic documents of those years, there are persistent appeals from the United States with demands

speeding up this business.

But ships are ships, but the main striking force

are ground forces. What was the situation in them? On the one hand, after 1945 they were reduced, but for some reason only the "older" conscription ages, and none of the historians has ever touched on the fate of the "younger" ones (forbidden?). By the way, as my father told me, the guys born in 1925 had the worst of all. They served "urgent" service for 9 years, three of which were in the war (in which you still had to live). In general, how cruelly the Motherland treated them! Those of them who survived have already served the 3 years required by the LAW then! And during the war! And they were FORCED to serve two more such terms! As a reward?

There was also a withdrawal of troops from other countries. For example, from China (Manchuria), but for some reason all the weapons of the Kwantung Army remained with the Chinese Communists. There was also a withdrawal from Iran. But they deduced that Iran was divided for some time.

On the territory of the USSR itself, it is strange that in 1945 there were 33 military districts in the country (hereinafter referred to as VO), at the end of 1946 there were 21 of them. Sometimes this is cited as proof of the "peacefulness" of the USSR. But, firstly, before the war there were 17 of them (taking into account a separate front in the Far East). And secondly, by 1950 there were 24 of them (some districts of the so-called "second" formation arose again). And how is this to be assessed? How is the "aggressiveness" of the USSR? Moreover, 33, and 21, and 24 are more than both the pre-war 17 and 16 during the "stagnation" period. For clarity, below is a table of the dynamics of the number of military districts in the USSR from 1934 to 1963.

Number of VO in the USSR from 1934 to 1963

Year	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941			
Quantity IN	9		9	12	13	13	13	15	14	15	

Year	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949			
Quantity VO 8		8		13		14	33		21	21	21

Year	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957			
Quantity VO 24		24	24			24		21	20	20	19

Year	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963		
Quantity VO 18		17		17		16	15	15

And if we touch on their history, then the great dynamics in the period 1945-1953 are very striking. For example, the situation in the north-west of the USSR:

- March 1940 - the Arkhangelsk Military District was created with management in the city of Arkhangelsk;

- 12/15/1944 - it was renamed Belomorsky with the relocation of management to the city of Kem;

- February 1946 - the Arkhangelsk Military District was re-created by separating a part from the White Sea Military District;

- March 1946 - Directorate of the White Sea Military District moves to Petrozavodsk;

- July 1951 - Belomorsk Military District was renamed to the Northern VO, and the Arkhangelsk VO to the Belomorsky VO.

Subsequently, these districts were disbanded, and their territories were transferred to the Ural and Leningrad MDs. Since 1949, they were commanded by Marshal Meretskov (former commander of the Karelian Front) and his former deputy, General Frolov. Their neighbors from the southeast were: former front commander Marshal Zhukov (Ural Military District) and former front commander General Eremenko (West Siberian Military District).

Greater dynamics was also observed with other environments.

gami.

By the way, I personally would not categorically call

the direction of Marshal Zhukov to the Ural Military District, if not noteworthy reference.

Question: with natural and climatic conditions
Which countries have similar natural and climatic conditions of the above districts? Answer: for example, with Canada and adjacent island territories. Question: where are they located? Answer: on the contrary, through the North Pole.

I feel, I feel how the right hand (for some, the left) of the reader of these lines is trying to rise to the temple area in order to twist his finger there. And I hear the question: *"What are you hinting at? To the 1st Arctic Front, or what?"*

I answer: firstly, it is possible that on him. Second, let's look at the facts.

Fact 1. From the book, ed. Novozhilova ("FROM THE HISTORY OF SOVIET AVIATION: Aircraft of the S.V. Ilyushin Design Bureau". M., "Mashinostroenie", 1990, p. 307): *".. 12D (airborne transport) with towed cargo gliders designed by Tsybin Ts-25, having risen from one of*

airfields near Moscow, made a unique flight to the North Pole, landing on the ice of the first Arctic landing on gliders, and then successfully completed a long return

non-stop flight to Krasnoyarsk.

It's strange - where did the "non-stop" come from, if the Il-12D had a flight range of 1200 km! Do not believe your eyes? Or did they land at secret airfields? For

references: to land on the polar ice on gliders -

deadly risk. The plane can still take off if the ice is thin. In particular, experienced polar explorers landed on the ice floe "with a check": before "deep
saw "engines, looked at the moisture content of the ski track, if the track turned out to be with water, then the landing was stopped and, adding gas, took off. But the glider cannot take off.

Therefore, the risk of landing on a glider in the Arctic is much higher than on an airplane, but such a "technology" was worked out after the war. For what? Did you prepare something?

By the way, in the anniversary illustrated album "SOVIET AVIATION TECHNIQUE" (M., "Mashino stroenie", 1970), two low-quality photographs of the Il-12D (No. 157) and the landing glider (No. 158) are given on page 67. The explanatory text is as follows:

"The whole world knows the aircraft created in the Design Bureau S. V. Ilyushin. One of them Il-12D (157) is specially equipped for the transportation of cargo and paratroopers. For landing operations, a large cargo glider (158) is designed, lifting over 7 tons.

(According to other sources - IL-32.)

Note: it is recognized all over the world that landing troops (especially landing gliders!) are needed only during an offensive. So what did the Soviet leadership think about after the war, ordering such equipment? Arctic landing gliders could only be used within the "Arctic Front" with any numbering. Other transport was used for peaceful purposes: ships, icebreakers, planes, dog teams, skis, finally. But not gliders.

Fact 2. (From the same book.) IL-12D was built in series in 1948-1949. For a number of years it was the main airborne transport aircraft in the country's Air Force. IL-12 was twin-engine. But at the same time, the Ilya Shin Design Bureau was also developing the four-engine model Il 18. However, it did not go into production at that time, since the Tu-4 (the Soviet version of the Boeing-29) was launched into the series.

Fact 3. According to the data from article 3. Kanevsky "OWL SECRET ARCTIC" (magazine "KNOWLEDGE - POWER", 1993, No. 9), immediately after 1945, one after another in high shi companies carried out powerful complex air expeditions. Planes flew to the North Pole and

back, detachments of various researchers, including purely military ones, landed at various points in the Arctic Ocean. From April 1950 to April 1951, a top-secret drift of the SP-2 station took place. It was created and worked in an atmosphere of not just strict but insane secrecy. For this drift, the head of the station, Mikhail Mikhailovich Somov, received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, the rest received the Order of Lenin.

There are also memories of the former doctor of this station V. G. Volovich. They were published in the Ukrainian Rabochey Gazeta on September 29, 1998 under the heading Unknown Pages. Their headline: "SECRET ARCTIC" and under the heading: *"The Third World War was about to start from the North Pole"*. Volovich gives various details of the life of polar explorers at SP-2. The working conditions at the station were difficult: in the summer it was still tolerable with bright sun around the clock (and even then it was not very convenient during the daily "night time"), and in winter the constant darkness of the polar night, frost down to -49° (in tents no higher than $+10^{\circ}$), an oppressive atmosphere of secrecy, communication - only by short encrypted radiograms. Neither relatives nor friends knew where the participants were. The only entertainment is feasts on holidays. (When Volovich returned, and even with the Order of Lenin, his friends thought that he had worked somewhere abroad). And also saved laughter.

V. G. Volovich: *"Laughter in the North is the most effective a drug that allows you to relieve nervous tension caused by a sense of constant danger and risk. Of course, during our feasts it is usually not did without raffles. Once, during the expedition "North", the authorities announced a general meeting on May Day water. A table was laid in a large tent. All gathered joyful, excited. Only my neighbor, a geophysicist, was indifferently picking with a fork*

salad, only sometimes wryly smiling too salty joke. Iya decided to stir it up.

- Listen to the news. Reported by TASS ... - you took the moment when it became quieter, I said. - The Americans made a statement about the alleged testing of an atomic bomb in the region of the North Pole.

But, since a Soviet expedition is working there, the test will probably be rescheduled. And in response, supposedly, TASS declared that there was no Soviet expedition in the region of the Pole.

There was silence. Meanwhile my neighbor is quiet got up from the table. Thirty minutes later, when having laughed, we went out into the fresh air, saw how he neatly packs his utensils. More he's in Arctic expeditions did not go. Remembering how the whole Arctic laughed at the famous story with mammoths allegedly excavated from permafrost and on foot across the tundra sent to Arkhangelsk. There were people who believed in this untruth!"

The secret station SP-2 drifted in a circle northeast of the city of Pevek in Chukotka, in operational proximity to Alaska and about halfway to the North Pole. In the geological museum of this city, I was somehow lucky to see a fragment of a mammoth tusk. At first I thought that it was a petrified tree, more precisely, a sawn off piece of a white trunk, in which, moreover, a piece of bark, as it were, slightly lagged behind the trunk. I asked what kind of tree? I was told that it was not a tree, but a mammoth tusk. Whole for him

they couldn't drag it - it didn't fit, so I had to cut off a piece...

Airfields were built on the permafrost, which the enemy should not know about, strategic roads were laid in it. At the Faculty of Geography of Moscow State University there was a specialization - "Geography of the northern polar

countries". From the second year and closer to the end, the word "special course" appeared more and more often in the class schedule.

Fact 4. On the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard in Soviet coal miners worked in the Barents Sea. In 1946, special money was even minted for them. And perhaps they all had mobilization orders.

Fact 5. Nowhere can I find information about what Rear Admiral Papanin did from 1946 to 1948. The biographies stubbornly point out: until 1946 it was that, from 1948 it was that, and in between?

Fact 6. I will not dwell much on the history of aerosleigh technology. I quote from the article "THROUGH THE FIRE AND THE BURZZLE" (Journal "MODELIST-KONST RUKTOR", 1988, No. 2, pp. 6-8): *"Hundreds of combat and transport operations were carried out during the war battalions ... The design of new models. In the winter of 1943/44, large landing snowmobiles ASD-400 were successfully tested. After During the Great Patriotic War, combat snowmobiles continued to carry out military service - mainly in the border troops.*

The remark "mostly" is interesting. There were also some airborne units?

Fact 7. An article in the MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL LE" (hereinafter its name will be abbreviated as "VIZH"), 1992, No. 10 "ARMADA WHICH DID NOT FLOW". Its author is N. N. Ostroumov, candidate of historical sciences, retired lieutenant general.

"In the spring of 1952, Stalin, unexpectedly for the highest military aviation leadership decided on the urgent formation of one hundred divisions of jet frontal aviation bombers ... Geography search for bases for air divisions expanded from every day. Increasingly, operational groups of specialists flew to areas of future deployment, in

including the northern coast, Chukotka, Kamchatka. The goal is to study the possibilities of accommodation aviation, the preparation of ice and stationary airfields, the creation of reliable bases ... " (You can see - in addition to those already existing. My father told me that when he arrived in Khabarovsk in January 1951, then teams were recruited for the construction of airfields to Kamchatka and Chukotka.)

Reference: front-line jet bomber Il-28 began to enter the troops in March 1950. Two engines. Speed - 915 km / h. Range - 2400 km. Normal bomb load at maximum range - 1 ton. On page 66 of the aforementioned album there is a photograph of this aircraft with the text:

"The building built in 40s front-line bomber Il-28 and its modification of the Il-28R, equipped with equipment for photography and a large supply of lighting bombs. [By the way, it is very useful during the winter offensive in the arctic and subarctic latitudes].

The question is logical: whom were they going to bomb with front-line bombers from floating ice? Polar bears? And what about the name of the front on floating ice - *"...-th Arctic"*? *"Greenlandic"*? *"Alya skinny"*?

When I reached these thoughts, I decided to clarify the data on Svalbard and look through the cards of the Geography section in the card index of one of the central Kyiv libraries. Surprisingly, among them were the following:

Ilyinsky Y. "Finland"	M .: Military Publishing House, 1947 (To help the teacher of the divisional school of party activists).
Volkov A "Countries of Central America and the West Indies"	M .: Military Publishing House, 1947 (To help the teacher of the divisional school of party activists).

Alexandrov B. "Oceania" M. : Military Publishing House, 1947.	
Stavnitser M. "Russian on Svalbard"	M. : 1948. (When I tried to clarify the cipher, I was informed that the book had been written off. Maybe because of dilapidation?)
Dantzig B. "Türkiye"	Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1949.
Matkovsky N. "Great Britain" Agranat	Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1950.
G. "Greenland" M. : 1951 (At the map of the world).	
Ziman L. "Hawaiian Islands"	Moscow: 1952 (At the map of the world).
Kovalevsky V. "Alaska" M.: 1952 (At the map of the world).	
Markov S. "Russians in Alaska"	M. : Military Publishing House, 1946 (Navy officer's library).

When I found a card for the book "Russians in Alaska" in the military library, I could not believe my eyes and decided to find the book itself and make a copy of its title page. It succeeded. Its appearance is as follows:

NAVY OFFICER LIBRARY

S.MARKOV

RUSSIAN ON ALASKA

(drawing of the seashore)

MILITARY PUBLISHING HOUSE
MINISTRIES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNION OF THE SSR
MOSCOW - 1946

As I understand it, if it had been released by some kind of children's publishing house, then it would be possible not to pay special attention to it. The book is historically written and quite interesting. But why did the military department become interested in this one of mine? Yes, even in

1946? When I later raised this issue on Internet forums, they answered me that this military department took care of the cultural and educational nominal level of military personnel.

This is how the history of geography turned out. It is interesting to note that after 1953 some of the books listed above underwent metamorphoses. For example, the book "Russians on Spitsbergen" was renamed "On Spitsbergen". S. Markov became interested in reprinting his novel The Yukon Raven in peaceful publishing houses (from the name of one of the rivers in Alaska - Yukon). And from the book about Central America (Mexico, etc.) they removed information about "fascist

organizations."

And more about the North. When I started looking for an opportunity to get illustrations for my work, I accidentally stumbled upon a book by honored pilots A. Lebedev and I. Mazuruk OVER THE ARCTIC AND ANTARCTIC (M., Thought, 1991). Not only does it contain some interesting photographs, but there is also a lot of interesting stuff in the text. In particular, a lot of space is devoted to studies of the remains of the ice airfield and camp of the SP-2 station found in 1954, which drifted in the eastern sector of the Arctic (about 1000 km from Alaska). The flag-navigator of polar aviation V. I. Akkuratov confirms the information about its

retnosti.

By the way, the name of the honored navigator of the USSR V. I. Akkuratova is found in various publications. For example, in the book by B. Shurinov about unidentified flying objects "PARADOX OF THE XX CENTURY" published in 1990 in Moscow by the International Relations publishing house. It is quite voluminous (320 pages) and is sometimes referred to in various articles on UFOs. But in general, it suffers from understatement, which is generally characteristic of the subject under consideration. A lot of

place in it is given to polemics with those who actively do not accept "ufo-logy", the facts of the denial of "flying saucers". At the same time, the author uncompromisingly believes in their objective reality. Moreover, his faith is based primarily on published or voiced observations. For example, on page 264 of the book is a brief account of a press conference held in 1968 in Moscow.

"On February 5, 1968, a meeting of Moscow documentarians was held at the Central House of Journalists, organized by the Moscow Department of Scientific journalism. The meeting discussed many interesting cases of UFO sightings over the Soviet Union. ... Honored Navigator of the USSR V. I. Akkuratov spoke about his encounters with unidentified flying objects. Several examples of UFO sightings were given by the twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Art. researcher of VVA them. Zhukovsky colonel G. F. Sivakov..." V. I. Akkuratov, in particular, told how in 1952 he observed UFOs when he was flying on a Catalina plane on ice reconnaissance. *"UFO Shape - a ball, like the moon, of a silver-pearl color. One half pulsed. Fighters were called to intercept UFOs, but he, having an advantage in speed, quickly went up from them. This UFO appeared in our sight for three days. And every once when approaching it, the UFO disappeared.* V. I. Akkuratov also met with UFOs in the Greenland region.

Apparently, he had to fly a lot over the Arctic from Chukotka to Greenland. Having spent many years in the Arctic, I can confirm that the work there is quite interesting. But I would like to find clarifications, what did Valentin Ivanovich do in the Arctic exactly before 1953? What was this "ice reconnaissance"? I didn't really hope to find an answer to this question, when suddenly one day they sent me the address of a site in

Internet with the memoirs of a soldier who was a driver in 1950 about how he participated in the "northern expedition", which included the navigator Akkuratov. They were engaged in searching for even ice floes and clearing runways (runways) on them for wheeled combat aircraft (fighters and bombers).

And for what tasks did polar explorers prepare at SP-2? There are no exact instructions. But there is an explanation for the landing of the SP-1 station in 1937. The aforementioned aviation history album on page 32 says:

"The work of the design bureaus required continuous checks in the air. Hence the abundance of kind of record flights. In the thirties they were carried out on machines of almost all classes. These records played a big role... A special place among they are occupied by distance records set on TsAGI ANT-25 aircraft crewed by M. M. Gromov and V. P. Chkalov. The flights of these crews took place in extremely difficult conditions. To organize them, a gigantic preparatory work had to be done, which greatly contributed to the expansion aviation Arctic research.

To understand the secrets of the "weather kitchen", on the pole was landed. This operation, which preceded the flights of V.P. Chkalov and M.M. Gromov, carried out on May 21, 1937 by an expedition led by Academician O. Yu. Schmidt. Material part of the expedition consisted of ANT-6 and ANT-7 aircraft. Their pilots are M. Vodopyanov, V. Molokov, A. Alekseev, I. Mazuruk and others. Flag navigator - I. Spirin. The Glorious Four - I. Papanin, E. Fedorov, P. Shirshov and E. Krenkel - began their nine-month watch on the ice floe, which contributed a lot to trance arctic flights..."

I wonder what kind of aircraft flights were planned to be provided from the SP-2 station? To Alaska - an eye

about 1000 km - quite within the range of a front-line bomber (not counting the heavier ones).

In the book by A. Lebedev and I. Mazuruk there is a photograph of the aircraft on which I.P. Mazuruk flew in the Arctic before the war. The photo shows a four-engine aircraft on skis and the caption: *"High-latitude expedition 1941. Aircraft 'USSR N-169' on an ice floe."* The number "H-169" is onboard (similar to the registration number on a car). And the brand of the aircraft is ANT-6, aka TB-3 ("heavy bomber" ... on skis). The first flight was on December 22, 1930. Payload - up to 19 tons, speed - 288 km/h.

Note that the picture is dedicated to the 1941 expedition. What did she do? Studied the "kitchen of the weather"? What for? Incidentally, almost every page of Lebedev and Mazuruk's book says that the weather in the Arctic can change "before our eyes." Very impressive, eerie examples are given. I even came across the phrase "it changes like the weather in the Arctic." But excuse me, specific knowledge of the weather at some point in the North (which will completely change in an hour) is very necessary, first of all, for work in the same place - i.e. in the North itself, especially for air flights. And where were you going to fly? And on what?

Returning to the biography of General I.P. Mazuruk, it can be noted that it turned out to be very interesting. One of the regiments of the one of a kind division, which he commanded during the war, was stationed in Fairbanks (Central Alaska, USA). Can you imagine those? Soviet combat pilots take "secret" maps of Alaska, get into planes and quite calmly fly them to the USSR! Moreover, the knowledge and ability to fly over Alaska was a "regular" duty for them! Mazuruk himself made an air trip around the world in 1944, having received Katalina seaplanes in the USA (which later ended up in the Soviet North

re). And during flights in the Arctic, he made 254 landings on floating ice. It is noted that this pulls on a world record. And with all this, he did not earn a place in the military encyclopedia! Well, "forgotten", which does not happen! And who is interested?

By the way, the fate of the TB-3 in 1941 turned out to be very similar to the fate of the B-29 Superflying Fortresses from December 1950 in Korea. In both cases, the enemy fighters had twice the speed. Because of what, these aircraft are sharply outdated from a military point of view. The fate of the TB-3 was decided by the German "Mes Serschmitts", the fate of the American B-29s (which you launched in the USSR under the brand name Tu-4) - the famous Soviet MiG-15s. What did the Soviet MiG-15s do in Korea? ABOUT! This is a large separate conversation, which in this book is presented in two chapters - in the chapter on aircraft and in the chapter on the events in Korea in 1945-1953. The official version on these occasions is full of "for

shuffles" and "defaults".

For example, the beginning of the war itself in Korea, to put it mildly, is "shrouded in darkness." In the USSR, it was officially considered that the South Koreans started the war with an attack on North Korea on 06/25/1950. The rest of the world is sure that South Korea was the first to be attacked by the DPRK army. But words are words, and as for combat operations, certain information can be obtained only by studying the maps of combat operations. For the Korean War, such maps are in "SVE", vol. 4, on the insert to p. 320-321. And their detailed study

leads to unexpected conclusions.

Several periods can be distinguished in the Korean War. And it is quite natural that each of them should be displayed on separate maps. Otherwise, the meaning of representation changes dramatically. For example, the process of the German advance from Minsk to Moscow in 1941 is usually shown on one map, while the reverse

retreat - on the other. And I, for example, never had a chance to see a map on which such two processes would be displayed simultaneously, until I saw a map of the first two periods of the Korean War, which simultaneously shows the arrows of enemy movements in different (opposite) directions. On the one hand, it was funny to see this. But on the other hand, such facts are suggestive. It is hard to believe that the editors of the encyclopedia decided to save paper. The reason is rather

gom - in an attempt to hide something by the method of a typical "shuffling".

In particular, the text says that South Korea has prepared 8 infantry divisions (PD), and North Korea - 10 rifle divisions (SD). However, if you count on the map the number of pd, the number of sd and compare them with serial numbers, then again questions arise. Let's say why the numbers of the South Korean divisions really do not go beyond the number 8, but from the side of the "northerners" divisions with numbers greater than 10 went into battle, for example, "15th Rifle Division". So how many divisions did the "northerners" train? Experts may, apparently, object: *"So they were not fully staffed!"* Say, only 10 divisions managed to fully equip, among which was the 15th! What is incomprehensible here? Logically! But ... it reminds me of something painfully familiar ... For some reason, *"June 22, Sunday, exactly 4 am"* is known to many, but how do you ask about *"June 25, Sunday, exactly 4 am"*, so only shake hands. In the United States, on the day of the 50th anniversary of this event, President Clinton remembered it and laid wreaths at the memorial. There are many sites on the Internet in English on the Korean War - "Korean War Project", "Korean War Veterans National Museum and Library", "Korean War: Weapons, History, Combat Photos", "2nd Infantry Division: Korean War Veterans Alliance Inc. »

etc. - "projects", "museums" and "libraries", "photo galleries", sites on military units and formations. But in the USSR, there was no interest in that war at all. And this passed to his heirs in the CIS. Indeed, the "forbidden war".

And only after 1991 did some clarifying information begin to appear. For example, something on p. 2 of the AEROHOBBY magazine for 1994, I saw a drawing of the MiG-15bis fighter by Major N. I. Shkodin, 147th GIAP, July 1953 (GIAP - "Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment"). And 5 stars are painted on the board. And in 2001, it turned out that Nikolai Ivanovich lived in Kyiv, 20 minutes on foot and a ride on the tram

wow from us.

In February 2001, I was once sent to the market to buy crab shavings. I bought it, and on the way back I noticed an interesting picture: in front of the seller of small haberdashery stood a man in a used coat with a cart on wheels. From the outside, it seemed that he was proving something quite calmly to the seller who was sitting there. When I got closer, I heard the phrase: "... *And I was in Korea,*

and when they entered Czechoslovakia, I commanded a corps!" "ABOUT! I thought. "To command a corps, you first had to have a general's rank!" and decided to talk to him about Korea. But he refused, citing the fact that he was not there enough. And suddenly he offered to turn to Shkodin Nikolai Ivanovich. "*Here he was there longer and shot down 6 American planes!"*" I "pulled up" the computer phone book, found his phone number, and took the risk of making a call. Doz stinks! And we talked for quite some time. I asked him if he had been approached by "our" side about his memories of that war. He said no, but with the American one - repeatedly, specifying when he shot down this or that aircraft and where. And one

they called and asked:

Do you know Fischer?

— No, I don't know.

Do you remember Korea ?

- Of course I remember.

Was Fischer there?

- Well, there was an American pilot Fisher, he was chasing after me, wanted to shoot down, I was chasing him, I wanted to shoot down ...

- He came and wants to meet you ...

And arranged a two-hour meeting for them in the Kiev Do me movie, filmed...

I asked if there were any consequences for him later? He replied that no, it wasn't. I also asked if they understood that the Korean War was kind of weird. He replied that no, that they perceived that war as completely "normal", "real".

And forget all this?

And why?

They say that asking the right question is half the solution. As far as the Korean War is concerned, the question alone is indispensable. Some have already been discussed above, but this does not close the problem. In particular, in the description of the beginning of the war, it is said that the South Koreans trained for a whole year with the help of American instructors. And early in the morning of 06/25/1950 they invaded the DPRK and were able to go 1-2 km. The North Koreans (having learned the plan of attack a month in advance) stopped the "southerners" and put them to flight at an average speed of about 10 km per day. On June 29, Seoul was lost by the "southerners". Thin arrows are visible on the map

up from the front, which are wrapped back with dotted retreat arrows. And was it necessary to prepare like that? And not a single American instructor put a bullet in his forehead, signing for complete professional unsuitability? And nobody asked to resign? However, it should be noted that H. Truman did depose General MacArthur. But he did it

after many months of fierce fighting. Already after MacArthur recaptured the lost territories and brought his troops almost to the borders with China and the USSR, and then rolled back to the 38th parallel under the blows of Chinese divisions.

Moreover, according to the normal laws of a "normal" war, at the most critical moment for the North Koreans, General D. MacArthur had to strike at their rear, which then turned out to be Chinese Manchuria and the Soviet Far East. What stopped him? Understanding that this war is "abnormal"? Or Truman's disagreement? The facts show that MacArthur really wanted to consider the Korean War as quite "normal" and sought from President H. Trume to agree to the transfer of hostilities to China. However, Truman refused, realizing that in this case, a world war would inevitably arise with the participation of the USSR.

But all this happened thousands of kilometers from America, and in December 1950 Harry Truman for some reason tried to introduce a state of emergency in the United States itself! Who threatened them at this time? Little North Korea? Soviet historians

but they tried to ascribe paranoid properties to the American leaders of those years. They say that something constantly seemed to them, which REALLY allegedly did not exist! With the best education system in the world, the best organization of labor in the world, the management is completely paranoid?! Somehow it doesn't fit.

And what do they think about the beginning of that war in the West? Here, for example, is the opinion of the authors of the British Encyclopedia THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Volum 6, 15TH EDITION (1986), p. 962:

"On June 25, 1950, the North Koreans, on the prompt ing of the Soviet Union, unleashed a carefully planned attack across the 38th parallel... (June 25, 1950 North Koreans, encouraged by the Soviet Union, according to

according to a predetermined plan, went to attack across the 38th parallel...)"

So who attacked whom? Even if the North Koreans are against the South, there seems to be a logic if they wanted to unite the country. But why unite it, if in the summer of 1945 the USA gave ALL Korea (then occupied by Japan) to the zone of action of the Soviet troops?! By the way, this fact was carefully concealed. But the mystery turned out to be "cracked"... Where, then, is the logic at all? An overview of this problem in the book is given in a separate chapter.

The following examples of "stuffed" and "silent" facts are diesel locomotives, encrypted international communications for Stalin, the fate of the Tu-95 aircraft. Etc. Etc.

Moreover, in the USSR, the post-war a long history of technological development not only in the USSR itself, but also in other countries, especially in the USA which the Soviet Union was never able to organize. And I was also surprised to learn that after the war in the United States, a lot of achievements of military laboratories were declassified - with this I have long

could not agree, since for many years we have been taught that American leaders after the war only thought about how to organize a new world war. Who is preparing a war like that? And the British generally sold Stalin a license for the production of the latest jet engine, which was then installed on the MiG-15 and Il-28 - the basic aircraft for the upcoming new world war.

And the question is not only that such facts do not quite fit into the generally accepted description of the history of the past decades. Ignoring them is

allows you to see the real causes of what happened. And in conditions when many documents are still

Since they are classified as classified, it is very difficult to draw correct conclusions, especially from local events. For example, conscientiously considering only the military preparations for the Korean War, the well-known historian and general Dmitry Volkogonov in the past was unable to deeply analyze the true causes of its occurrence. And many other historians, trying to logically consider the events of the 1940s and 1950s, cannot reach the final explanations, being under the pressure of the ideological cliché about the USSR as the most peaceful country. It is very difficult to admit a completely opposite fact - that the Soviet Union, on the contrary, for many decades was a source of destabilization of world politics, moreover, being guided in the domestic economy by an artificial theory that led the country to an economic dead end.

But only by recognizing this very idea, practically all incomprehensible events become logically correct. And not only in the period of 40-50s. As the development of the theoretical substantiation of some phenomena (chapter on the theory and practice of provocations) showed, the day of June 22, 1941 became much clearer.

a day about which controversy has not ceased to this day. And the tragic time of the second half of that year and the subsequent 1942 may become clearer, the attitude

to which historians also suffer from inconsistency
vehemence and innuendo. And this does not allow us to fully appreciate that
superheroic feat, the unprobable price that the Soviet people had to pay for the
implementation of plans for their own

military leadership.

But the theme of 1941-1942 requires a separate
dialect, and this study focuses on the years after

1945, the other main party of world politics in which the United States found itself. But their leaders could not remain outside observers. They had to draw conclusions and somehow respond in a timely manner. What did they see? How did they react? For example, US President G. Truman in December 1950 tried to impose a state of emergency in the country. But it is not so easy to introduce it in a market economy. We need hard evidence. Here is a quote from V. Kobyshev's article "MEETING IN VIENNA" (New World magazine, 1979, No. 9, pp. 192-193):

"A peace that has come through suffering, paid dearly for peace, and it was as if it did not exist. We haven't tied yet all the wounds, millions continued to live in dugouts, the echo of the war was heard under every roof. And in January 1950, G. Truman gave the order ... to prepare a secret report on the US military potential and the situation in the world. Apocalypse-like report prepared. "It is quite clear that the Kremlin seeks to place under its rule the free world... He wants to impose his absolute power on the whole world," it said. (It's a pity that the quote from the report is very short. Would you like to read the rationale! Or did the "paranoid" make them up? And there is nothing to read there?)

Here is another quote (VIZH, 1996, No. 2, p. 74) :

sang change a few months after

how the State Department and the Pentagon submitted a secret report to President Truman in December 1949. It was also approved by the National Security Council. It provided for the activation of the US military policy, the replacement of the containment tactics of the "Soviet expansion" into an offensive military confrontation with the Soviet Union".

Note - "in a few months ... from December 1949". And the previous paragraph says

time after January 1950, i.e. the date turns out to be approximately March-April 1950. What happened by this time? The division of the military ministries of the USSR in February 1950 has already been mentioned. The fleets were divided earlier. New military districts emerged. The Soviet representative left the UN Security Council. And not only from there. Representatives of the Soviet Union

Poland and Czechoslovakia at the beginning of 1950

came from various international organizations. The top-secret polar station SP-2 was landed. In March 1950, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin agreed with Kim Il Sung's decision to start a war for the unification of the country. The USSR has atomic weapons. The troops received the first serial Il-28 front-line bombers. And much more...

And all this applies to "peace-loving initiatives"? Of course, you can explain anything and how you want to your population. But in the international arena, saying one thing and doing another is dangerous. Balancing on the brink of war is very risky. This was clearly shown in 1941. And as proof of just such an orientation of the post-war Soviet foreign policy, I can cite someone else's thought (G. Alimurzaev. "SHIELD OR SWORD? On the history of Soviet military doctrine", the journal "INTERNATIONAL LIFE", 1989, No. 4, pp. 112-122) :

*"During the second period of the Great Patriotic war, the apparatus is being finalized precisely strategic offensive. Your final it runs in during the course of hostilities for outside the USSR. **Since the end of the Second world war and for many years to come the best as a means of ensuring our own security, we begin to consider the creation of an environment maximum military threat to the territories and population of those countries that we enroll in***

category of their opponents. (Highlighted in the text by the author of the article.)

Strange conclusion. And what, really weren't preparing to fight? Just wanted to "joke"? And who is "we"? Those who huddled in dugouts?

Let us listen to one of the leaders of the USSR of that period: *"It is not for us, but for the imperialists and aggressors be afraid of war... Can there be any doubt that if the imperialists unleash a third world war, then this war will be the grave no longer for individual capitalist states, and for of all world capitalism"* (Malenkov G.M., 32nd ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, M., 1949, pp. 21-22). So, so ... so we do not need to be afraid of war; It means that war is very useful for us. And this is what one of the leaders of the most peaceful country says?

And now I propose to compare excerpts from two biographies.

Colonel General (1948) Malandin G. K:

1943-1945 - Chief of Staff of the 13th Army.

1946-1948 - head of the head. headquarters - deputy commander-in-chief ground forces.

1948-1952 - deputy. Chief of the General Staff.

1952-1953 - Chief of Staff of the Carpathian Military District - 1st Deputy. district commander.

1953-1955 - deputy. Chief of the General Staff.

1955-1956 - Head of Ch. headquarters - deputy commander-in-chief ground forces.

since 1956 - head of the department of the Military Academy General Staff.

Army General (1962) Epishev A. A. :

1943-1946 - Member of the Military Council of the 38th Army.

1946-1950 - Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of

Ukraine for Personnel.

1950-1951 - 1st secretary of the Odessa Regional Committee parties.

1951 - 1953 - Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR.

1953-1955 - 1st secretary of the Odessa Regional Committee parties.

"... 1953 entered the history of international relations of the post-war period as a year of easing international tension..." (Khaitzman V. "USSR AND THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT. 1945-1959. History of International Negotiations". M., "Nauka", 1970, p. 161).

And what happened? The US has always been and still is. On the contrary, the arms race was spinning even steeper. Has something changed in the USSR?

On March 5, 1953, one person died - I. V. STALIN. As it was written then, "humanity has suffered a heavy loss." Judging by the data that is being revealed, it is still a question of what loss humanity would have suffered if this one person had lived for a few more years. There were people who artistically presented such a situation - the Strugatsky brothers. In their fantastic story "THE INHAUSTED ISLAND" they, in particular, clearly showed how, since 1949, Soviet generals planned to break through the enemy's defenses in an atomic war and at what cost.

But could the death of ONE person really change the situation? Couldn't those who replaced him continue? Actually, they could. But due to a number of reasons and circumstances, the policy of the USSR in 1953 underwent strong changes. In addition, it seems that on March 5, 1953, some very important link fell out, which could not be quickly replaced. Reflections on this

the account is given in the book a separate chapter.

And so the "post-war period" came (from 14.03. 1953). The new leaders of the USSR could no longer continue the same program at the same pace. time for her

was missed. The arms race has unfolded. I had to "turn the shafts." And, apparently, the command went to historians: "shuffle", "keep silent" and "falsify". But what can such a "blinded" history teach?

Moreover, the result was a very "uninteresting" period. As if nothing special happened. It was not interesting to remember that the war in Korea alone, according to some estimates, claimed more than 10 million people. Plus the civil war in China. Plus losses from terror in the USSR. Plus, the emergence of terror in Eastern European countries. Plus an arms race. And write it all off? As a last resort, blame only one side?

It should be noted that some truth nevertheless made its way into official history. For example, in the image of the last temporary textbook in the Soviet Union for the 11th grade, "HISTORY OF THE USSR" (ed. by V.P. Ostrovsky. M.: "Prosveshchenie", 1990). It was planned to be revised *"taking into account the feedback received, as well as*

*new publications of scientific and social policy
chesky character.*

However, the authors of this textbook, deep in the post-years were not included. For example, events in Korea 1945-1953 they devoted only one paragraph. So absolutely nothing is said about the life of the army and the navy (except for the creation of the atomic bomb). Accordingly, no deep conclusions about that time have been made. And it is generally hinted that the Soviet Union is

where it did not develop quite correctly, contradictory, to 1953, many problems have accumulated, which from him but gradually began to be resolved.

What if we go into details? Was it all so incomprehensible and inconsistent? It is best to study small details in "vertical slices". The first of them in this work is devoted to aviation.

WINGS OF THE MOTHERLAND

Let's start the aviation "vertical cut" with the memoirs of retired lieutenant general, candidate of historical sciences N. N. Ostroumov, already mentioned in the DIGEST (VIZH, 1992, No. 10).

Its preface states that in the spring of 1952 I. V. Stalin, unexpectedly for the highest military aviation The leadership leadership decided to urgently form one hundred divisions of front-line aviation jet bombers. General Ostroumov writes that Stalin passed this order to the Air Force Commander-in-Chief, Air Marshal P.F. Zhigarev, who brought him to the heads of the leading departments and their deputies at an urgent meeting. But Marshal Zhigarev questioned the need for precisely one hundred divisions. He

said:

"Where this figure came from, no one knows. In the General Staff they only make a helpless gesture. They cannot explain on the basis of what calculations, considerations you need to form such an armada. Yes, and with us no one consulted, no one was interested in whether Air Force to solve the task ... "

"- Understand why a hundred divisions? — he ordered. Why do we need so many? Today it is so each air army has up to three formations bombers. In general, count for all parameters. Including in case of war, taking into account

*volume of bomber aviation operations at all
aviation directions.*

Here you can express the idea that Stalin loved "round" figures. For example, in 1943, when it was decided to launch work on the Soviet "uranium project", its leadership was

one hundred Moscow residence permits were divided for attracted specialists. (Yorysh A.I., "WHAT THE BELL RINGS ABOUT". M.: Politizdat, 1991) You can also remember that until the end of the 30s in the Red Army for a long time the largest number of an infantry division was 100. But, excuse me, 100 NEW divisions is a serious problem for the national economy. And "just like that" to start it is actually too expensive.

But an order is an order. And having received the task of the marshal, calculations were made at the headquarters of aviation, which showed that in case of war, no more than 60 aviation bomber divisions (and taking into account the available ones) may be required. The point is that this figure was followed by others in succession, since front-line bombers require cover by fighters, and reconnaissance aircraft are also needed to effectively search for targets. And if one hundred new bomber air divisions are formed (in addition to the existing ones), then at the same time, to ensure their operations, it is also necessary to create about 30 air fighter divisions, as well as up to about 10 air reconnaissance divisions.

regiments.

But for some reason, Stalin demanded the formation of only aviation bomber divisions (presumably, front-line twin-engine jet Il-28). Without any auxiliary and supporting parts. Therefore, Marshal Zhigarev decided to consult with the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky. But eye

it was said that he knew about this decision and replied: *"This is the order of Comrade Stalin himself - follow it!"*

And in his confirmation from the General Staff came a directive, which ordered the leaders of military aviation to urgently prepare various options for the future basing of new air divisions, as well as to appropriate proposals for the organizational schedule. After that, doubts gave way to practical work on the implementation of this grandiose task.

Ostroumov writes: *"... a multifaceted, large-scale work was rapidly gaining momentum. It was led by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and a department created for this purpose. This responsible section was headed by Colonel General Aviation I. M. Sokolov."*

A truly titanic work lay ahead. deployment of military schools. In the shortest possible time, it was required not only to create a sound educational and material base, but also to train at least ten thousand pilots, the same number navigators, as well as gunners-radio operators, not to mention already about the large army of engineering and technical staff, other service personnel, the staffing of communications specialists, rear. And where was hire staff? How to solve a host of other tasks of an organizational nature? Above these they worked on issues at the Air Force General Staff, the main executor of I. V. Stalin's instructions.

But in addition to organizational and technical problems, it was necessary to solve the problem of finding and arranging the bases of the formed divisions. Airplanes are not tanks, they need airfields that occupy large areas. Therefore, in the areas of the future base specialists of the ministry were sent. They had to explore the possibilities of deploying aircraft and creating reliable bases. It's clear. But ge

Neral Ostroumov emphasizes the following locations for the future location of airfields: the northern coast of the USSR in general, Chukotka (in particular, including the southeastern one), Kamchatka, floating ice. Now, this is something that makes you think. If an extra airfield somewhere in Ukraine can still be explained by concern for defense against attack, then why are front-line bombers on the floating ice of the Arctic? Who was supposed to be bombed? Polar bears?

And it's not a joke. Ostroumov points out that then a difficult time came for the aviation industry, which had to produce more than ten thousand bombers (Il-28) in excess of the plan. Moreover, in the shortest possible time (which could only be achieved when working in wartime mode).

Naturally, the performers of such a task are conceived pondered over its causes and came to the conclusion that the USSR was actively preparing for a new war.

Ostroumov recalls: *"... in those years, everything in the newspapers publications began to appear more often, "transparently" hinting that the sale period was about to expire Alaska to the Americans that some of our southern regions of the Transcaucasus in the recent past were illegally seized by Turkey. In a word, the processing of social consciousness was gradually going on, purposefully the country was preparing for the coming trials, Or rather, to war. In any case, that's how we assessed the situation, working on the implementation Stalin's order.*

However, it was never implemented. After March 1953 of the year, all activities to create a giant armada of bombers began to curtail and soon re completely stopped.

Here's a memory "broke through" in 1992 to the print pages. It's worth a lot. However, some

his conclusions are incorrect. For a better understanding, a broader study is helpful.

N.N. Ostroumov writes: *".. just appeared we had jet bombers still far away not perfect as aircraft - carriers of nuclear weapons."* But for such a statement, one must know not only the characteristics of front-line bombers, but also the characteristics of types of nuclear weapons.

and tactics of using both different types of aviation, as well as and atomic weapons themselves.

Firstly, by 1953 there were very few nuclear weapons so that front-line aviation could massively use them (more on this in the next chapter). Secondly, the first samples of atomic bombs were heavy - several tons. And by 1953, the main front-line jet bomber of the Soviet Air Force was the twin-engine three-seater Il-28 ("Development of Aviation Science and Technology in the USSR", Moscow: Nauka, 1980). Its specifications:

- year of issue - 1948;
- maximum speed - 915 km / h;
- flight range - 2400 km (with a load of 1 t);
- the number of bombs - 1-3 tons.

Such an aircraft at that time could not be a carrier of nuclear weapons, and when designing it, even it was not taken into account that in his arsenal there may be atomic bombs (this happened later in connection with the improvement of atomic weapons). The meaning of using front-line bombers in the late 1940s and early 1950s remained the same as during the war: at the very beginning of hostilities, to ensure "clear skies", then to support ground troops. In short, this was as follows: front-line bombers should be concentrated before a SURPRISE ATTACK on airfields, arranged

nyh at the most advanced line of the future front. On the day of the ATTACK, all of them must take off and bombard the reconnoitred airfields of the enemy in order to destroy as much of his aircraft as possible while still on the ground. That is, to do what the Nazi planes did on June 22, 1941. And having won dominance in the air, in the future to carry out fire support for the advancing troops.

But in its purest form, the task of gaining dominance in air in the early 50s could not be solved only by front-line bombers. And secondly, they are also entrusted with the responsible task of air support for the battlefield. But these conditions are fraught with great losses, which, apparently, led Stalin to the decision to create a large armada of only such aircraft.

On the other hand, in vain General N. N. Ostroumov speaks badly of the then type of front-line bomber - Il-28. For his tasks, he was very successful. Aircraft designer A. S. Yakovlev in the book "SOVIET PLANES" (M.: Nauka, 1975) wrote (p. 136): *"[Il-28] was distinguished by a simple technological*

layout and was easy to fly. (He) was a worthy successor to the Pe-2 and Tu-2 piston bombers and became the main front-line bomber of the Soviet Air Force. It can be added that it remained so until the end of the 50s.

Moreover, the Il-28 was created in competition with the Tupolev Design Bureau, which was also instructed to create a front-line jet bomber. In mid-May 1949, the decision to launch the Il-28 into large-scale production was made at a meeting with Stalin. Apparently, the main role in this was played by

a flock and a high-tech design, the laboriousness of which was close to that of a single-seat front-line fighter.

In general, the IL-28 turned out to be one of the most successful

aircraft of their time. This has been emphasized by various aviation historians. In particular, the material about him, posted in the Kiev magazine "AVIATION AND TIME" (No. 1 for 1997), is called: *"Successful sa*

a mole that was unlucky."

Unlucky for this plane, according to the authors magazine, because *"the high combat potential, the capabilities of the Il-28 were not in full demand ... And although the fate of the Il-28 did not indulge, and the aircraft did not received such loud military glory as his peers MiG-15 and MiG-17 or the British Canberra, he, certainly takes a place in the honorary ranks of the most successful aircraft in the world"* (p. 20).

In other words, it is a pity that for the IL-28 there was no good world war. But I think they can please surviving pilots and the rest "about aggressive" humanity.

And the journal's materials, by the way, show that the preparations for a new world war were intensively carried out. For example, serial production of the IL-28 was started at three major aircraft factories at once. On one of them (No. 30 in Moscow) in 1949-1955, more than 100 aircraft were produced in certain periods.

per month.

In the list of high combat qualities of this bomber, there was also great survivability, which was also explained by the fact that it had radio altimeters of high and low altitudes, which made it possible to confidently fly at WMA (extremely low altitudes) (is it not from the American "Catalina" ?).

The plans for its use can be guessed from the following elements of training in those years: flights in any weather conditions, day and night. Field training there in dense combat formations with a distance between aircraft of up to 40 m. Training for actions outside their bases and in unfamiliar territories (with the help of global

ballroom trans-union multi-day raids, for example, along the route of the Carpathian region - Central Asia).

And after the creation of small atomic bombs II-28 turned into a tactical nuclear weapon, but long-range aircraft had to deliver nuclear and conventional munitions to the main industrial areas of the enemy (primarily the United States). And this is another topic. And it should be noted that by 1945 it was very bad with long-range bombers in the USSR.

By that time in the Soviet Union the category The "strategic bomber" was suitable for the piston four-engine Pe-8 created back in 1939 (which had one more (fifth) engine as a high-altitude compressor). Its characteristics:

- maximum speed - 450 km / h;
- flight range - 4700 km (with AM-35A engines)
6000 km (with ASh-82FN engines);
- the number of bombs - 2 tons.

But only 79 of them were built. (here and yes Further characteristics of the aircraft are taken from the book of the aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev "SOVIET AIRCRAFT" (M.: Nauka, 1975).

For comparison, it is necessary to assess the situation with analogues in the British and US Air Forces

Boeing B-17G Fortress III (Flying Fortress):

- year of issue - 1935;
- maximum speed - 481 km / h;
- flight range - 2736 km;
- the number of bombs - 2.7 tons;
- manufactured - 12,726 pieces

Avro 683 "Lancaster I":

- year of issue - 1939;
- maximum speed - 440 km / h;
- flight range - 4040 km;
- the number of bombs - up to 2 tons;
- manufactured - 7374 pieces.

Consolidated B-24 Liberator:

- year of issue - 1939;
- maximum speed - 483 km / h;
- flight range - 4023 km;
- the number of bombs - 1.4 tons;
- manufactured - 19,000 pieces

And in 1942, the Boeing company manufactured and began testing a new B-29 Superfortress (Superfortress) bomber. Its data:

- maximum speed - 598 km / h;
- flight range - 5300 km;
- the number of bombs - 4 tons;
- manufactured - 4547 pieces

The USSR did not begin to spend large amounts of money on the creation of strategic aviation. Although long-range aviation was. It was armed with aircraft: Il-4, DB 240 and the same Pe-8. But there were few Pe-8s, and the rest of the models could be attributed more to mere long-range bombers than to long-range strategic ones, and even more so - to intercontinental ones. But they were from

relatively few. Moreover, in the initial period of the war, long-range aviation suffered very heavy losses, primarily due to the performance of combat missions of attacking enemy columns that were not characteristic of it.

during the day and at low altitudes.

There was also a separate long-range aviation command. From February 1942 to December 1944 it was commanded by Air Chief Marshal (1944) Golovanov A.E. But in December 1944 it was transformed into the 18th Air Army. It was only in 1946 that long-range aviation was reorganized. She continued to command Golovanov A.E. And his deputy became a well-known

1930s polar pilot, Colonel-General of Aviation (since 1944) Gromov M. M. (An interesting moment - the deputy commander of long-range aviation is a specialist in flights in the Arctic! An accident?)

The re-creation of this type of air force in the USSR in 1946 was logical, since in the case of the United States the situation has changed. Before one could reach the continental industrial regions of the United States, thousands of kilometers of territory, including Canada, had to be captured (or an amphibious assault across the same thousands of kilometers of the Pacific Ocean, which is completely unrealistic).

Under these circumstances, it may be necessary to carry out raids on individual American industrial centers, as well as sea communications routes. Until the end of the 50s, this could only be done with the help of strategic aviation, which, as mentioned above, by 1945 the USSR practically did not have.

However, by the end of the war in the Soviet Union, only four specimens damaged by means of the air defense of Japan of B-29 aircraft (P. Kolesnikov "Make the same one!", TECHNICA - YOUTH magazine, 1992, No. 10). Since 1944, US Air Force pilots on these planes carried out massive raids on Japan and Japanese-occupied Chinese territory. Including atomic bombs were dropped from the B-29.

If the aircraft was damaged by air defense systems, its crew was allowed to land at the nearest Soviet airfield. So in the Far East there were four newest American bombers at that time. Naturally, Stalin found out about this. He was well aware of the poor state of Soviet strategic aviation, so he ordered Soviet industry to master the American bomber. And he only gave it two years. Tupolev was instructed to supervise the work. Many research institutes, 900 enterprises of various people's commissariats (ministries) were involved. Three Boeings were transferred to an airfield near Moscow. One was dismantled for the release of drawings. Two

others were left as standards. Ultimately, in 1947, the Soviet Tu-4 bomber appeared.

Its characteristics:

- maximum speed - 558 km / h (at an altitude of 10 km);
- flight range - 5100 km (with 2 tons of bombs);
- the number of bombs - up to 8 tons;
- engines - 4 piston 2400 hp each every.

In L. Kerber's book "THE MAN AND THE PLANE" (M.: Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1973) it is said that in order to speed up the production of the Tu-4, the decision of the government provided for the release of a batch of 20 aircraft at once without relying on an experimental machine. Kerber notes that this required the perfect quality of the drawings. In July 1947, three aircraft were shown at an air parade in Tushino, and by the end of the year all 20 aircraft were assembled, and their flight tests began, which ended in 1948 (Stalin himself approved the act.) And during the years of operation of Tu aircraft -4 required their urgent modification. It was needed so urgently that one of the leaders of the defense industry, B. L. Vannikov, offered to work during the May holidays.

As you can see, in Soviet times they did not want to remember copying the American Boeing. But it was necessary to explain the history, so they came up with the reason for the "quality of the drawings".

But it turns out that the Tupolev Design Bureau began to turn to the design of a long-range aircraft as early as 1943, and especially in 1944. And by the time work began on the Tu-4, much had already been done. In the article "Do the same!" P. Kolesnikov reports that on Stalin's assignment to master the B-29, Tupolev said that he could do better. But Stalin did not agree with this and said: *"It is better not to necessary. Do the same!"* This suggests that timing was important for Stalin in the first place.

The Tu-4 remained in service until the mid-1950s, constituting the backbone of long-range aviation in the USSR. He became the first Soviet missile carrier - KS-1 cruise missiles were hung under its wings. It was from him that the first atomic bomb was dropped.

The experience gained while working on the Tu-4 made it possible in the future to create an even heavier Tu-85 aircraft. It was indeed an ultra-long-range bomber. It was the largest and last piston bomber built in the USSR.

Characteristics of the Tu-85:

- maximum speed - 605 km / h;
- flight range - up to 13,000 km;
- the number of bombs - up to 5 tons;
- engines - 4 piston 4300 hp each every;
- ceiling - 13 km.

They completed the construction of the Tu-85 in 1950. Full the flight weight of the aircraft exceeded 100 tons. It successfully passed all flight tests. At an average speed of about 500 km per hour, the full range flight took more than a day. But the Tu-85 became a "swan song"

Soviet long-range aircraft with piston engines

lyami.

The fact is that jet aviation began to develop in the mid-1940s. And the first combat jet aircraft were fighters. In Hitler's Germany, for example, it was Me-262. Their main characteristic was high speed.

Progress in the improvement of jet fighters turned out to be very rapid. In 1947-1949, the La-15 and MiG-15 fighters were put into production in the USSR, of which the latter was produced en masse. The maximum speed of the MiG-15 was 1050 km / h, range - 1420 km. Following him, in 1952-1953, the MiG-19 was launched into the series (as

front-line fighter, its maximum speed is already 1454 km / h, the range is about the same) and the Yak-25 (as an all-weather night fighter-interceptor, the maximum speed is 1090 km / h, but the range is 3000 km).

In 1949, Stalin set the task of developing an interceptor fighter in front of three design bureaus: MiG, La and Yak. The Yak-25 won, followed by the development of the supersonic Yak-28.

Until the end of the 50s, the MiG-19 and Yak-25 were the main new fighter aircraft of the USSR.

The creation of jet aircraft depended on the availability of jet engines. And since this case was new, the engines were first developed not large (for fighters). And in the early 40s

There was a competition between liquid-propellant jet engines and air-jet engines. In liquid, in addition to fuel, it was also necessary to refuel the oxidizer, which made the aircraft heavier and reduced the flight time. Will the air-jet win. And overseas.
mno

Many authors on the history of Soviet post-war aircraft (including A. Yakovlev) emphasize that the development of jet engines took place in three stages: first, captured German engines were installed on aircraft, then licensed English ones (on the MiG-15, Tu-14 , Il-28) and only then - engines from Soviet designers. The English engine "Rolls Royce Nene" turned out to be licensed, put into mass production in the USSR in the summer of 1947 under the brand name RD-45F (reliable, with a long service life, with a takeoff thrust of more than 2 tons).

However, the emergence of jet fighters speed twice that of piston bombers showed that it was time to create jet bombers. The case was held back

which suitable motors.

As noted above, in 1948 the Tupolev Design Bureau created a three-engine jet Tu-14. However, due to the presence at that time of the economical Il-28, the Tu 14 did not receive much development and was used in small quantities in service with the Navy as a tor

pedo.

Work on the heavy long-range high-speed bomber was entrusted to the Tupolev Design Bureau. Under this program, by the beginning of 1952, a twin-engine Tu-16 was created. Soon after it reached a speed slightly higher than designed, the car was launched into a large series.

new production.

The Tu-16 could deliver 3 tons of bombs to a range of 5760 km at a maximum speed of up to 1000 km/h. Subsequently, the Tu-104 passenger aircraft was made on its basis.

But urgent work in the USSR to create more and more of the perfect strategic jet bomber did not stop there. Stalin needed an intercontinental jet bomber. The piston Tu-85 could fly at such a range. But the Korean War showed that the first combat flight of any piston bomber could be

for him and the last.

The Tupolev Design Bureau began designing the Tu-16 jet in 1949. At the same time, work accelerated in the United States. You are on the creation of the B-52 strategic intercontinental bomber. In D. Guy's book "Heavenly Gravity" (M.: Moskovsky Rabochiy, 1984) this is said (p. 118): *"It was done in extreme haste*

(after the explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb) ... Information about the B-52 began to leak into foreign magazines.

Aviation Week in November 1949 announced the start aircraft design.

Stalin, apparently, at first hoped for the Tupolev Design Bureau.

And other design bureaus were not involved in this task until the results of air battles in Korea at the end of 1950, which dramatically changed the situation. There will be a separate chapter on the war in Korea, here it can be noted that in September 1950, US troops entered the battles. And in November, the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps began hostilities. Together with the MiG-15, he had Yak-9U and La-11 piston fighters (magazine "TEKHNICA - YOUTH", 1992, No. 5-7, p. 19, an article by aviation engineer P. Kolesnikov about La-11 "The Last Piston") . And on the side of the "southerners"

for some time, piston fighters were also used: the American P-51D Mustang and carrier-based F4U Corsair, as well as the English Fury.

Everything related to the participation of the Soviet Air Force in the Korean War was secret for many years. The fact that none of the Soviet pilots was captured by the Americans contributed to the preservation of the secret. Even perego thieves in the air first tried to organize in Korean. However, this did not work out, the pilots used Russian. The Americans were able to record the talks and submitted them to the UN, but in response it was stated that any record could be edited. And only from the end of the 1980s various memoirs began to appear in the press. For example, Guards Lieutenant Colonel B. S. Abakumov "SOVIET PILOT IN THE SKY OF KOREA" in the journal "ISTORY QUESTIONS", 1993, No. 1. He confirms that all Soviet pilots *"were listed according to some kind of statements by Chinese*

volunteers. My name (to the outside world) was Yu Huachun". But he writes that real Chinese and Korean pilots also took part in the battles. However, they were less skilled. And he cites the usual losses of Soviet pilots in comparison with the enemy as 1 to 16 in favor of the Soviet ones.

But the most complete memoirs under the title "IN NOT

WITHOUT NORTH KOREA" were published in many issues of the journal "Aviation and Cosmonautics" for 1990 and 1991.

Their author is one of the former commanders of the 64th Corps, retired lieutenant general, Hero of the Soviet Union G. Lobov. In 1952, the corps consisted of about 26 thousand people and included 6 divisions (both pilots and anti-aircraft gunners), 3 separate regiments and other units. General Lobov described in detail the tactics of air battles, in particular, the fact that the time of the MiG-15 attack on the American "Flying Fortresses" was measured in seconds (due to the large difference in speed). During this time, the gunners on the American planes could not oppose anything. As a result, the Americans began to suffer heavy losses, changed tactics, switched to night bombing, but nothing helped. Even American congressmen came to analyze the situation.

But in the years 1950-1953 in the USSR, reports of air battles in Korea were cited in such a way that only "Korean" pilots were involved in them on the part of the DPRK. Examples:

"PRAVDA", December 27, 1950, p. 4, V. Kornilov. "At the Korean Pilots": *"... In the days of their temporary successes command of the American interventionists in Korea once boastfully stated that from the North Korean aviation is over, they say, at American airfields in Korea it is lighter at night than on Broadway in New York. While the American invaders were amusing themselves with witticisms, the power of the young Korean aviation was growing and strengthening, the skill of its flight personnel was maturing. Now other motives are heard in the reports of the American command. American bandits are no joke and sharpness. Increasingly falling down on fire "flying fortresses", crash into the ground lined Korean Mustang pilots ... In the evening, during the analysis of the results of the battle, the commander of the unit, Kim Tal Won, reported*

It was believed that on this day a "flying fortress", five B-26 aircraft (medium bomber) and one jet fighter were shot down.

"Glorious deeds of the Korean anti-aircraft gunners", "TRUTH", 1951, January 7, p. 4: *"...From the beginning of the war to January 4 this of the year, all anti-aircraft units of the Korean People's Army, the backbone of which was now the 19th Guards Anti-Aircraft Regiment, shot down 511 American aircraft, in including: 53 "flying fortresses" - "B-29", 90 light bombers, 254 jet aircraft, 88 attack aircraft and 26 fighters and reconnaissance aircraft.*

"BATTLE CASES OF PILOT OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMY", "RIGHT YES", 1951, January 16, p. 4: *".. Pilot An Heng Tsun, who has 6 downed enemy aircraft on his combat account, told the correspondent the details of the battle.*

"We were ordered," he said, "to intercept a group of American planes heading for bombardment of a city. As soon as we discovered 8 enemy bombers, which were escorted by 12 fighters, our lead aircraft

dived on enemy planes, violated them formation and shot down one B-26 bomber. I followed my commander, attached myself to the tail of one "flying fortress" and fired at it until until she collapsed in flames." To the correspondent's question, where were the fighters escorting the enemy bombers?

Cong replied, "American pilots are brave when shelling our villages and unarmed people. But when they meet our planes, they usually saving their lives, they prefer to hide, leaving their slower bombers to defend themselves.

Thus, the results of the battles quickly showed that the age of piston warplanes is over. Tu-85 is outdated, not having time to be born. This forced

to work on the creation of jet strategic bombers. Guy's book says that Stalin decided to find out the capabilities of Soviet designers, primarily Tupolev (pp. 118-119). Stalin directly asked him if he would be able to design a strategic machine with turbojet engines in a short time? Andrei Nikolaevich honestly and frankly said: "No." Then he added that it would not work on two engines. Stalin said that then why not add a couple more? But Tupolev replied: *"We are preparing a project for an intercontinental aircraft with turboprop engines, which, according to*

apparently, should give a strategic range. Turbojet fuel consumption is too high, and it is not clear how to reduce it.

This project should be understood as work on the creation of a four-engine ultra-long range bomber Tu-95. In Soviet times, for some reason, there was no description of the history of its creation. In several books devoted to Soviet aviation in general and Tupolev Design Bureau aircraft in particular, for some reason there is no exact data on the time of work on it. But there were indirect data, according to which it was possible to establish approximate dates.

There was "open" information that in 1954 Tupolev received an assignment for a new passenger aircraft. And in 1957, the ultra-long-range Tu-114, built on the basis of a bomber, was released. It was a four-engine aircraft with turboprop coaxial engines (two propellers on one axis) of 15,000 hp each. every. The flight range was: 8400 km (the longest with 16 tons of cargo) or 7000 km with the maximum payload. Cruising speed is 750 km / h, the highest is about 900 km / h. (Data from A. Yakovlev's book "SOVIET PLANES", M.: Nauka, 1975.) But under certain conditions, he could fly even longer distances. So, in December 1962

a non-stop flight Moscow-Havana was made, then back. The range was 10,900 km. The flight there was completed in 17 hours 9 minutes, back - in 13 hours 55 minutes (from A. Yakovlev's book, but edition 1982, pp. 367-368).

Kerber's book says that testing of the Tu-114 was completed in 1956 (p. 249). The article "Secrets of the closed sky" in the journal "New and Contemporary History", No. 6 for 1992, says that the Tu-16 and Tu-95 were shown at the air parade in Tushino in 1955 as analogues of the American B-47 and B-52.

It turns out that the Tu-95 flew in 1955, and apparently in 1953, i.e. by the time in 1954, when Tupolev began to create a passenger version on its basis.

For some reason, for a long time with the Tu-95 aircraft was there is some mystery involved. In the fourth edition of the book A. Yakovleva "SOVIET AIRCRAFT" (M.: Nauka, 1982), the mention of him is generally removed! It is only said that *"The experience of creating a passenger aircraft based on bomber was repeated during the construction of the Tu 114 ... The basis for it was a heavy long-range bomber equipped with four NK-12 turboprop engines designed by N. D. Kuznetsov"* (p. 267). Excuse me, what was the make of that bomber?

In the magazine "TEHNIKA - YOUTH", in No. 11 for 1988, on p. 61-64 contains the article "Andrey Tupolev's Style". It contains not only a description of the most famous Tupolev aircraft, but also contains many color images of their appearance. Of the post-war bombers, there are Tu-4, Tu-14, Tu-16, even Tu-85. But there is no Tu-95! Not even a mention! However, a drawing and description of the passenger Tu

114.

And even in 1990, the process of creating the Tu-95 remained secret! In that year, the military publishing house published

the third edition of the book of Colonel-General of Aviation, Dr. Sciences A. N. Ponomareva "SOVIET AERIAL DESIGNERS". The annotation says that it *"illuminates some of the" white spots "of the history of the development of aviation."* Us. 50-51 on the creation of the Tu-95

it says the following:

"The creation of a medium-range bomber with swept wing (meaning Tu-16 (1952)) and on its base a passenger liner (i.e. Tu-104, the first flight of which took place on 07/17/1955) allowed start designing a heavy combat aircraft of intercontinental range. ...Airplane with four engines was originally created as a missile carrier. Subsequently, on its basis was built passenger aircraft Tu-114, designed for flights on long-distance routes ... "

Well shuffled! Judging by this explanation, Tu 95 (by the way, the brand is not indicated again!) began to be designed ... already in 1955! And according to other sources, in the same year, SEVEN SERIAL Tu-95s were already demonstrated at the parade in Tushino!

But closer to the collapse of the USSR, the veil of secrecy over this aircraft began to weaken. In the journal "TECHNIKA - YOUTH" in No. 11, 1990, an article by G. Fedorov "BATTLE WITH" BOA " about how 27.04.

In 1983, during the mid-air refueling of one Tu-95, the hose broke off from the tanker aircraft, wrapped around the cancer carrier and began to strike at its hull. The pilots managed to land the plane. As an illustration of what was said on p. 28 shows photographs of the Tu-95 from the side and a front view of the cockpit. The inscriptions to them say: *"The same strategic bomber-rocket carrier Tu-95 withstood a mortal battle with a boa and a Tu-95 before the next flight."* And a beautiful color photograph of the Tu-95 refueling in the air when viewed from above is shown in another issue of "TECHNIQUES -

YOUTH" (1991, No. 9, p. 4, although Tu-16 is erroneously indicated in the inscription).

What could be secret in the Tu-95 case? According to the characteristics of the Tu-114, one can also evaluate its indicators, except for one thing: the timing of creation! By the way, in the article about the battle with the "boa constrictor" it is said that the Tu-95 crew consists of five people (two pilots, a navigator, two radio gunners), and the weight of the aircraft is about 200 tons.

What the terms of creation can say, we are talking ahead, for now, let's return to the above conversation between Stalin and Tupolev. It could take place no earlier than January and no later than March 1951. The fact is that Soviet pilots began to participate in battles in Korea from November

1950. But some time had to pass in order to be able to draw conclusions on the use of different types of aircraft. Laudatory reports in the newspaper Pravda began to appear from the end of December 1950, especially in January of the following. And in March 1951, the design bureau headed by V. M. Myasishchev, who had previously replaced Petlyakov for some time after his death in a plane crash in 1942, was urgently restored. Myasishchev in those years was fond of heavy long-range bombers and by 1951 he already had a scheme for a large jet aircraft.

Most likely, the conversation between Stalin and Tupolev took place in the first half of February 1951. The fact is that, for example, in the newspaper Pravda until December 1950, the main theme of almost all materials was "unbridled" propaganda of the struggle for peace. Naturally, any sane reader should have understood its main reason - the very high probability of a new world war.

But from the end of December, its intensity began to weaken. And on February 17, on the front page, a long interview of Stalin with a Pravda correspondent was printed, in which he stated that he did not consider the new world

war is inevitable, *"at least for the time being."* Thus, it is quite possible that by February 17, Stalin decided not to start a world war for the time being. And it is most likely that such a decision was influenced by the B-29 "flying fortresses" falling down in flames, which were hastily produced in the USSR under the name Tu-4.

The fact that the war was decided to be postponed is also evidenced by such facts as the urgent adoption by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in March 1951 of the "Law on the Protection of Peace" and the release of "younger" draft ages (who were kept in the army since the war). The adoption of the "Law on the Protection of Peace" is an absolutely propaganda action. Inside the USSR, it had practically no meaning as a "law". And even more so abroad.

In a conversation with Stalin, Tupolev said that he was working on a strategic bomber, but not on a jet one. Thus, the Tu-95 could have appeared in 1952-1953 (taking into account the required tests of the prototype and the decision to launch it in a series).

But for some reason Stalin was in a hurry. And since he usually entrusted very important tasks to at least two groups of performers, that is why the second design bureau for the design of an intercontinental jet aircraft appeared under the leadership of V. M. Myasishchev.

The following information is given about this in Guy's book *"Heavenly Attraction"*: *"... the spring of 1951 turned into for Myasishchev and his entourage with impatient, greedy, all-consuming work, about which one can only dream. They did not know anything like this from the military time. "There was a real mobilization, as in a war," Georgy Nikolayevich Nazarov characterized the April and May days ... The Design Bureau was formed according to Stalin's direct order, that said it all* (p. 120) *... People immediately turned into an incredible*

the pace of design, production of drawings. Yakov Borisovich Nodelman recalls how the next day after arriving at the OKB, he sat at the blackboard until 11 pm, and a day later spent the night at work on a cot. This was not an exception, but rather the norm (p. 121) ... To speed up the construction of the aircraft, practically all the mechanical shops of the plant were engaged in the manufacture of models. Models were produced almost around the clock (p. 123)... In less than a year, the team managed to complete and transfer to the plant all the technical documentation - 55 thousand drawings. Began building a machine (p. 130) ... In December 1952 a car of grandiose dimensions, which later received the index 103M (M4), was rolled out to the airfield (p. 138) ... (The first flight took place on January 20, 1953) ... May 1, 1954 year over Red Square for the first time majestically Myasishchev's 103M bomber sailed... The issue of launching the giant into series was discussed" (p. 142).

Briefly about the further fate of Myasishchev Design Bureau. After The 103M model was used to develop the 201M aircraft, which made its first flight in 1956. Then the 50M supersonic bomber was developed (and even flew). There were plans for a supersonic passenger aircraft. But in connection with the creation of intercontinental missiles in the early autumn of 1960, the design bureau ceased to exist, and Myasishchev himself went to work as director of TsAGI.

And only after the collapse of the USSR, more detailed information about the creation of the Tu-95 began to appear in the press. For example, in the magazine "CIVIL AVIATION" in No. 12, 1994 on p. 9-12 was placed a memoir about the previously little-known designer S. M. Eger ("The Right Hand of Tupolev", author - S. Agavelyan). It cites the aftermath of Stalin's conversation with Tupolev: "... Tupolev returned in the evening. Out of breath, he sank into armchair. Everyone was silent ... "Well, what," he began. — Rain

foxes? They ordered to "storm" the Tu-95 now. From today, to suspend all work on the Tu-80 and Tu-85. Close orders! The following describes how the first Tu-95s were tested. In particular, the very first had the number "951". He made 16 successful flights, but on the 17th (05/11/1953) a fire broke out on board and the plane crashed, pilot A.D. Perelet and flight engineer A.I. Chernov died. "Black clouds were gathering over the plane. But the government demanded

slowing down, take on the construction of an understudy ... The understudy Tu-95 ("952") was not a repetition of the first copy. The car was significantly lightened, increased reliability. At the same time, the Kuibyshev Aviation the plant was in serial production of the aircraft. At the air parade in Tushino in 1955, they demonstrated seven Tu-95 strategic bombers.

In the same year, 1994, a book by Yu. Zuenko and S. Korostelev "RUSSIAN COMBAT AIRCRAFT" was published in Moscow. It indicates the year of the first flight of the Tu-95 - 1952.

But the most complete description appeared even later. One day at the end of 1996, I went into a bookstore and saw this magazine, one cover of which left me speechless for a while. It was No. 5 for 1996 of the Ukrainian magazine "AVIATION and TIME". Half of the issue was devoted to the history of the creation of the Tu-95. And on the cover there was a photo of the aircraft in flight and under it the heading: "*Tu-95 in the article "Purpose - America".*" The text of the authors from Moscow was supplemented by a large number of photographs. And inside was a tab with detailed drawings of some modifications of the Tu-95. And all this was preceded by an "introduction" with the heading: "*Tu-95, setting the task.*" It began with this paragraph:

"In 1949, the first nuclear device. The country has entered an unprecedented mass

headquarters of an arms race in which the former allies developed ruthless plans for the total destruction of each other. the Soviet Union for launching a strike on the North American continent, carriers with a range of action were needed at least twice as large as the United States, which the USSR could cover with nuclear "carpets" from its numerous European and Asian bases. The Tu-4, which entered service with a flight range of no more than 6000 km, could solve combat missions only in within Europe, North Africa, the countries of the Middle and Middle East, as well as from Far Eastern bases attack Japan. Attempts to increase it range by equipping a refueling system in the air did not leave the experiment stage. That's why the scenario of a flight to America was seriously considered one way, according to which, after completing the task, the crew left the aircraft in a given area, where the submarine picked him up. But no options for the use and modernization of the only one on late 40s. Soviet carrier of nuclear weapons could not pose a real threat to America. For this a new bomber was needed."

The original phrase in this paragraph sounds: "combat missions **only within** Europe, North Africa, the countries of the Near and Middle East, and also ..."

In less than five years, the Red Army, in almost THREE YEARS long, covered the distance from Stalingrad to Berlin, not only on wheels, but also on foot and crawling "on the belly." And here "only" "some" Europe (ALL!!!). In the sense - "it will not be enough!". And "only" "only" North Africa. Those. Wouldn't they have given up on the South as well? Nice size TVD! Flat maps won't help anymore. You can't do without a big globe...

And the "Problem Statement" ends with confirmation

the fact that work on large piston bombers stopped precisely because of the war in Korea:

"The war that began soon in Korea completely showed futility of heavy piston bomb carriers. As a result, the United States curtailed all their development programs and accelerated work on jet B-47 and B-52. Great Britain began to create heavy bombers of the "V" series, capable of carrying nuclear weapons at transonic speeds. Soviet The Union reacted immediately. Barely built completely successful Tu-85, the USSR is urgently curtailing this world's last heavy piston bomber program and moving on to the design of strategic nuclear weapons carrier aircraft with turbojet and turboprop engines.

The main stages of the start of work on the Tu-95 in the magazine are stated as follows:

"On October 31, 1951, the draft design "95" received a positive conclusion of the Aviation Technical Committee under the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, although work on it was completed only in mid-December.

On November 15, the Kuibyshev Aircraft Plant No. 18 received an order to begin preparations for serial production of the 95 aircraft with a completion date of September 1, 1952. During 1954-1955. the plant was instructed to transfer 15 serial bombers to the Air Force, and the engine-building plant No. 24 (also located in Kuibyshev) was to master the TV 12 engine, which received the designation NK-12, in a series. At the same

OKB-23 V. M. Myasishchev and Moscow Plant No. 23 hastily prepared for serial production of the M-4. Estimated date for the start of a nuclear conflict with the United States, 1954 the year was approaching" (p. 3).

Briefly about turboprop engines for TU-95. The magazine says that they were developed by OKB-276 under the leadership of N. D. Kuznetsov. Really in 1951

there was only the TV-2 model, developed on the basis of the captured German Jumo 022. Its forced version of the TV-2F had a power of 6250 hp. (Horsepower equivalents). The new TV-12 engine with a power of 12,000 hp still to be developed. Therefore, in order to shorten the time, it was decided to make the first Tu-95 on four twin engines, each of which consisted of two TV-2F and had a total power of 12,000 hp. A number of technical solutions for

this had to be done for the first time in the world.

Thus, as expected, the information about the creation of the Tu-95 is directly related to the plans of the Soviet Union to prepare for war with the United States. Of particular interest is the message about the start of the war - 1954. But what does the "estimated date" mean? Who suggested it? The United States, according to the Dropshot plan, assumed D-Day for 01/01/1957. It turns out that Stalin planned the war for 1954?! And this statement was printed in 10,000 copies?! Besides, what does it mean *"the former allies developed ruthless plans for total annihilation of each other"* (p. 1)? The Americans have declassified their plans. And they were widely and willingly quoted by Soviet historians in the 80s. But no matter how much Western experts called on the Soviet side to do the same, this has not yet been done. Soviet historians hinted that the USSR did not develop any plans to attack someone! And if something was developed, it was only as plans for protecting one's own territory from a possible external attack! And what suspicions can there be about the policy of the Soviet government after the cruelest Great Patriotic War? But as already shown

the above materials, I think doubts can have a legal place.

From other materials of the magazine, it can also be noted that the case for the creation of the Tu-95 turned out to be more complicated.

nym than first thought. In particular, in 1955, only one Tu-95 could be demonstrated at the air parade in Tushino. And in the combat units of the Soviet long-range aviation, he began to arrive from the beginning of 1956. Myasishchevsky competitor (M4) could not reach the planned range of 12,000 km (it turned out to be only 9,800 km), but it was also put into mass production in 1954.

In subsequent years, the creation of the Tu-95 was dedicated their pages and other publications. For example, "AVIATION AND COSMONAUTIKA" in No. 10 for 1995 is a selection of materials under the general title "HISTORY OF THE AIRCRAFT FAMILY from TU-95 TO TU-114-142". In particular, in it on p. 2 states that by the end of 1952, about 1000 Tu-4s were produced. And although it was outdated by that time, it was quite suitable for some combat and especially for transport and test work. In addition, the production of the Tu-4 was also launched in China, where it remained the main long-range bomber for longer (although this can be understood, since its opponents turned out to be closer than those of the USSR).

In addition to magazines, the history of the creation of the Tu-95 was devoted to a separate series of Ukrainian serial documentary film "Chervoni Zirki" ("Red Stars"), in which it was directly stated that this aircraft was being prepared for the Soviet-American war.

1954, the Soviet plan of which was called "Groza-2".

And briefly about their (Tu-95 and M4) competitor - the American B-52 "Stratofortress" ("Stratospheric Flying Fortress") (data from the "HANDBOOK ON ZAR REGIONAL MILITARY AND CIVIL AIRCRAFT", M.: TsAGI, 1973) :

The prototype B-52 made its first flight on 04/15/1952 (Tu-95 - 11/12/1952). Aircraft of this model were mass-produced since 1954, and entered the troops from 1955. Until 1961, 640 pieces were produced

modifications A, B, C, D, E, F, G. Then another 102 pieces of modification "H". (90 aircraft were made per year.) The take-off weight of the latter is up to 220 tons. Flight range - up to 16,000 km. Flight altitude - up to 17 km. The maximum speed is 1050 km/h. The number of bombs - up to 23 tons. Crew - 6 people.

The strategic bomber ("Hawker Siddley Volcano" B.1) was also produced in England. But few of them were made - only 45 in 1955-1958. Then followed the release of the B.2 model. An experimental aircraft of the B.1 model took off in August 1952.

In conclusion of the conversation about long-range aviation, it is necessary highlight the main findings.

1. After 1945, long-range strategic aviation was urgently created in the USSR on the basis of piston bombers. By the beginning of 1951, there were a certain number of aircraft in it, but by this time they had cut to outdated.

2. Since March 1951, work on creation of faster strategic bombers by two design bureaus. But by the time of Stalin's death in March 1953, only their prototypes were flying. And for some reason, the timing of the creation of the Tu-95 (and its brand itself) was kept in the strictest confidence for a long time.

3. In the Air Force of Great Britain and the USA by the beginning of 1951 there were many long-range piston bombers. But by this time they were also sharply outdated, and among them there were no intercontinental ones in range.

4. Urgent work in the United States on the creation of the B-52 jet bomber began at the end of 1949. But from 1952 until 1954, only its prototypes flew.

5. Intercontinental missiles came to an end 50s.

STAGES OF THE GRAND NUCLEAR ROAD

After 1945, Stalin could not start a new big war without atomic weapons. Therefore, it is useful to briefly familiarize yourself with how it was created in the USSR. Since the late 1980s, various books have appeared in print.

gi and articles in magazines that shed light on this topic. A fairly detailed account of the development history

ki nuclear weapons in different countries is presented in

the book of Yorysh A. I. "WHAT THE BELL RINGS ABOUT" (M.: Politizdat, 1991). In it, a separate chapter is devoted to work in the USSR, in which much space is also given to pre-war research. But they passed under the special control of the government and Stalin personally in 1942. Gradually, the scale of work expanded.

In March 1943, a special resolution of the State Defense Committee of the USSR on work on the "uranium project" was issued. I. V. Kurchatov was appointed scientific supervisor.

The government allowed the project management one hundred Moscow registrations for any specialists from all over the Soviet Union. They could also be recalled from the army, including from the front. However, instead of the allowed one hundred scientists, Kurchatov initially limited himself to a small group.

On August 20, 1945, by the decision of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, a special committee was created under it, and L.P. Beria was appointed chairman. The same decision was organized by the First Main Directorate (PGU)

under the government of the USSR, headed by the former people's commissar (minister) of ammunition B. L. Vannikov. In July 1953, it was transformed into the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. In addition, a Scientific and Technical Council was established under the chairmanship of the same Vannikov (Kurchatov became his deputy).

At the end of 1945, a selection and survey of the construction site of the first industrial
th nuclear boiler.

By 1946, Professor Yu. Khariton was under prepared tactical and technical specifications for the first Soviet atomic bomb. For its implementation, by the decision of the government in 1946, the country's first research center was created under the name KB-11 (at laboratory No. 2). It was built on the basis of one of the factories of the former People's Commissariat of Ammunition by the Glavpromstroy of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Here it is useful to digress a little and familiarize yourself with curious background information from the book "ECONOMIC life of the USSR" (Book 1, 1917-1950, Moscow: Soviet Encyclopedia, 1967).

On January 7, 1946, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (SSSR) "On the Formation of the People's Commissariat (Ministry) of Agricultural Engineering" was issued on the basis of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition and its enterprises, tractor plants of the People's Commissariat of Medium Machine Building and the People's Commissariat of Transport Engineering, as well as agricultural machinery factories buildings of the People's Commissariat of mortar weapons. The narco mat of ammunition is abolished.

On January 19, 1946, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the Formation of the People's Commissariat (Ministry) for the Construction of Military and Naval Enterprises" was issued.

On February 17, 1946, the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme the formation of the People's Commissariat of Mortar Weapons into the People's Commissariat of Mechanical Engineering and Instrumentation.

08/25/1946 by a decree of the government of the USSR with
On September 1, 1946, the wages of workers and engineers of enterprises and construction sites located in the Urals, Siberia and the Far East increased by 20 %.

We return to the history of the "uranium project".

On December 25, 1946, at 18:00, an experimental nuclear reactor F-1 was put into operation. Its launch was one of the key moments in the creation of atomic weapons, which Lavrenty Beria himself came to see. Yorysh's book contains a dialogue between him and Kurchatov. Here are some

quotes:

Beria: - *Well, what else will you show? A crack in the reproducer, a knot on a string... Not enough. How else Can you prove it's a chain reaction?*

Kurchatov: - *... Let's put samples of uranium, we will irradiate them for a month, and chemists will see the release of pluto niya.*

- *How much will stand out?*

— *Micrograms.*

“ *Micrograms... You won't see anything again. Under microscope, or something, you can tell whether it is plutonium or what else did you put in?*

- *can only be distinguished by instruments for radioactivity, for chemical stvam.*

“ *And when will you see that this is not a deception, not your fantasy?..*

After the successful start-up of the nuclear reactor, I. V. Kurchatov said: *"Nuclear energy is now subject to the will of the Soviet people."* (I could have specified who exactly: “- I. V. Stalin.”)

At the same time, a large reactor was being built in the Urals (near Chelyabinsk), which could already be used to manufacture plutonium for weapons (Plant A). A radiochemical enterprise was also being built, which would have to separate plutonium from the plutonium irradiated in the reactor.

uranium (plant "B"). The entire plant with a uranium-graphite reactor went into operation in 1948 (Plant A in the summer, Plant B a few months later). After that, the production of military plutonium and the manufacture of the first atomic bomb began.

On 10/1/1948, at a meeting of the First Committee of the III session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviet representative declared that the secret of the atomic bomb does not exist. And the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Molotov said this on November 6, 1947.

In 1948, the government of the USSR ordered I. V. Kurchatov, Yu. B. Khariton and P. M. Zernov to the deadline for making and submitting the first copies of the atomic bomb for state testing. Yu. B. Khariton was appointed chief designer.

This task has been completed successfully. The bomb tests were preceded by a reception at Stalin's. It took place, apparently, in April 1949, since the book of Yorasha says that after it Kurchatov went to the Kazakh training ground near Semipalatinsk in May.

According to the book, I. V. Kurchatov, Yu. B. Khariton and P. M. Zernov came to Stalin's office in the Kremlin. With them, they allegedly brought in a box a nickel-plated plutonium ball almost 10 cm in diameter - the nuclear charge of the first Soviet atomic bomb. Kurchatov reported to Stalin that he was ready and asked for permission to

explosion, then a dialogue took place between them, in which Stalin asked how quickly the accumulation of charges was going on. And when he found out that it takes four months to make one bomb, this did not please him. At the end of the conversation, Stalin allegedly touched the charge ball with his hand. (*"Stalin himself put his hand on the ball and said: "Yes, warm. And always warm?" - "Always, Joseph Vissario is new ..."*).

Stalin agreed to the test.

In May 1949, Kurchatov went to the training ground, which

ry was located 70 km from Semipalatinsk in a spacious bowl surrounded by hills. But Kurchatov did not like the quality of the work, and he demanded that some objects be redone, especially the central tower.

Nu, because of which the date of the explosion was moved to August.

The explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb took place on August 29, 1949.

"10 minutes before he heard the voice of Beria:

" And nothing will work out for you, Igor Vasilyevich !"

- What are you, Lavrenty Pavlovich! Required by radiant! exclaimed Kurchatov.

After the explosion, the chairman of the state commission, Beria, doubted whether the Americans had such an explosion, and decided to clarify this with M.G. Meshcheryakov, who, together with D.V. I saw an underwater atomic explosion there:

" Mikhail Grigorievich! Does it look like American?

...Very? ... We did not blunder? Kurchatov doesn't rub our glasses? All the same? ...Fine. So, you can report to Stalin that the test was successful?

...Good good..."

These are the stages in the creation of Soviet atomic (plutonium) bombs based on atomic fission reactions. And in 1947, a special group of scientists was formed with the participation of I. E. Tamm and A. D. Sakharov to study the possibility of creating a hydrogen bomb based on the reactions of fusion of the nuclei of light atoms.

At the end of July 1953, preparations began for testing a thermonuclear bomb at the test site near Semipalatinsk. The explosion was made on 08/12/1953.

The United States detonated a hydrogen bomb on Biki Atoll on March 1, 1954. England exploded its first atomic bomb on 10/3/1952.

These data are given in Yorysh's book, published

Shay in 1991. And in the 33rd issue of the OGONEK magazine for 1993, a conversation was published with Academician Yuli Khariton himself, who describes some events differently. For example, he confirmed that on the eve of the first test, there was a meeting with Stalin, who, in the presence of Beria and Kurchatov (project leaders), heard all the other main specialists. During a conversation with Khariton, Stalin asked:

"Is it not possible, instead of one bomb from the available for charge of the amount of plutonium to make two, albeit weaker ones? So that one remains in stock ... "

Y. Khariton explained that the accumulated in plutonium just corresponds to the charge manufactured according to the American scheme, and excessive risk is not acceptable. Stalin agreed.

And there was no display of the plutonium pellet in the Kremlin, since it was delivered from Chelyabinsk-40, where it was made, to Arzamas-16, to Khariton Design Bureau. And then, on the eve of the trials, he was sent to Semipal

Tinsky landfill.

"Question: - You are called the "father of the nuclear bomb" ...

Answer: — That's wrong... The creation of the bomb required the efforts of a huge number of people... Undoubtedly, the main role in the uranium project belongs to Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov. I supervised specifically the creation of the bomb, all physics, that is, I was the scientific supervisor and chief designer ... organization of the institute and design bureau, I said that it was bad I understand organizational issues. To be able to use the maximum of opportunities and be engaged only in science and technology, that is, to be truly chief designer, need more one person who would take care of everything else. So the position of director appeared ... Pavel became him Mikhailovich Zernov. And a very energetic work began on the creation of laboratories and the recruitment of personnel ... Neither

who then did not imagine the scale of the work ... We received quite detailed information from America from Fuchs. He gave a description of the atomic bomb, and we re sewed it to repeat.

It's easier to copy, of course...

- Don't tell me! The work was tense and nervous. It was necessary to calculate all the processes taking place in the atomic bomb ... "

In the same OGONEK magazine, other materials on the history of the Soviet nuclear project: an article by Yuli Khariton "THE HAPPIEST YEARS OF MY LIFE" and an interview with an academician V. I. Goldansky.

In his article Yu. Khariton explains the role of Klaus Fuchs.

He was a talented German theoretical physicist and at the same time a communist. In 1934 he emigrated to England, where he became involved in the development of nuclear weapons. There, in England, he came to the Soviet embassy and reported on the ongoing work. Some time later, the group where Fuchs worked was invited to the USA at the Los Alamos Laboratory in southeastern New Mexico. Soviet

intelligence was able to contact Fuchs there too, who systematically transmitted extremely valuable information about the progress of work. And although the schematic diagram of an atomic bomb based on uranium-235 or plutonium-239 was known to Soviet physicists as early as 1939-1940, it was decided to put aside inventive activity and act in accordance with the information received.

Academician Goldansky commented on this as follows: *"Intelligence reports by themselves, in the absence of trained school of physicists and physical chemists, not would give results. Meanwhile, even without data*

intelligence, our physicists would still have come to the creation of a bomb, perhaps two years later.

This idea - that they could have done it themselves, but later - is also found in other testimonies of that time. But

what is the reason for the delay in independent work? In the fact that in this case it would be necessary to go through all the stages sequentially. That is, it would be impossible to launch serial production PARALLELLY to the creation of the first, in fact, EXPERIMENTAL samples. And a completely different situation is when this same sample has already been made, tested and is being mass-produced. And given that it was necessary to create new

industries, the best option

volume in terms of timing was the development of someone's finished products or proven technologies.

Thus, it was only with the help of intelligence data that it was possible to simultaneously build an experimental nuclear reactor, an industrial nuclear reactor, and a plutonium separation plant. And also to develop the terms of reference for the atomic bomb. This is what reduced the time of work on the Soviet "hooray for a new project"!

The first atomic explosion, as mentioned above, was carried out in the USSR at the end of August 1949. That bomb had the RDS-1 index (jokingly translated - "Russia does it itself"). The second - tower - 09/24/1951. And on October 17 or 18, 1951 at 13.00 Moscow time, the Tu-4A crew dropped the Maria bomb with an RDS-3 charge with a capacity of about 30 kilotons at the training ground in the Semip area. But she did not go to the mass

production (apparently due to the fact that the designers were required to minimize the weight of serial bombs). The first mass-produced nuclear warhead was the unified 30-kiloton charge RDS-4, designed for both missiles and free-falling bombs. His version of the RDS-4T became the basis for bomb

would be "Tatiana", which entered service with long-range and front-line aviation (with a weight of not 5 tons, like the RDS-1, but only 1.2 tons).

In 1953, a government decree was approved on the adoption of "Tatiana" into service and the launch

ke into mass production with annual quantity

20 pieces

Reducing the weight and made it possible to turn the front-line Il-28 into a carrier of atomic weapons. As a result, entire divisions of such bombers were deployed near the western borders of the socialist camp. At first they were based in the western regions of the USSR, but their crews turned into a kind of "suicide bombers" (there were practically no chances for a return). But then the Il-28 (including those with nuclear weapons) began to be deployed on the territory of Poland and the GDR. Their range made it possible to reach the shores of the English Channel. But this already refers to the time after 1953 (to the period of "détente").

By June 1953, the United States had carried out 34 atomic explosions, Great Britain - 1 (data sources from the journals: AVIO, 1996, No. war of the 53rd") and "AVIATION AND TIME", 1997, No. 1).

Finally, two pieces of information. The first is that in the newspaper Izvestiya, in its issue of March 8, 1950, TASS published a refutation of the Reuters news agency about the trial in London of the English physicist Fuchs, who was sentenced to 14 years in prison for transferring atomic secrets to "agents of the Soviet Government": *TASS is authorized to report that this statement is a gross fabrication, since Fuchs is unknown to the Soviet Government and no "agents" of the Soviet Government had nothing to do with Fuchs.*

The second information is related to the second Soviet

nuclear explosion in 1951. In the newspaper "PRAVDA" for 6.10. 1951 was published "RELEASE OF COMRADE I. V. STALIN TO THE CORRESPONDENT OF PRAVDA ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS" (later it was published as a separate pamphlet with a circulation of 2 million copies). Here are some quotes from it:

"Question: What do you think about the noise raised on days in the foreign press in connection with the test atomic bomb in the Soviet Union?"

Answer: Indeed, recently a us testing a type of atomic bomb. ispy atomic bombs of various calibers will continue to be carried out in accordance with the plan for the defense of our country against attacks by the Anglo-American aggressive bloc.

Question: In connection with the testing of the atomic bomb various US figures are raising the alarm and yelling about a threat to US security Is there any reason for such concern?"

Answer: There are no grounds for such anxiety... If the USA does not think of attacking the Soviet Union, the anxiety of US leaders must be considered pointless and false, because the Soviet Union does not think of ever attacking the USA or to some other country."

Tests of the first Soviet nuclear weapons forced the Americans to change their approach to planning a possible war against the USSR. A directive of the US National Security Council dated April 14, 1950, decreed that a potential enemy has more than 1,000 Tu-4 bombers and at least 10 atomic bombs. And this, as emphasized, radically changes the likely picture of hostilities in Europe, since the main targets for them will be NATO military groups.

In order to increase the effectiveness of the operation of Soviet long-range and strategic aviation, since 1948, the technology of aerial refueling was also developed (it was adopted in 1951).

"WHITE SPOT" OF THE POST-WAR HISTORY SOVIET TECHNOLOGY

It turns out that the policy of mass application of foreign experience was used not only in the creation of the Tu-4 or in the "uranium project". After the war, many advice

sky engineers and designers on an unspoken decision

governments switched to the development of foreign achievements. Science commentator Vadim Orlov reflects on this in the article "Heroes? Pirates? or ... "kruzhkovtsy"? in the magazine "TECHNIQUE - YOUTH ZHI", 1993, No. 4.

He writes: *"You can't throw out a word from a song: in our*

There is a period in history (post-war?) when the manufacture of "solid-drawn" (that is, wholly copied) structures was elevated almost to the level of state policy. It was deliberately started

campaign, but on its occasion they did not beat the propaganda drums, but did everything quietly, to the mute.

And he gives an example of "pure copying" by the Soviet industry of the American B-29 bomber (under the name Tu-4 and which was considered in the chapter on aircraft). In addition, the article also provides

other stories:

"The brainchild of S. Korolev, the R-1 rocket was an improved V-2. Based on the German "Wasserfall" designer Sinelnikov made an anti-aircraft missile for the air defense forces. At first they copied foreign

*strange radars, sonars and gyrocompasses, recreating
whether technologies for the production of alloys and plastics, the release
Kali cars that differ little from foreign prototypes. Etc."...*

Moreover, if the information about foreign products was sufficiently detailed, then attempts by Soviet engineers to create something of their own were thwarted. Vadim Orlov gives an example of the dismissal of Academician P. L. Kapitsa in August 1949. In accordance with a government decree signed by Steel

In other words, he was dismissed due to *"not using the existing advanced technology in the field of oxygen for border."* Although Stalin, according to his customary rule
lu in this case could solve one more problem: some
Some specialists should have been persecuted in order to force the rest to unquestioning obedience and high responsibility for the results of their work. At the beginning of 1949, Stalin planned a "preventive purge" of physicists along the lines of what had been done in biology. But successful work on the creation of the atomic bomb prevented. However, Stalin may not have allowed too free an atmosphere among scientists (the post-war terror will be discussed in more detail in a separate chapter).

Interesting confirmation about the post-war situation
tions in Soviet rocket science is given in the article
"CHIEF DESIGNER AND HIS TIME" of the journal "SCIENCE AND LIFE",
1992, No. 4 (author - Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of
Sciences V. I. Fedoseev). He's writing:

*"Immediately after the end of hostilities in the Soviet
the occupation zone (Germany) was flooded with a stream of our
technical specialists. There was something to see
there was a lot to learn. All rocket affairs were in
hastily created institute codenamed
"Berlin", where General L. M. Gaidukov was the head,
and his deputy and chief designer -*

"Colonel" S. P. Korolev. Worked at the Institute
Germans from among those specialists who did not leave or
did not have time to leave for the western zones of occupation. At the end
In 1946, when the "Berlin" was preparing to leave for their homeland (in
the USSR), the Germans were also taken out. After 3 years, it was
decided to send them back. In 1946, when the Berlin was still in
Germany, a secret
government decree on rocket technology. It was not only about ballistic,
but also about anti-aircraft missiles. Sergey Pavlovich was appointed
chief designer for ballistics ... You can

say confidently, if not for the Germans with their V-2,
Sergei Pavlovich Korolev to break distrust
and to achieve such a powerful turnaround of work, but it would take
another ten years of stubborn walking along
authorities.

The militarization of the national economy, so necessary and natural
during the war, after it
graduation took on a new breath ... In those distant
At times, the word "rocket" ... carried an element of state secrets. We
said "product", "object",
or "two", "five". P1 is the same V-2 rocket, but made by us. As for

P2, then there was something essentially new in it: a detachable
warhead, a bearing block (so far one) and
the instrument compartment rearranged from the bow to the tail Range
P1 - 300 km, P2 - 540 km ...

In those years there was a military-industrial boom. Unlimited funds
were poured into the creation of new means of military equipment.
Many diverse, mostly quite real projects were proposed. I remember
Chelomey intensively modernized

German V-1 projectile, ... promising a real
range of about 300 km. It is remembered that for
son of Beria, a huge design bureau was created to develop
another projectile aircraft ... with a range of several

thousand km. There were other projects that I only heard about out of the corner of my ear. Like mushrooms, new design bureaus grew on liquid and solid propellant engines, anti-aircraft missiles, guided bombs and other damaging means.

The completion of work on P1 and P2 posed new challenges for the military-industrial complex. The first is their serial production. A special plant was needed. He was found in Dnepropetrovsk. Before that there were made, it seems, tractors. Now - rockets. There was, one might say, anti-conversion. The second task necessary for the military is the transition from oxygen to new, so-called. high boiling oxidizers. In parallel, the development of R5 missiles (on oxygen) and P11 (on nitric acid and kerosene). On flight tests they came out at the same time - in April 1953. The range of the R5 was 1200 km, it was capable of carrying a nuclear charge.

An interesting memory of the post-war years: "military industrial boom", "unlimited environments properties", "anti-conversion", "cruise missiles", "separating heads". And frantic deadlines ("Faster! ... Still streaky!"). What for? By the way, was it similar in the USA? Something about the situation in the United States during the war and after the war, we will consider later, but for now let's return to the article by Vadim Orlov.

He tries to explain only the post-war policy of copying foreign designs. But the explanation is limited to the need for "short time" and remarks that *"searching for an answer, historians still*

have not yet come to a consensus" and that *"for historians of technology, the post-war period is often a continuous number of questions."* It's strange, but after all, the "short deadlines" must also be explained by something, right? It is sometimes said that the United States threatened to attack the Soviet Union, and declassified documents are cited as proof.

70s AMERICAN plans. As a counterdo

I can ask two questions:

1. When the German plan of attack was developed on the USSR (the famous "Barbarossa") and when was the preparatory work carried out on it?

2. And what were the relations between the USSR and Germany at that time?

Answers:

1. From the summer of 1940 to June 1941.

2. Friendship and cooperation, and no "cold war!"

Moreover, historians explain the prewar period in such a way that it is impossible to understand anything: was anything done on defense or not done? Judging by the catastrophic defeat in 1941, it turns out - what was not done. But the generals make excuses, for example, Marshal Zhukov assures us that Marshal Timoshenko, People's Commissar for Defense, worked 19 hours a day, even sleeping on a cot. And what did he do? Maybe the entire pre-war Soviet generals consisted of solid German agents? Why didn't Stalin then accuse them all of treason and didn't shoot them? Maybe he was also from the same "friends" of Germany? Then it is not clear why they spent so much effort on organizing defense?

As a reminder, how historians should

to study the past, I propose to get acquainted with the thought

V. I. Lenin, which he cited in his unfinished work "STATISTICS AND SOCIOLOGY" (PSS, Vol. 30):

"... The facts, if taken as a whole, in their connection, do not only stubborn, but also unconditionally demonstrative thing. ... We must try to establish such a foundation from exact and indisputable facts, on which you can it would be to lean. ...for it to be real foundation, it is necessary to take not individual facts, and the entire set of those related to the considered

to the question of facts, without a single exception, because otherwise there will inevitably arise a suspicion, and a completely legitimate suspicion, that the facts are chosen or chosen arbitrarily, that instead of an objective connection and the interdependence of historical phenomena as a whole is presented as a "subjective" concoction to justify, perhaps, a dirty deed.

Moreover, this quote was taken not from a volume of Lenin's works, but from the "Ryutin platform" of 1932 (section 3. "Stalin as a sophist") (Collection " REHABILITATION: POLITICAL PROCESSES of the 30-50s", Moscow, 1991, p. 349). Quoted words of Stalin's predecessor as party leader, the authors of the "platform" under led as an illustration to their evidence of the "dirty deeds" of Stalin himself, including the handling of facts. Many of them echo the rules of scientific falsification outlined at the beginning of this book. A more detailed acquaintance with the documents of the "Ryutin group" leads to the idea that official historians attach insufficient importance to them, especially in the matter of strengthening terror in the USSR from the mid-30s. But a separate chapter will be devoted to the topic of terror. And here I propose to get acquainted with another interesting thought of LENIN (from the article by Yu. Chernichenko "SCIENCE AND AGRICULTURE", the journal "NOVY MIR", 1981, No. 7, p. 164):

"... To draw good things from abroad with both hands: Soviet power + the Prussian order of iron roads + American technology and organization of trusts + American public education ets. ets. + + = ÿ = socialism..."

But, firstly, Soviet power with the Prussian order who can still somehow be combined, it is much more difficult to reconcile the absence of private property with the American private property management system.

leniya - this is generally some kind of not even nonsense, but how to call it ... But we digress.

Incidentally, during Stalin's time, the first MOBILE systems for launching missiles (P11) were developed (by the same Korolev). Their flight tests began in 1953 ("SCIENCE AND LIFE", 1992, No. 1, article by Doctor of Technical Sciences A. Abramov "Still RECENTLY IT WAS SECRET"). Then the idea arose to put them on submarines ... And how much "dirt" was then "poured" about mobile missile systems in the USA

as soon as these "paranoids" dared to spend a billion dollars for such barbarous means of destruction of mankind?!).

But let's get back to the post-war demand for "shorter deadlines." They were achieved in different ways. First of all - complete copying of foreign samples. And where this could not be done, then several (at least two) collectives were involved in the work there.

Vov designers.

In any case, maximum information about foreign achievements was required. It turns out that they received not only through scouts, but also quite openly. And not only when reading special technical publications.

For example, in the magazine "NOVIY MIR", in No. 10 for 1979 A. Malinov's article "160 MINUTES AND ... ALL LIFE" about the Soviet astronomer A. B. Severny was published. There were two interesting moments in his life after the war. In May 1945, the Defense Committee and the Soviet government ordered him to leave for defeated Germany as part of a group of Soviet specialists to search for and send home the scientific equipment stolen by the Nazis. But little of the loot they managed to find. Besides, in

the article does not say whether the group was interested in German achievements. But it turns out to create

again lost devices did not make sense, since *"during the years of the war, scientific instrumentation in the United States made noticeable strides forward"*! (By the way, such a conclusion is interesting in itself. For its appearance, it was necessary to constantly monitor the state of American instrumentation! Apparently, surveillance was at its best.)

The article goes on to say that in 1946 a group of Soviet specialists was sent to the United States to "study the American experience." A. Severny stayed there for half a year (returned in 1947). *"Member of the same*

trip Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences Vladi Mir Borisovich Nikonov spoke about how

fury, snatching literally a few hours for

sleep, studied, like a schoolboy, the art of scientific instrumentation from

overseas colleagues, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences A. Severny.

(By the way, we will also touch on the bashful term "studied." If in other countries something from Soviet achievements is repeated, then it was called "copied", "stolen", and for some reason the reverse process is called "study". Although copyright is an element of commercial competition in peacetime, but in the field of armaments, monopolies in this field are always tempted by military confrontation, and therefore generally risky.)

But the question may arise: is there a lot of knowledge could the Soviet specialists in the USA have obtained at that time? After all, it is believed that since March 1946 the Cold War has been unfolding. Historians write that at that time the United States began preparations for a nuclear attack, which forced the Soviet Union to

to speed up military preparations, in particular on atomic project.

But not everything is so simple. In the article "How can Minerva conquer Mars?" (magazine "KNOWLEDGE - POWER" in No. 3 for 1991

E. N. Kuznetsov, an intern at Cornell University in the United States, Ph.D. in Economics, explains that in the United States in 1946, twelve and a half million demobilized soldiers and officers appeared on the labor market, and almost the same number were released from the defense industry. In total - 24 million people! However, there was no "lost generation" in the United States, as happened in Western Europe. And this happened because the developments of defense laboratories created during the war were immediately declassified and quickly transferred to a commercial basis. All engineers working for the armed forces were given the opportunity (even encouraged) to create their own firms. *"Thus war began to serve the world and became the very power*

powerful impulse of post-war development".

This is also confirmed by the American magazine "ELEC". TRONICA", a special issue of which, dedicated to its 50th anniversary, was translated in 1980 by the publishing house "Mir" (Moscow) (the original issue of the magazine is 1980, Vol. 53, No. 9 (587)). Its pages 12, 13, 48-71 provide a brief overview of developments in the electrical and radio engineering industries in the United States during the war and post-war period.

It turns out that in 1941 - 1945 in the electronic the US industry was flooded with a multi-billion dollar the current of funds, under the influence of which it has turned from an insignificant industry focused on the production of household radio devices, into an important manufacturer of products for military equipment. In particular, the development of such branches of science as computer technology,

miniaturization techniques, radar, long-range navigation and guided missiles. During the war years, the number of people employed in the US electronics industry increased by about five times, reaching 560,000 people.

The War Production Committee noted that if in 1941 the total volume of factory sales for 55 of the manufacturers of radio equipment amounted to 240 million dollars, then in 1944 the sales volume of this industry, which

which by that time had become the industry of radio communication equipment (including the production of parts), reached an annual figure of 4.5 billion dollars, which amounted to an increase of 1875%.

A large number of radio devices found wide application in the main types of military equipment. According to William L. Batt, chairman of the Needs Committee of the War Production Committee, each tank of that time contained about \$5,000 worth of radio equipment, and a heavy bomber about \$50,000. by the Engineering Department of the Radio Manufacturers Association

paratures.

On June 27, 1940, the US government created the National Defense Research Committee. It was chaired by Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington and an electronics specialist. It was he who approached President Roosevelt with a proposal to mobilize science for defense needs. The members of the committee included prominent scientists, businessmen and representatives of the military. It lasted throughout the war and was dissolved in January 1947.

Much attention was paid to the organization of new research laboratories, which were created under the direction of a special National Research Committee. He created: two centers for anti-submarine defense, a radar center for studying the use of microwave frequencies (SHF), a laboratory for creating means of

countermeasures to interfere with communications and enemy radars, etc.

Great success was achieved by American and British scientists in the development of radars, especially in the microwave range (in the ultrahigh frequency range up to 30,000 MHz), while in France, the USSR, Japan and Germany they managed to create radars only in the range up to 300 MHz. . Moreover, more funds were spent on the development and production of radars in the United States than on the atomic bomb (\$2.5 billion versus \$2 billion). As a result, the American and British radars had a 2 times longer range than the German ones (80 km against the German 40). And the experimental American S-band station had a range 5 times greater than the German ones - 200 km. To improve the convenience of displaying the information received, all-round visibility indicators (PPI) based on new kinescopes were developed. The first such aircraft IKO was installed in July 1942 on a Lockheed Navy patrol bomber.

These developments led to the creation in the United States in the early 1940s of a prototype microwave early warning radar, which ensured the detection of targets at a distance of more than 240 km and could mark several targets. Some facts about this the systems remained classified for decades. It used a powerful S-band magnetron. In the 1950s, it provided the basis for the American early warning radar system deployed in Canada.

In 1943, the H2X station was developed for precision bombing in bad weather (with an accuracy of up to 100 m). It was installed in the nose of the B-17 bombers during flights to Germany.

In addition to radars, hydro

anti-submarine locators. And in the end

the study of enemy search methods led to the creation of navigation systems for their own ships and aircraft. In this case, the Loran system, developed at the Radiation Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has achieved great success. Its first sample was installed in October 1942 on the Atlantic (East) coast of the USA. The range of the system ranged from 300 to 800 nautical miles during the day and 1500 at night. She could determine the position of ships with an accuracy of **1%** with a distance of up to 800 nautical miles and **5%** more.

One of the biggest research and development achievements of World War II was miniaturization. This was required to create highly effective self-guided radio fuses for mines, shells and bombs. For this, subminiature lamps were invented. In addition, thick-film printing technology was developed. This allowed a third of the US electronics industry to turn to the production of radio fuses. The total cost of the project approached \$1 billion, and more than 20 million of these fuses were produced in total. They were first used on January 5, 1943 by the anti-aircraft gunners of the American cruiser Helena. Shells with radio explosives turned out to be three times more effective

effective than projectiles equipped with remote fuses, even when using radar leg fire control.

Military needs stimulated work on the creation of electronic computers, especially for the calculation of trajectories necessary for the creation of firing tables. Bell Telephone Laboratories completed the Model III relay computer in 1943. He weighed 10 tons, but could calculate the trajectory in 40 minutes. Then there was the law

The creation of computers "Mark I" and "Mark II" at Harvard University together with IBM was conceived. The broad advent of the era of electronic digital computers began after the official introduction of the Eniac 15 machine in February 1946. It weighed 30 tons, occupied a room of 9x15 meters, had 18,000 lamps, but worked until 1955.

Another direction of military development was the improvement of cathode ray tubes (CRTs or "kinescopes"). They were used in radars, sonars, equipment of the Loran system, etc. Various types of CRTs were developed. In 1945, RCA succeeded in creating the superorticon, a new television transmission tube that replaced the iconoscope, which had less image clarity. By the same year, the issue of frequency allocation for non-military FM broadcasting was resolved, after which television began to develop rapidly as a separate industry. In 1946, six commercial stations began broadcasting to several thousand black-and-white television sets in the United States. At the same time, work was underway to create color

foot television.

Due to the fact that in 1945 the possibility of a new world war was not seriously discussed (and was not yet visible), it is natural that after the end of the fighting these and many other military developments found wide application for peaceful purposes. Most of them have been declassified and commercialized.

usage.

In particular, radars began to be used to ensure the flights of civil aircraft and the movement of ships. They also found application for radar mapping. The business world became interested in computers, and in 1947 the first firm was founded to produce them.

ma (Eckert & Mauchly Computer Corp.). The quality of broadcasting has improved. The quality of the gramophone recording has been improved. Microwaves began to be used both in industry (for drying fabrics, heat treatment of rubber, preheating plastics) and in everyday life for heating food (the first microwave oven was produced by General Electric in 1947). The German invention, the tape recorder, was actively introduced into life.

You read these lines and refuse to believe that the first microwave ovens went on sale in the USA in 1947! Of course, it is quite possible that not everyone could afford them for the price, but in the countries of the former socialist bloc they remained an unrealizable dream of housewives! The production of household tape recorders in the USSR was still somehow able to be established, but they were of such a quality that it was better to keep quiet about it.

The introduction of new products in the peaceful industries in the United States after the war became possible not only because of the declassification of military developments, but also through the transfer of personnel from the military industry to the civilian sector. In 1944, the law on the rights of military personnel came into force, thanks to which millions of veterans did not become idle after the war, and many of them were able to return to educational institutions. The act also provided veterans with unemployment benefits, special medical care, and loans to buy houses, farms, and start businesses. Many former military engineers created their own firms (for example: William Hughlett, David Packard, Howard Vollum, Joseph Keithley and others).

In order to spread the new
But their description began to appear in magazines, for example, in the same ELECTRONICS, one of the editors of which was Donald Fink. He recalled: *"When I returned from the war , of course, I had access to almost everything*

what happened in the radiation laboratory. Very soon everything was declassified, and a lot of materials on radar were ready for publication in a magazine ... Immediately after the war, electronics became develop unstoppably. Consumer electronics has been on the rise, television appeared. All the industries that boomed during the war — microwave and Microwave technology, magnetrons, semiconductor devices (diodes, not yet transistors) have become available in the domestic and commercial sectors. Fink himself prepared an extremely interesting series of articles on the mysteries of radar.

A similar increase in achievements should have been in other areas of American science and technology, it is quite possible that in optics. In other words, A. Severny and other Soviet specialists, if they wished, in 1946-1947 could learn a lot about American technical innovations! This means that the United States is talking about a big war in 1945-1947. didn't even think about it? Or did they think that they would "throw hats" if someone attacked? (In the sense - atomic?) So, the attack on someone was not seriously planned?

Indeed, why did the United States "spit" on the four B-29s that ended up in the Soviet Union? Why did they drastically reduce the army and the defense industry? Why have declassified many developments of military laboratories? Moreover, groups of Soviet specialists were allowed in? (Not counting the presence of intelligence officers of various levels. By the way, the fact that there were a lot of Soviet diplomats in the United States during the war and once experts, says the memoirs of the pilot I.P. Mazuruk, who in 1944 made a long business trip to North and South America). Who is preparing a war like that?! Here we can also recall the fact that Great Britain sold the latest jet engines to the Soviet Union, which then

curled on the MiG-15, Il-28 and other massive Soviet combat aircraft. Incidentally, the offer to buy from the British, the aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev expressed a license to purchase jet engines during a meeting with Stalin (he writes about this in his memoirs). Stalin did not even believe it, he said that "what kind of fool would sell his secrets?" That's right, if you prepare for war, then this is the stupidity of stupidity! Of course, if the British only thought about a new war, then such a possibility is incredible! But let's look at this problem from the angle of the British. The war is over; in the next 10 years, such a war does not seem to be foreseen. And during this period, the engines become obsolete. Why will they "gather dust" if they can be sold to someone? Moreover, the Treaty of Friendship, concluded in 1942, was then in force between Great Britain and the USSR!

Although there are other data on the post-war American conversion, which are somewhat different from those given above (PRAVDA newspaper, 10/31/1988, J. L. Geddis (USA), "ABOUT THE PAST FOR THE FUTURE"): *"between 1945 and 1947 personnel US military has been reduced from 12 million to 1.6 million people, and military appropriations were reduced from 81.6 billion to 13.1 billion dollars.* The figures are smaller than those given by E. Kuznetsov, but they are also impressive.

So if the leadership of the United States does not supposed to start a new world war in the coming years after the victory in 1945, then why did Stalin set "very tight deadlines" for Soviet designers? Why such a hurry?

However, the "blank spots" in the postwar history of Soviet science and technology do not end there. These include the development and production of technical products for "special" purposes. For example, gas generating trucks. That

there are cars that ran on gas, obtained in a special device by burning solid fuel (wood chocks). Here are some of their characteristics:

Gas generator trucks produced in the USSR

brand	years release	Carrying capacity, t	Consumption of chocks per 100 km of track, kg
GAZ-42	1939-1942	1.2	60(30hp)
ZIS-21	1939-1944	2.5	95 (45 HP)
ZIS-21A	1944-1952	2.5	95 (45 HP)
Ural-EIS-352 (based on ZIS-5M)	1952-1956	2.5	115 (45 HP)

(The data is taken from the AUTOMOBILE QUICK GUIDE, which had many editions from the late 50s to the late 80s.)

What are NGVs for? I give a certificate from TSB (1971, vol. 6, p. 21): "Gas generator

A car is a car whose engine

runs on gas obtained from solid fuel in

gas generator mounted on its chassis. IN THE USSR

work on the creation of Ga. were started in 1923, serial production of G.a. (3uC-13) was mastered in 1938. As a fuel for G.a. wood chocks or brown coal are used. It is possible to use wood

coal, peat, semi-coke, etc. G.a. intended for

operation in areas remote from the places of production of liquid fuels. G.a. widely used

during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945,

when there was an acute shortage of liquid fuel for the needs of road transport.

In other words, during the preparation and conduct of the war of 1941-1945, as well as until the mid-1950s, one or two models of aircraft were mass-produced in the USSR.

vehicles that could not run on fuel derived from oil. This can be understood in a war—oil is saved for other equipment: tanks, aircraft, and so on. For comparison, we can recall that gas generator cars were also produced in Nazi Germany. The remark that such a technique is useful even in peacetime in areas rich in forest does not work! The fact is that its operation is fraught with a number of difficulties. The best wood for gas generators is oak and birch, while conifers are more widespread in the forests of the Soviet Union. The importance lies in the different properties of

store and give moisture to different tree species. There are also difficulties when using peat or coal (this is due to the degree of slag formation, etc.). Ultimately, the power of a gas generator engine is reduced by 35-40% compared to a gasoline engine. And besides, on such a car, additional space is required for the installations themselves and for a larger supply of fuel. This results in a reduction in load capacity. It is quite logical that, over time, such a technique was abandoned. But for some reason, in the considered period of the history of the USSR, the need for it remained.

But it turns out that after the war, gas generating locomotives were also developed in the USSR! This is written in the reference book "SOVIET DIESEL LOCOMOTIVES" (M.: Mashgiz, 1961, p. 42).

"In 1950, the All-Union Research Institute of Railway transport was switched to mixed fuel one locomotive series TE1. The gas was produced in an AM anthracite (i.e., coal) gas generator set. Next, an experimental batch of similar locomotives at the Ulan-Ude Locomotive and Carriage Repair Plant and sent to work at the Baskunchak depot Volga Railway ... However, the application

two types of fuel greatly complicates the work depot, and in the presence of a sufficient amount of liquid fuel, such a complication is not necessary. Therefore, further experiments in this direction have been discontinued.

For reference, it should be noted that single-section diesel locomotives of the TE1 series have been produced by the Kharkov Heat and Locomotive Plant since 1947. Since 1950 on the same plant began to make two-section diesel locomotives TE2. Since 1954, the TE3 series has gone.

The reference book informs about retrofitting of one-section TE1. But in the newspaper "PRAVDA" for January 11, 1953, on the first page there is a photograph of a three-section diesel locomotive, the extreme sections of which resembled sections of TE2! The comment says:

"Socialist industry equips our vehicles are first-class vehicles. In the directives of the 19th Party Congress on the Fifth Five-Year Plan planned to "start production of new powerful locomotives, electric locomotives and diesel locomotives, including gas generators". The picture shows an experimental mainline gas-generating locomotive manufactured by Kharkov plant of transport engineering. It is equipped with a gas generator and engines with a capacity of 2000 hp. The engines run on anthracite with a small amount of liquid fuel added. On conventional locomotives only liquid fuel is used. The new locomotive is capable of covering long distances without fuel or water. gas generating diesel locomotive passed the first tests.

But in the reference book on diesel locomotives, information about this model did not fit. It is possible that this was the result of "further experiments". But for some reason, historians of technology do not want to dwell on this fact in detail.

Indeed, in peacetime, "with a sufficient amount of liquid fuel," the need for such transport is small. But can a situation arise when "liquid fuel" becomes scarce? At least during the war - definitely!

Receipt

It appears that such a possibility was provided for by customers of such equipment. And the main customer of everything new at that time was I. Stalin.

Another example of "special" equipment is amphibious tanks. Many experts believe that they can be widely used only in the offensive. In both

one, when the fuel was running out, the tanks were digging

whether the tower into the ground on the front line. So, in the USSR in 1949-1951, under the leadership of Zh. Kotin, the PT-76 amphibious tank was developed and put into service. Moreover, besides him, another model was developed by another design bureau, but did not get into mass production.

Modeled on the PT-76, amphibious tanks were also produced in China in the 70s. In the United States, the LVTH-6 amphibious tank was adopted in 1955, but it was not widely used. And since 1971, the IKV-91 amphibious tank has been produced by Sweden. (Information from the magazine "TEKHNIKA - YOUTH", No. 8, 1990.) All this shows that most countries of the world did not particularly care about the presence of such special equipment in their armies (it does not find much need in defense).

The next example of "special" military equipment can be considered snowmobiles. It turns out that before the war, as well as during and after it, the USSR developed

tyvayutsya and used for various military purposes

snowmobiles (magazine "MODEL CONSTRUCTION", 1988, No. 2, pp. 6-8. I. Yuvenaliev, "Through the fire and the blizzard").

The propeller driven snowmobile was invented in 1904. During the First World War, there were times

a certain number of transport snowmobiles were worked and used, the operation of which continued during the Civil War in Russia.

After its completion, work on the construction of the aerosleigh continued. Until 1939, the NAMI and TsAGI institutes created more than twenty designs. Machines of the NKL type were mass-produced at a special plant of Lessudomashstroy, and of the KM type at the Krasny Metallist Gorky plant.

And most of the models of Soviet snowmobiles were military. Moreover, they were used in battles, starting with the Soviet-Finnish war. Then it would be commercially produced TsAGI-ANT-IV designed by A.N. Tupolev and OSGA (NKL)-6 by N.M. Andreev. An NKL-6S ambulance was developed to transport the seriously wounded. Then they adopted the headquarters NKL-38, followed by cargo snowmobiles NKL-12 for

serving field airfields.

The improvement of the snowmobile continued after 06/22/1941. Special airborne battalions were even formed.

About the post-war fate of the snowmobiles, the magazine said only that *"combat continued to serve in mainly in the border troops*. Transport vehicles were used to transport mail and other goods in Siberia, in the North and in other hard-to-reach places.

The remark "mostly" is interesting. So, were there any other special aerosleigh units?

Of course, snowmobiles could be used practically in most of the USSR in winter. But

in some places they could be the main

ground military transport - in the event of a war in the Arctic! The situation with the northern latitudes will be considered further, and now let's move on to another type of "special" equipment, necessary specifically for

waging an offensive war on the territory of other countries. It will be about a special connection for Stalin.

Very brief information about this is given in the memoir of a member of the CPSU since 1926 , A.A.

Before his arrest on February 7, 1948, he worked at the Research Institute of the Mining Aviation Industry. He began serving his term in the Komi ASSR, in Intlag, where at that time there were more than 100,000 prisoners. In January 1949, A. Zorohovich was transferred to a strictly secret research institute near Moscow, which was part of the MGB system. It was called "p / I 222" or "NII-2". In the language of the prisoners - "sharashka". Zorokhovich notes that in total there were more than 300 specialists-prisoners and about 100 civilian employees and officers, including the mathematical physicist A Solzhenitsyn. The main task of this "sharashka" is to create a perfect telephone communication system for Stalin, but barking to speak with Soviet representatives in different countries without the risk of being overheard by someone's intelligence. In addition, the "owner" set another most difficult condition: his voice must be easily recognizable on the other end of the wire. In 1956 Zorohovich was rehabilitated.

Why did Stalin need such a system? After all, under ordinary ("peaceful") conditions, special haste in international relations is not required. There is quite enough postal diplomatic communication, including telegraph with the use of ciphers. It was with their help that Stalin exchanged messages during the preparation and conduct of the Korean War. But it turns out that he assumed that conditions would arise when he personally would have to talk with some of his representatives in other countries. And for some reason, no other type of communication could replace

telephone. And what advantage does the telephone have over encrypted telegraph or mail? There is only one answer - shorter communication time!

Could conditions arise where fast communication becomes very important? They can. Moreover, in the life of Stalin, this was already in practice. When? During the Great Patriotic War. Numerous examples can be cited. They are found in many memoirs of the former commanders of the fronts and armies of the Red Army. It turns out that Stalin assumed the emergence of such a thing in the near future! That is, the emergence of a NEW WORLD WAR. More precisely, not about

a hundred "suggested", but rather carefully prepared.

On this list of "special" post-war technical Nicky doesn't end. You can remember Stalin's "construction sites of the century", which, for example, D. Volkogonov briefly mentions in the 2nd volume of his book "TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY": these are the Baikal-Amur railway, a tunnel from the mainland to Sakhalin Island (under the strait) and a railway line from Northern Urals to the Yenisei. Volkogonov writes that their construction was started without the necessary economic justification, secretly, and then stopped (p. 522).

But they stopped building them AFTER Stalin's death. And they started even before the war of 1941-1945. There is a recollection of this by the former prisoner L. M. Gurvich in the collection "... TO HAVE THE POWER TO REMEMBER". He was arrested in 1938. The verdict was announced on September 2, 1940 and sent to Sevzheldorlag, which was entrusted with the construction of a railway from Kotlas through Konosha to Cherepovets. It was part of the gigantic northern railway line conceived by Stalin from Leningrad to the Ob and further through the Yenisei and Lena to the Far East, created by slave labor

in the extremely severe climatic conditions of the Far North.

In general, there are three reasons for the construction of any objects: economic, military or other. Others are rare. For example, the construction of a stadium for the Olympic Games can be attributed to it. The first two are the main ones. The fact that some of Stalin's "constructions of the century" were stopped after his death proves that there was no economic sense in them at that time. For example, the railway came to the north of the Tyumen region later, but in a different way - from the south, i.e. as the economic development of those places. The Stalinist highway was built from west to east along the forest-tundra. There is also no other meaning in such constructions, since it implies some kind of use of the objects being built. But they were built in strict secrecy and were abandoned. But this is precisely the fate of most of the objects created according to military plans! Not in the sense that they are necessarily under construction, but in the sense that the need for them eventually disappears. As confirmation, you can

recall the city fortifications of the ancient and middle ages, the "Stalin Line" (fortifications on the old western Soviet border that were abandoned after 1939, although they were built very carefully and in strict secrecy), etc. They may turn out to be unfinished if the military need for them ceases before the completion of construction. And they are built, as a rule, in secrecy, secretly.

It turns out that until March 1953 there was some kind of military necessity for some large construction projects in different regions of the USSR, especially in the North. And after that date, she disappeared. And what was it?

This is not the end of the history of "special" technology. It is clear, but it is time to move on to the second important historical fact, which testifies to Stalin's desire to start a new world war - to the events in Korea.

KOREA 1945-1953

Another serious fact showing that Stalin was not joking at all about the approach of a new world war is the events in Korea before 1953.

The 13th volume of the TSB of the latest (third) edition states that the Soviet Army entered Korea from the north in August 1945, and in September of the same year, US troops landed in Korea from the south. This was done

in accordance with the Allied agreements

in Yalta (February 1945), in Potsdam (July-August 1945) and by the decision of the Moscow meeting of the Foreign Ministries of the USSR, USA and Great Britain (December 1945). The purpose of the entry of the Allied troops into Korea was to accept the surrender of the Japanese troops there.

Concerning the meetings in Potsdam, in another volume The TSB only has two articles: one is about the Potsdam Conference, the second is about the Potsdam Declaration. The first speaks only of the decisions of the Allies on Germany, not a word about the decisions to wage war against Japan. This is discussed in the Potsdam Declaration, which was published on July 26, 1945 on behalf of the governments of Great Britain, the USA and China. The declaration, in an ultimatum form, demanded the unconditional surrender of Japan. She

provided:

- the elimination of the power and influence of militarism in Japan;

- temporary occupation of Japanese territory;
- transfer of the Japanese economy to a peaceful track;

etc.

The TSB goes on to say that the Japanese government rejected (07/28/1945) the requirements of the Declaration. But after the accession of the Soviet Union to it (08/08/1945) and the beginning of hostilities against Japan (08/09/1945) On 08/14/1945, the Japanese government announced its acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.

As you can see, in all the places listed there is no clear description of how Korea was divided, who and when proposed to do it. Moreover, for some reason, a long list of "agreements" is given: in Yalta, and in Potsdam, and in Moscow (again, "shuffling"?). Moscow owl

this list can be removed - how could the troops act in August-September according to the December decisions? In Yalta they could make fundamental decisions, working out the demarcation line between the armies is a more specific matter. It turns out that the most realistic place, according to its agreement, is the Potsdam Conference, which took place from 07/17/1945 to 08/02/1945.

I wonder what would be written in TSB if the United States proposed to divide Korea, the USSR would be against it, but the United States insisted? Probably, they would have written that the USSR was against the division of Korea, but the militaristic circles of the USA, having received the atomic bomb, brazenly demanded something. And since the Soviet Union did not have an atomic bomb, Stalin was forced to agree, which later led to innumerable suffering for the Korean people. But... such words

we don't find.

Moreover, despite the presence of the atomic bomb, the United States was interested in the participation of the USSR in the war against Japan, which is why it was not profitable for them to arrange any disputes before it began. And in Soviet publications, the question of the initiator of the proposal is divided

Korea never climbed, it was very diligently bypassed. For example, quite recently, for the deputy editor-in-chief of the journal "PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST" B. N. Slavinsky in his article " KOREAN WAR 1950-1953: MODERN TRANSITION

CONSIDERATION (1991, No. 2) rightly notes that although that war has long ended, the problems remain

so far, and in dealing with them, he proposes

"clear the rubble of the past", clarify everything that

led to the emergence of the most Korean samples

lemmas, refuse silence, omissions, semi

truth, *"or even just distortions of historical*

facts, which took place not only at the time

Stalinism, but also in subsequent years. The time has come to clear up a number

of "blank spots" in the history of international relations and foreign policy of the USSR...".

Then, quite logically, he turns to the history of events in Korea since 1945 and reports the following:

blowing:

Let us recall that at the final stage of the war

with Japan, the commands of the USSR and the USA came to an agreement to consider the 38th parallel as a dividing line

military line of American and Soviet

troops on the Korean Peninsula. In accordance with

By this decision, the Soviet troops ... "

That the Soviet troops subsequently acted in

according to this decision is understandable. But having delved into the small

details of that conflict, one really wants to ask the author of the article (and other historians): "And who was the FIRST who suggested dividing Korea? And where?"

Judging by the very approximate information in the above quotation, it turns out that Korea was divided in the course of the fighting in connection with the combat situation. And it is hinted that the question of the initiator of the division does not play a role. For my part, I would like to strictly officially note: it is precisely this question that is extremely

important, because it immediately answers another important question: who was interested in the future Korean War, the total losses in which (over 10 million people) can be compared, for example, with the losses of Germany in World War II (about 13 million people) . It is not possible to "unravel the tangle" without finding its beginning. And the beginning of the Korean problem was carefully concealed for many years. I noticed this problem for a long time, although

was not interested in her.

And when already in the midst of perestroika on television broadcast a special program on how and where Korea was divided, I watched it with great interest. In it, a Soviet general in a white tunic in detail

recounted the sequence of military negotiations in Potsdam on the development of a demarcation line between the troops of the USSR and the USA in the Far East. First your

proposals were made by the American delegation, the transformation of ALL of Korea into a zone of action of Soviet troops. In addition, the Americans offered to send one Soviet division to the central Japanese island. The USSR delegation, agreeing in principle, for its part proposed that the demarcation line in Korea should run approximately along its middle. The Americans were surprised and reported that they were unable to fight in Korea. To land in Korea, they need to capture Japan. And the capture of Japan means the end of the war. By

and they suggested that they think until the next day and report their opinion to Stalin. The next day with

The Veteran delegation confirmed its decision to share Korea. US generals, being at a loss, agree foxes.

Unfortunately, when I watched that TV program, I was not yet fond of collecting data on the topic "M-2" and did not think of writing down the name of the program, its date, channel, and the names of the participants. Therefore, I only have to mention her.

But you can see that in the "TSB" because of the principle encyclopedic brevity, any information cannot be exhaustive, and in articles of a popular nature, a number of details can be omitted without malicious intent or because of the author's preferences. The search for details should be carried out in specialized publications, for example, in "HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION 1941-1945". Indeed, in the 5th volume of this "HISTORY ..." (M., 1963) there is a description of the negotiations in Potsdam. Regarding the planning of the war in the Far East, it says:

"In the course of the Potsdam talks, many problems of the war in the Pacific were discussed. Soviet, American and British military representatives exchanged the necessary information.

The American-British command was interested first of all, the plan for the upcoming actions of the Red Armies... Military talks in Potsdam on issues Far East were successful, which was noted by representatives of the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain. "Conferences of the military in Potsdam," wrote subsequently the American General D. Dean – ended in an atmosphere of complete agreement" (p. 539).

At this point in the HISTORY... no specific information is given on the plans for military operations in Korea, but such a discussion took place, as can be judged from the following report (p. 586):

"On August 15, 1945, the Americans developed the so-called project. "General Order No. 1" , in which were areas for accepting the surrender of Japanese troops each of the allied powers - the Soviet Union, the USA, China and Great Britain. The order, in particular, provided that the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East surrender Japanese troops in northeastern China, in northern part of Korea (north of the 38th parallel) and on

South Sakhalin. The surrender of Japanese troops in Korea south of the 38th parallel was to be accepted Americans. Conduct landing operations there for the purpose of interaction with the Soviet Armed Forces During the hostilities, the American command refused to use forces. General Marshall stated in connection with this at the Potsdam Conference that the Americans were not preparing for such an operation, that "at present this operation would be is at great risk as long as the US has no bases in Japan." The American command chose to land its troops in Korea only after the end of the war. without any risk to oneself and exclusively for imperialist purposes" (September 8-9, 1945)."

But there are several possible questions about this paragraph. First, why is General Order No. 1 "so-called"? Stalin himself agreed that the post of commander-in-chief of all allied forces was taken by an American general, and he was formally OBLIGED to issue a general order to accept the surrender. More precisely, this post itself was only needed to issue ONE general order to accept surrender. Japan, for its part, gives ONE order to its troops. And by what order should the allied troops accept the surrender? Each commander in chief? But at the same time, problems may arise, for example, due to disputed territories. Of course, in order to prevent them, negotiations can be held in advance. And it was done in Potsdam. But the troops are not acting on a decision

negotiations, but on the orders of commanders.

To illustrate the foregoing, I give a quote from the book "Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the USSR President and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945", Volume 2 (August 1941-December 1945) (ed. 2. Moscow: Politizdat, 1989):

"No. 360. Personal and secret message from Generalissimo I.V. Stalin to the President of the United States, Mr. G. Truman.

I have received your message of August 12 regarding the appointment of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies.

to accept, coordinate and carry out the general surrender of Japanese troops.

The Soviet government agrees with your proposal. Also in line with what you suggested.

procedure stipulated that General Makar Tur would give the Japanese Imperial Headquarters

an indication of the unconditional surrender of the Japanese troops and in front of the Soviet High Command on

Far East. Lieutenant General Derevianko was appointed representative of the Soviet Military High Command, and he was given all the necessary instructions (12.08.1945)"

Secondly, what does it mean *"General Marshall declared IN CONNECTION WITH THIS at the Potsdam Conference?* In connection with what? At the Potsdam Conference from July 17 to August 2, General Marshall could not say anything in connection with General Order No. 1 of August 15, 1945. General Marshall could make his statement only during negotiations to discuss the future delimitation of the border line, and only if someone else suggested dividing Korea, since the Americans were not preparing for such an operation, that *"at present this operation was would be at great risk as long as the US has no bases in Japan."* Correct remark, what could be the charges?

The Americans did not even imagine that they would have to land in Korea! They are uncomfortable! They don't have bases close to Korea! And who is the most comfortable? British troops from some islands? Or China, which is occupied by Japan in the northeast? Was it very difficult for the Soviet Army to drive even

450 km south of the 38th parallel? Did you miss two petrol and diesel fuel stations? Moreover, Soviet military historians note that the division of Korea worsened the landing operations of the Soviet Army (American planes dropped sea mines into Korean coastal waters ("HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-1945". T. I, M., 1980)).

Thirdly, if it was known in advance that the American the Kanians will land *"exclusively for imperialistic purposes"*, why was it impossible to protest the SO-CALLED "General Order No. 1"? It could be. Moreover, in the same "History of the Great Patriotic War..." on p. 586 the next paragraph says:

"The Soviet government basically did not object to the content of General Order No. 1, but made several amendments to it. It suggested include in the surrender area of the Japanese armed forces Soviet troops, firstly, all the Kuril Islands, which, according to the Yalta decision, were to be transferred to the Soviet Union, and, secondly, the NORTHERN HALF of about. Hokkaido.

It is further stated that an exchange of opinions took place between the Soviet and American commands, in which resulted in a "misunderstanding" with the Kuril Islands (the Americans, as it turned out, asked for the opportunity to use the airfield on them for the intermediate landing of their aircraft), but did not give Fr. Hokkaido. More precisely, the exchange took place not between commands, but directly between Stalin and Truman (see "CORRESPONDENCE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR CM...", Volume 2). This was the end of the coordination, and "General Order No. 1" was approved.

Again questions arise. But what about Korea? Why was Stalin not only not against the division of Korea, but also proposed to divide the Japanese island of Hokkai do? For what? Was there any plan? Formally, in the CENSUS

KE CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR CM...", volume 2, demand of the northern half of Fr. Hokkaido was explained by Stalin as a political reason, as if in retaliation for the fact that Japanese troops were on the territory of Soviet Russia during the Civil War. The Americans were against in return, they offered to symbolically send some troops to the central Japanese island. Apparently they understood the difference between symbolic joint troops and uncontested occupation.

In the "Introduction" it was already noted that if a historical event has not been written anywhere for many years exactly but, and it can be interpreted in different ways, then falsification is possible. So, the division of Korea was not mentioned anywhere for many years. There are plenty of opportunities for fraud. I found one in the form of a note to the article of the candidate of historical code of V. A. Tarasov "COUNTRY OF MORNING FRESHNESS" (notes on the civil war on the Korean Peninsula) ("VIZH", 1996, No. 2, p. 74). We read: *"The 38th parallel - dividing line between Soviet and American rican acceptance zones for the surrender of japanese troops, approved **on the initiative of the United States** (emphasis added by me) in August 1945. It turned into a border between the border formed in the north in September 1948 North Korea and proclaimed in the south in August 1948 by the Republic of Korea.*

What was the "initiative", the author does not specify. And this is understandable, since his opinion is based on the absence of a documentary description of the negotiations, which, in fact, should have been published. And this was partially done - in the 80s, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs published 6 volumes under the general title "SOVIET UNION AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 1941-1945 : Collection of documents". Of these, the 6th volume (1984) was entirely devoted to the Berlin (Potsdam

skoy) conference. But throughout the volume containing 511 pages, there is only one paragraph about military negotiations, repeated twice: *"During the Conference there were meetings of the Chiefs of Staff of the three Governments on military matters of common interest.* It turns out that after 40 years their contents are still secret.

And the question still remains open, where did the idea of the 38th parallel come from?

For a long time I could not find the answer to this question.

There were various materials on the Internet. For example, on the site http://www.worlds.ru/asia/north_korea/ on North Korea, I found the phrase: *"In 1945, **according to the documents of the Potsdam Conference,** The 38th parallel was marked as a line, I divide zone of occupation by Soviet and American troops."*

Or another example from the site <http://www.ruskorea.narod.ru/republic.htm>:

On August 15, 1945, shortly after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allied forces. As a result, Korea was finally liberated, and after 35

years of colonial rule gained independence.

However, the joy of the Korean people was short-lived.

An ideological confrontation arose over the question of who should govern the state. Soviet troops hurriedly occupied the northern part

peninsula, and US troops occupied its southern part

***in accordance with the decisions of the Potsdam Conference of 1945** ".*

But where? Where to read these very solutions Potsdam conference?

And so I find on the Internet at <http://lib.ru/EMIGRATION/LANKOV/n-korea.txt> a large book about

North Korea. Its author is Andrey Lankov, a specialist in oriental culture. In his work was a "SHORT NOTICE":

"The book that is brought to your attention was published in 1995 at the publishing house "Eastern Literature" (former Main Edition of Oriental Literature publishing house "Science"). Its circulation was normal for our stormy days - 700 copies, so for it has remained inaccessible to most readers interested in North Korea."

And further, Andrei Lankov quite correctly notes that *"the vast majority of Russian citizens about this country, which is located with everything in the neighborhood and even has with us a small (only 14 km) common land border"*, knows almost nothing. There are several reasons. Until the end of 1989, the Soviet press made little mention of the DPRK. After 1991, the situation changed slightly and longer articles appeared, *"but not as much [changed] as may seem at first glance."*

Lankov notes that studying North Korea is difficult. The reason is the very nature of North Korean society, its policy of informational self-isolation, pursued by the North Korean authorities. North Korea is still very much a closed country.

"The main problem facing the historian is trying to deal with the past and present of North Korea is, of course, a chronic lack of reliable sources. The DPRK is a country of absolute, all-encompassing secrecy, the USSR of the Stalinist period, in comparison with it, is almost

open society. ... Contrary to generally accepted ideas, things are not in the best way with former Soviet archives. It's well known that in the early 1990s they were with great fanfare from

wings for researchers, but far fewer people know that in the mid-1990s, the process of opening the archives was first suspended, and then I quietly reversed. However, the author

managed to get a lot of new archival documents, which are widely used in this book. An important role was also played by interviews with participants in the events — diplomats, military men, political emigrants, many of whom live in Russia and other republics of the former USSR”.

But I was more interested in the chapter in Lankov's book about the period of August 1945. What did he write about the very reason for dividing Korea in half? The answer I hoped can be found in chapter 2. *“NORTH KOREA 1945-1948: ROZH*

DENIES OF THE STATE”. But, as it turned out, I hoped in vain, although a lot of interesting material was found in it. About what Soviet troops entered Korea. Who commanded them. What was their biography, especially Colonel General T. F. Shtykov. But for some reason, Lankov did not want to specify where the 38th parallel came from and who suggested dividing Korea. Not

how many quotes

“For the Soviet Union, the war in the Far East began on August 9, and already on the evening of August 11, at the end of the second day of fighting, units of the 25th Army crossed Sino-Korean border at Gyeongheung. Over the next few days, resistance

Japanese garrisons north of the 38th parallel were suppressed. On August 15, the Japanese command announced the surrender of its troops in Korea ...

Almost all military operations on the territory of the Korean Peninsula were conducted by units of the 25th Army of the 1st Far Eastern Front. Therefore, there is nothing surprising in the fact that it was precisely this army that was entrusted with the task of establishing control over the occupied territory and creating a temporary occupation there

tional administration. ... The commander of the 25th Army was Colonel General I.M. Chistyakov, a member of the military council - Major General N. G. Lebedev. ...

In addition to N. G. Lebedev, in the first years after the war, two more people played a huge role in Korean affairs: Major General Andrei Alekseevich Romanenko, who arrived in Korea in October 1945, who became head of the Soviet civil administration, and Colonel General Terenty Fomich Shtykov, a member of the Military Council of the 1st Far Eastern Front, who from the very first days of the Soviet occupation was in Pyongyang and had a decisive influence on the development of all the most important political decisions of the Soviet authorities, as well as on their implementation in life. In fact, it was he who was the real supreme leader of North Korea in 1945-1947. His appointment was determined by reasons both formal - he was older in rank and position than all the other Soviet generals operating in Korea, and informal - before the war.

T. F. Shtykov was a major party functionary, worked in Leningrad as the second secretary of the regional committee and was closely connected with A. A. Zhdanov...

In 1945, T. F. Shtykov was colonel general com, that is, he had the highest rank, for which in those times only a political worker could count (except for him, in the entire Soviet Army by the end of the war only three political workers had such a title). Through T. F. Shtykov, a direct connection between the Soviet authorities in Pyongyang and the top Soviet leadership - Zhdanov, and even Stalin in Moscow...

A prominent role in Soviet policy in the North Korea also belonged to a group of employees of the 7th Department of the Political Directorate of the 25th Army. In the Soviet Army The "7th departments" were engaged in propaganda against the troops and

enemy villages, and in the event of the occupation of one or other territory by Soviet troops, it was they who usually responsible for maintaining contacts with local authorities. For the most part, these people have

They had a good education and were well versed in local politics. Of these officers, G. K. Mekler and V. V. Kovyzenko should be mentioned (the latter was Japanese by education). ...

As far as the author can judge from the conversations and documents available to him, the 25th Army was preparing for the upcoming actions in Korea, viewing them as a purely military operation, while its political aspect is completely ignored

fell...

It is indicative that even the most important political decision is to entrust the occupation of Korea to units

25th Army - it was accepted, as can be understood from memoirs of its commander I.M. Chistyakov, only around August 25, that is, after the end of hostilities. On this day, the commander of the 1st Far Eastern Front, Marshal K. A. Meretskov called

THEM. Chistyakov and, informing him of this decision, offered a choice of two possible places for the future headquarters location: Hamhung and Pyongyang. THEM. Chistyakov chose Pyongyang.

Perhaps this semi-random decision predetermined the position of the future North Korean capital. It must be said that no matter what

I. M. Chistyakov in his choice (most likely, purely military considerations played a decisive role), but with Today, it seems to be quite successful: of all the cities that ended up in the Soviet zone of occupation, Pyongyang was not only the largest, but also one of the oldest. In addition, this city

was also one of the historical capitals of Korea, which

*also partly gave some legitimacy
respect to the government stationed there."*

But where did the "Soviet zone of occupation" come from?
Is it possible to find somewhere more precise information
about who divided Korea and how? "Who" - you can guess: the
USSR and the USA. But where and how?

And finally, I found on the Internet the site "Mezh
The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) established
in 1991 by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
in Washington, DC) supported by the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation. CWIHP collects, translates and publishes

cops from the archives of different countries, primarily the former
socialist camp. And also makes
views of the historical materials of the governments of all
participants in the Cold War and systematizes the information
received on the historiography of that period. In addition, the
Woodrow Wilson Center organizes international conferences and
exhibitions on selected topics in the history of the 1950s-1980s,
publishes the Bulletin and Working Papers (CWIHP Bulletin,
CWIHP Working Papers).

The CWIHP had a website at <http://cwihp.si.edu> with a large
archive of articles (naturally, in English, and there were also
articles by Russian authors). Dr. Kathryn Weathersby of the
Department of History at the University of Florida was an active
participant in the project. She worked on a book about Soviet
policy towards Korea in 1945-1953. and in 1991 - 1993. searched
for documents in the archives of Moscow. The CWIHP project
posted her long article "SOVIET GOALS REGARDING KOREA
AND THE PREPARATION OF THE KOREAN

WARS, 1945-1950. NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE SOVIET ARCHIVES" ("SOVIET AIMS IN KOREA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR, 1945-1950: NEW EVIDENCE FROM RUSSIAN ARCHIVES" - <http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACFB76.pdf>)

In particular, it provided little-known materials about how Korea was divided. The plan of military action was discussed at the Potsdam Talks in July-August 1945. Katherine Weathersby confirms that at that conference the American military delegation proposed that the entire Korean peninsula be placed in the Soviet zone of ground operations

proceeding from the fact that the Americans did not want to conduct amphibious assaults in Korea. They thought more about that they will have to carry out amphibious landing in the central Japanese islands, in connection with which for For this they had to preserve the military forces. However, Katherine Weser writes evasively about who proposed to divide Korea.

But the Soviet representatives evaded opportunity to gain complete control over military operations in Korea. Army General A. I. Anto Novov first asked if the Americans were planning to land ground forces in Korea. Upon learning that the United States was not planning sea landings on Korean coast, he then proposed that the peninsula be included in the Soviet zone of land operations and the US air and sea operations zone (FRUS, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), 345-353, 408). Finally, ... on August 14, Stalin approved without discussion the US proposal, presented on the same day, to divide Korea into two occupation zones along the 38th parallel.

Further, it is written about how the Soviet troops stopped at the 38th parallel and immediately began, without

despite the protests of the United States, to block communication between north and south, blocking mail, cargo, the supply of electricity from the northern hydroelectric power stations, etc.

And she explains how the idea came about on the 38th parallel.

It turns out that late at night on August 10, 1945, the Coordinating Committee of the State Department/Ministry of War/Ministry of the Navy met at the Pentagon. In the draft General Order No. 1, which was to govern the surrender of Japanese troops to the Allies, **it was decided** to include a provision for the division of Korea into two zones of occupation.

to accept the surrender of the Japanese in this peninsula. Two colonels were sent to the Cartographic Department to clarify the dividing line. They saw that the 38th parallel would divide the country into two parts and would leave the capital (Seoul) in the American zone, so they proposed this line. And it was included in the draft "Order number 1", which was sent to Stalin for approval. He made a remark

regarding the other two provisions of this very long order, but did not say anything about the plan for the division of Korea. Stalin agreed with this decision, and the Soviet troops stopped at the 38th parallel, even though American troops did not appear in Korea until next month.

But the question may arise, why? Two colonels were sent to find out on the map which parallel Korea is divided in half? Probably, for this there should already have been some kind of fundamental decision to SHARE? Then it is clear that we had to find out which parallel does this. And the only place where such a problem could be discussed was the Potsdam Conference.

Thus, numerous sources call this conference exactly the place where it was

decided to divide Korea. But for some reason which of the authors does not risk directly citing a specific new quote.

And as a result, TWO states appeared on the Korean Peninsula, which could theoretically have the idea of waging a war for reunification (if other methods did not help). For if there were ONE state, then no war could

nick basically.

But only de facto governments with subordinate troops and economies can fight. At the end of 1945, there were no such people in Korea either in the north or in the south. That is, there was no one to fight. They had to be created. How was this process? Unlike the division of the country, it is known in more detail, since it took place before the eyes of the whole world, but even in the Soviet interpretation it has "blank spots". And only from the end of the 80s began to appear more real comments on the "cultivation" of future military

ny opponents.

It is quite natural that the Soviet military administration in its (northern) zone of occupation of Korea contributed to the creation of a structure of party and state power along the lines of the model that existed in those years in the Soviet Union. A large number of Soviet advisers, especially of Korean nationality, were sent to North Korea. And gradually a society of "barracks socialism" began to be created in the north of the country, with its

command-and-control management style
sensible centralism, restrictions on democracy (in the Western sense), the creation of prerequisites for
the birth of the cult of personality.

In particular, on October 10, 1945, the Organizing Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea was created (it is marked by the date of the creation of the WPK - the Workers' Party of Korea).

February 1946 - the creation of the VNKSK (Provisional People's Committee of North Korea) - the highest authority (without elections).

August 1946 - the unification of the CCP and the New native party (established in February 1946) in the WPK.

February 1948 - The Korean Army was formed.

home army.

March 1948 - at the 2nd Congress of the Workers' Party of North Korea, it was decided to create a revolutionary base in the country that could become the stronghold of all revolutionary forces in Korea. (By the way, the partisan separatist actions of the Chinese Communists in Manchuria were also defined in Soviet literature as the creation of a "revolutionary base".)

May 1948 - "Contrary to the national aspirations of the Korean people, elections were staged in South Korea."

August 1948 - Elections were held for the Upper People's Assembly (PNC) of North Korea and proclaimed a "so-called" republic in South Korea. Following this, on September 9, 1948, the North Korean National Assembly proclaimed the formation of the DPRK and formed a government headed by Kim Il Sung.

It should be noted that the former allies back in 1945 created a joint commission for the preparation and creation of a unified Korean state. However, in the context of deep differences in approaches to the state structure of the future Korea, it was never able to work out an agreed procedure for unification. In particular, as it turns out, the American side

could not agree with the Soviet understanding of the term "democracy" and, having a mechanical majority in the UN, referred to it the issue of preparing elections, which were held in the south of the country. And what does the "national aspirations of the Korean people" have to do with it, if

did the Soviet and American sides not come to an agreement on the elections?

March 1949 - an agreement was signed between the USSR and the DPRK on cooperation.

June 1949 - The United Democratic Patriotic Front (EDOF) was created. In 1949 and in 1950 he put forward proposals for peaceful unification. However, they were rejected by South Korean

by the authorities *"who sought to destroy the people's democratic system in the North by force of arms."*

June 25, 1950 - the beginning of the war (*"the South Korean military unleashed hostilities against*

DPRK" - "TSB", volume 13, article "Korea", part III). Advice

The Chinese side for many years adhered to the version that the troops of the Republic of Korea ("southerners") were the first to attack. It was based on two radio messages from Pyongyang on June 25, 1950. The first of them said that early in the morning of that day the South Korean army, numbering up to 10 divisions, made a surprise attack on the territory of North Korea along the entire line of the 38th parallel and that it succeeded invade North Korean territory to a depth of 2 to 3 km. The second message informed about the counteroffensive of security (border) detachments together with parts of the People's Army. The counteroffensive of the "northerners" turned out to be

powerful that in three days the "southerners" lost their capital, Seoul, and by the end of September, 95% of the country's territory was under the control of Pyongyang.

To this list of events, one can also add that Soviet troops were in the DPRK until December 25, 1948 ("HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-1945", volume 11, M., 1980, p. 284).

And you can also dwell in more detail on the history of the Communist Party of Korea, which in 1945 was created for the second time. In the book of Robert Conquest "GREAT TERROR" (Volume 2, trans. from English. Riga: Rakstnieks, 1991)

in the chapter on terror in the Communist International of the late 1930s, there are the following remarks:

"... Tito points out that there was a tendency in the Comintern to dissolve the entire Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as was done with the Communist Parties of Poland and Korea..." (p. 234).

"... When in 1944 it was necessary to create a communist Polish government, he had to collect "from the pine forest." To those few who had the good fortune to end up in a Polish prison and survive there, like Gomulka, people like President Bierut (formerly known as NKVD investigator Rutkovsky) or economic leader Mind, who had previously worked as a lecturer at

one of the institutions of Central Asia..." (pp. 236-237).

"... Undoubtedly, Stalin believed that, when necessary, he would be able to scrape together the required number of "leading comrades". As we know, that's how it turned out in practice a few years later. Moreover, the Polish communists of the old school, if they had survived, would certainly have reacted with hostility to the forthcoming pact with Nazi Germany and partition of Poland..." (p. 238).

In 1939, Stalin and Hitler divided Poland, planning a war there. In 1945, he divided Korea with the Americans, planning a war there as well. The "old guard" of the communist parties of Poland and Korea was liquidated no later than 1938, along with the parties themselves. Was Stalin already in 1938 preparing to divide Korea? Hardly. The reason, apparently, is different.

Perhaps, according to the original plan (even before the war with the Germans), Stalin expected more from the seizure of territories than the result of 1945. Moreover, both in Europe and in Asia. Now they call Hitler the "icebreaker", but Japan could have played a similar role in Asia (by the way, the authors of the "Ryutin platform" back in

In the early 1930s, they noted the "strange" attitude of the Stalinist leadership of the Comintern to the aggressive Japanese actions in China). It is quite possible that after the victorious conclusion of the war in Europe, Stalin intended to carry out the transfer of troops to the Far East and carry out the "liberation" of the countries occupied by Japan. And it is useful for them to prepare "their" governments in advance. The "old guard" of the corresponding communist parties was dangerous for this work. Stalin needed people devoted to him personally, and not to the cause of the liberation of their countries. As for the Poles and Koreans, there were also many of them in the USSR: the Poles lived in Belorussia and the Ukraine, while the Koreans lived in the Amur Region, Primorye, and Sakhalin. Perhaps for this purpose, a Korean battalion was trained in the Soviet Army in the Far East (where the future leader of the new Korean communists, Kim Il Sung, served). But initially, apparently, Korea was not supposed to be divided. Until the end of 1941, the United States was not an adversary of Japan.

But then life made strong changes in these plans.

niya. Most likely, the idea to divide Korea could have occurred to Stalin not earlier than the summer of 1944 (in connection with planned negotiations with the allies about the post-war arrangement). But by the time of the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945 it was already there. So, they didn't have time to finish one war (in Europe), they didn't have time to start and end another one (with Japan), and the "great fighter for peace" Comrade Stalin plans to prepare for the next war!

To illustrate what has been said, one can cite an excerpt from an interview with a witness of those events, the former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the DPRK Kang San Ho (or Ivan Afanasyevich Kang) (OGONEK magazine, January 1991, No. 1, pp. 25-27). He tells:

"- In 1946, at the request of the Organizing Bureau of the Communist Party

North Korea Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks transferred to the permanent ra

But in North Korea a whole group of party Korean workers (who lived in THE USSR). Such requests were repeated three more times, so that in so many key positions in the party and the state were Koreans sent by Stalin, and I am among them. A lot of Soviet Koreans remained in the DPRK in 1949, when the Soviet Army withdrew from it. We all took Korean citizenship and "turned" into members of the Labor Party of the Northern Korea. So, on the situation in the party and in the country, we could influence very seriously, which ultimately done..."

As for South Korea, let's start with a list of US-South Korean agreements. There were three of them: "On Finance and Property" (1948), "On Economic Assistance" (January 1950) and "On Mutual Defense" (August 1953).

It turns out a strange sequence of events: first, the South Korean military, trained by the Americans, unleashed a war, fought together with them for three years, and only then a military agreement was concluded between them?!

The search for other data on South Korea unexpectedly led to a detailed description of the events in the DPRK at that time in the OGONEK magazine, June 1993, No. 25-26. The article was called "SHOULD THIS BE FEARED?" "(behind the scenes of the Korean War)" and written by the famous military historian Dmitry Volkogonov. In addition, he also turned out to be the main speaker in the TV program "WAR IN KOREA", which aired on 06/25/1994 on the Ostankino TV channel.

Volkogonov reports that he was able to work with archival materials, judging by which the sequence of events differs sharply from that officially accepted up to that time.

In particular, before the spring of 1949, Kim Il Sung

allegedly more and more often the idea of a military association arises

research institutes of the country.

03/05/1949 Kim Il Sung meets with Stalin in Moscow and discusses with him the idea of military unification of Korea. According to some reports (for example, from the previously cited article "FORBIDDEN WAR", the magazine "RODINA", 1990, No. 5), Stalin was allegedly reluctant to agree to this decision and could only promise political and moral help. But firstly, Kim Il Sung himself found himself at the head of the leadership of North Korea with great Soviet participation, and secondly, the types of Soviet assistance turned out to be almost unlimited.

worthless.

Throughout 1949, intensive deliveries take place from the USSR to the DPRK of weapons, military equipment, ammunition passes, other military equipment.

On January 19, 1950, a message was sent to Stalin from the Soviet ambassador (and chief military adviser to Kim Il Sung), Colonel General Shtykov, that Kim Il Sung was asking him for permission to start a war with South Korea ("since he himself would not start an *offensive*

maybe because he is a communist, a disciplined person, and Comrade Stalin's instructions are law for him.

01/30/1950 - from Stalin to Shtykov: "I received a message dated 19-01.50. Such a big deal needs preparation. The matter must be organized in such a way that there is no great risk ... "

02/04/1950 - from Shtykov to Stalin: Kim Il Sung asks to speed up loan repayments, to open a new credit from the USSR for the purchase of weapons. And asks permission to increase the number of infantry divisions to 10.

February 9, 1950 — Stalin agrees to the preparation of a large-scale operation on the Korean Peninsula. Deliveries of Soviet military equipment and other property are being activated. At the headquarters of the Korean

missions with the participation of Soviet advisers in deep secret are not developing a plan for an offensive operation.

05/14/1950 - Stalin's telegram to Beijing to Mao Tse Tung stating that "due to the changed international situation" he agrees with the proposal of the Koreans to begin unification. But he would like the Chinese and Koreans to make the final decision together. If the Chinese are against it, then this matter should be put aside. (Peking agreed.)

05/30/1950 - telegram from Shtykov No. 408/410 *"special, out of turn to Vyshinsky for instance"* (i.e. for Stalin): Kim Il Sung reports that he approved the operational new decision to attack. Organizational preparation ends by June 1, 1950. Of the 10 divisions, seven are ready for offensive operations. The General Staff offered

wants to start at the end of June for two reasons: first
Firstly, the "southerners" can reveal the plan of the offensive, and secondly, in July the weather usually deteriorates, it rains and the offensive may slow down. In addition, in those
The telegram contains another application for additional receipt of property and materials. Stalin's resolution: "On your No. 408/410, the authority approves your proposals. The receipt of medicines and oil will be accelerated."

Indeed, on the map given in Volume 4
"SVE" (insert to p. 320-321), along the line of the 38th parallel whether from the side of the "northerners" seven rifle divisions. The placement of the other three is shown to the north. But why come across strange numbers: 12 sd, 13 sd, 15 sd? So, they were preparing not 10 divisions, but 15? By the way, veterans recalled something similar about 1941 (the fact that not all divisions were fully staffed). The following can be noted to this: firstly, during the war it is easier to complete the assembly than to start

nat from scratch. And secondly, if all divisions are fully staffed, then the economy will collapse! (Besides, it will be too noticeable for a future enemy.)

On Sunday 06/25/1950 - the beginning of the war. Three days later, Seoul was captured by North Korean troops. In the first days of hostilities, more than 600,000 tons of bombs and more than 220,000

shells. According to the government report of South Korea, the population of Seoul on 01/04/1951 amounted to 1,200,000 people, by the end of the war - 500,000.

These new facts fully confirm the version of the beginning of the war, which was followed by the Western states. In particular, the US Ambassador in Seoul on June 25 1950 reported to Washington that early in the morning the 75,000-strong army of the North rushed through the 38th parallel Lel, attacking six main points along it and landing amphibious assault forces at two points on the east coast of South Korea. North Korean radio immediately began claiming that the attack was "defensive" and that South Korea was attempting to invade the North. Meanwhile, developing a swift offensive, the tank column of the KPA units advanced in the direction of Seoul, which was already occupied on June 28. (The data are taken from the previously cited article by V. Slavinsky in the journal PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST.)

06/30/1950 - Kim Il Sung (through Ambassador Shtykov) sends Stalin a large (many pages) application on a huge amount of materials: cartridges, shells, cars, telecoils, etc. Resolution: *Satisfy. Stalin.*"

Until mid-September, the DPRK troops achieved great operational successes. It seemed that the outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion. But...

Here it is useful to stop and analyze something. Volkogonov periodically notes the presence

Soviet advisers in the leadership of the DPRK. They were there even when Kim Il Sung "has the idea" of a military unification. He went with her to Moscow for a meeting with Stalin on March 5, 1949. Stalin approved. It is doubtful that Kim Il Sung did not first discuss this issue with Soviet advisers. Or maybe they hinted? Incidentally, the unwillingness of Yugoslavia

listening to all the opinions of Soviet advisers and always consulting with them became one of the main reasons for the confrontation between this country and the USSR in the late 1940s.

In addition, in the spring of 1949 they reached the finish line. direct work on the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb would. As noted above, in issue 33 of the OGO NEK magazine for August 1993, the memoirs of various leading physicists about that time are printed. The work on the atomic project was well led by L. Beria under constant control by Stalin. Moreover, Stalin periodically summoned one or another leading specialist. An interesting remark is made that at the beginning of 1949 Stalin asked whether

Is it possible to make from the obtained materials not one atomic bomb, but two smaller ones? They answered that it was impossible, since the work is being carried out, including taking into account the American experience (according to Fuchs). Why did Stalin need several atomic bombs already in 1949?

The explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb took place in August 1949. Moreover, Academician Goldansky cites the following direct evidence: "... I cannot help but recall here how one of my friends (I will not name him), who was an active participant in the work on atomic weapons, in June

1950, when the Korean War began, doubted that the appearance of Soviet atomic weapons contributed to the cause of peace. He understood very well

that if we didn't have the atomic bomb, there wouldn't be a Korean war ... "

So, at the beginning of 1949, Stalin knew that the atomic bomb is almost ready, and gives the go-ahead to Kim Il Sung to prepare an offensive. Throughout 1949 there were "intensive" military deliveries from the USSR to the DPRK. Soviet military advisers are working on a war plan in North Korea. But during the preparation, one interesting point arose, noted by Volkogonov. The Korean ground units were prepared without any special restrictions. What Kim Il Sung asked for, he got. But then he asked Stalin, through Ambassador Shtykov, to strengthen the naval forces. Volkogonov writes that Kim Il Sung could have been reminded of this by Soviet advisers. Shtykov, as usual, promised, and then sent a request to Moscow. But suddenly he received a reprimand from Stalin that he (Shtykov) must remember whose interests he is defending - the USSR, and not Korea! Kim Il Sung complained that there were not enough ships. One from the USSR received, but without a crew. And asked to send a few more with

people, since the deadlines are already running out, there is no time to train their sailors. But Stalin refused!

Volkogonov explains this by saying that *"Stalin is very does not want the US, the UN, the global community opinion caught him in direct participation.* But is this the only thing? What did Stalin refuse Kim Il Sung? In under cooking of naval forces, i.e. refused to use amphibious assault forces! Ground forces, please! To arm seven divisions, ten - no problem! How about preparing an amphibious assault? IT IS FORBIDDEN! But Korea is a peninsula, an ideal theater for using both airborne and (especially) amphibious assaults!

And who refused was Stalin, who before 1941 paid a lot of attention to the training of air and sea paratroopers in the Soviet Army. The fact that more airborne paratroopers were trained is understandable,

they were going to fight mainly on land. Moreover, they were preparing precisely an offensive operation without other goals. That's why they paid such pain to the landing troops

your attention.

And in Korea, a successfully used amphibious assault can dramatically change the situation in hostilities. The Soviet advisers should have understood this. That is probably why they tried to draw Kim Il Sung's attention to this. Especially since the Japanese islands with US bases are nearby, filled with warships (American and Japanese prisoners).

And so it happened. We read from Volkogonov:

(Saturday) *"09/16/1950 South Korean troops*

together with the United States launched a powerful counterattack. Operation included a landing in the Incheon area (slightly south of the 38th parallel on the west coast) of a large, part of the 10th US Army Corps, Marine Marine. At the same time, an offensive began from the Pusan bridgehead (the extreme southeast of South Korea). The defense of the North Koreans was broken through and became crumble. South Korean and US troops quickly moved north. Kim Il Sung's troops suffered a heavy defeat. They have lost a lot part of artillery, tanks. American aviation dominated the air, destroying everything that moved. (Then Pyongyang and part of the DPRK were lost almost to the Chinese border).

N.S. Khrushchev writes about this in his memoirs (OGO NEK magazine, 1991, No. 1, January, pp. 27-28):

"But in the end, when Kim Il Sung's army approached Busan, they did not have the courage. It had to be taken, and the war would have ended... Alas, this did not happen. The enemy took advantage of the fact that Lee Syngman organized resistance in Busan and prepared troops for the landing. The landing force was landed, and very difficult conditions were created. Actually, the whole

the mission, which was in the south, was cut off by this landing, and all the weapons that were there went to Syngman Rhee ... The threat of catastrophe hung over North Korea."

On October 1, 1950, Ambassador Shtykov sent an urgent message from Kim Il Sung to Stalin (dated September 29, 1950), in which Kim Il Sung said that the DPRK would not be able to stop the US and South Korean troops on its own.

In response, Stalin sends a request to Beijing, a "terrible" request. Volkogonov writes that he "breathes cold." Here is a quote: *"... the United States, because of prestige, can be drawn into into a big war, will, consequently, be drawn into the war by China, and at the same time the USSR will be drawn into the war, which is linked to China by a mutual assistance pact. Should we be afraid of this? I don't think it should be how together we will be stronger than the USA and England, and other capitalist European states without Germany, which cannot now provide USA any help, do not represent serious military force. If war is inevitable, then let it will be now, and not in a few years, when Japanese militarism will be restored as an ally USA.."*

Let us suppose that Stalin exaggerated a little about Japanese militarism. It is more possible that by doing this he wanted to make the Chinese more accommodating, especially since they did not very willingly decide to send "volunteers" to Korea. First, Mao Zedong encouraged Stalin (*"... of course, if you fight, then you need to fight now ... It is advisable to send not 5 - 6 divisions, but at least nine..."*). But then a message came to Moscow from Beijing that the Chinese leadership was still considering whether to send troops to Korea. Volkogonov writes that Moscow is worried. However, Beijing soon agreed. The offensive of the Chinese troops began on 10/25/1950 and continued

until 07/09/1951. They liberated Pyongyang, once again took Seoul, Incheon, Wokju, and other cities. But then a new offensive of the "southerners" followed, which was stopped approximately at the 38th parallel at the end of July of that year. This dynamic period of the war ended. The front line almost froze until the very end of the war, making small fluctuations.

But the war was brutal. Both sides suffered heavy losses. According to the American press, it was the fourth largest war in US history. According to the article FORBIDDEN WAR (RO DINA magazine, 1990, No. 5), 9 million Koreans died in the Korean War, about 1 million Chinese (including the death of Mao Zedong's son), more than 50 thousand Americans and an unknown number Soviet citizens. The materials of this article confirm that the war began at 4:00 in the morning with the artillery preparation of the North Korean troops, which lasted two hours. Then the 100,000-strong North Korean army, supported by T-34 tanks, went on the attack and began to quickly move south. But later, after the entry of the American troops into the war, the fierceness of the fighting increased.

There is a telegram from Kim Il Sung to Stalin (Volkogonov did not indicate the date) in which it is reported that the troops of the DPRK are losing 400-500 people daily. Stalin in

In 1951, he himself told Kim Il Sung that it was necessary to initiate conduct peace negotiations.

They started on 07/10/1951 in Kaesong. And they went very for a long time. The Soviet media said that the Korean and Chinese sides sincerely want a speedy end to the war, but the American generals allegedly do not want this. And from

It is known that during the talks the American The Kans periodically tried to repeat the offensive.

An interesting reason for the need for negotiations

D. Volkogonov stated in the book "TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY" (Kyiv, "Political Publishing House of Ukraine", 1990, volume 2, p. 498):

"After about 30 Chinese divisions (according to other data, there were more of them - 40) moved forward, the situation changed dramatically again. Chinese and North Korean troops not only liberated the territory north of the 38th parallel, but also advanced south up to 100 km. The morale of the American troops and the military prestige of the United States by the middle of the summer of 1951 had noticeably dropped ... the most responsible and not safe moment had come. The Americans will not withstand defeat and may seize on the last, nuclear argument. Perhaps then, after 1945, this would have been the most obvious threat of a third world war. American General MacArthur began aggressively demand the bombing of Manchuria. Truman gave understand that the use of atomic weapons... Two long years of negotiations began, during which fierce battles did not stop on the Korean peninsula. American aviation dominated the air, Chinese volunteers on the ground.

On September 19, 1952, Stalin met with Zhou En-lai in Moscow. Peace talks were discussed. But Stalin did not rule out the continuation of the war. He promised the Chinese to supply weapons for 60 Chinese infantry divisions. On August 20, 1994, Radio Liberty broadcast a special broadcast from Washington on the change of leadership in the DPRK (after the death of Kim Il Sung). It reported that a book about the history of events in Korea was published in the United States. And it is also noted that Stalin, until his death, was opposed to ending the Korean War.

03/05/1953 - Stalin died (or was he killed?). And a month later, in April 1953, the UN finally approved a resolution demanding an early conclusion of a truce in Korea, which was signed on July 27, 1953

between the Supreme Commander of the DPRK Army and the Commander of the Chinese "People's Volunteers" on the one hand, and the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces on the other. War for ended.

A passing question may arise here: why did the UN troops fight on the part of the "southerners"? It turns out that because the decision to send them was taken at the Security Council! But the USSR is not only a member of the nations, but also a permanent member of the Security Council! Where was the Soviet representative (diplomat Ya. Malik) looking? Why not use the veto? It turns out that he did not look anywhere and could not physically apply the right of veto, since from 01/13/1950 to August of the same year there was NO Soviet representative in the UN Security Council! ("HISTORY OF THE USSR FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAYS", volume 11. M.: Nauka, 1980).

He was recalled *"in protest against the Western powers' refusal to restore China's rights at the UN."* True, in August *"he again took his place in the Council Security"* (nothing is said about the restoration of China's rights in the UN by this date). The same "History of the USSR..." states that the United States achieved the adoption by the Security Council of resolutions accusing the DPRK of an armed attack on South Korea. For reference: at the same time, Yugoslavia was a non-permanent member of the Security Council, relations between the USSR and which were tense, according to Yugoslav terminology, *"the atmosphere of armed aggression was being escalated"*, for which everything was prepared and which literally *"was in the air"* (Yu S. Girenko, "STALIN - TITO", Moscow: Politizdat, 1991).

In the book "BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE UN" (M.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1991), a separate chapter is devoted to the Korean problem, which contains the following

the following sequence of actions of this organization
tions.

1947 - The question of Korea is first discussed in the General Assembly, which unsuccessfully tried to achieve the creation of a unified Korean state on the basis of nationwide free elections.

1948 - after the proclamation of two governments in Korea, the General Assembly established its own Commission on it.

06/25/1950 - The United States and the Korean Commission reported UN that this morning the Republic of Korea was attacked by the armed forces of North Korea. A meeting of the Security Council took place. It declared this armed attack a violation of the peace and called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of North Korean troops beyond the 38th parallel.

06/27/1950 - in connection with the continuation of hostilities, the Security Council recommended to the member states of the organization to provide effective assistance to South Korea. The US said it had ordered its air force and navy to provide cover and support for the South Korean government's troops.

On June 29, 1950, the newspaper Izvestiya published two notes. The first one says that Mr. Trygve Li (general secretary of the organization at that time) sent a message to the leadership of the USSR about the decision of the Security Council on the Korean question of 27.06. republic of troops from North Korea is a violation of the peace. The UN Security Council called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, called on the North Korean authorities to immediately withdraw their armed forces to the 38th parallel. But the North Korean authorities did not stop hostilities and did not withdraw their armed forces to the 38th parallel. In this regard, the United Nations Security Council pe

instructs the members of the United Nations to provide the Republic of Korea with all assistance in repulsing aggression.

The second note is called "RESPONSE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO THE COMMUNICATION OF Mr. TRYGVE LI".

It begins with the following words: *"The Soviet Government has received from you the text of the Council's resolution*

Security Council of June 27, calling on UN members to the need to intervene in Korean affairs in

favor of the South Korean authorities. Then comes the justification for the incompetence of the Security Council to take decisions in the absence of representatives of the USSR and the PRC, which ends with a strange conclusion: *"In view of the foregoing, it is quite obvious that the indicated*

Security Council decision on the Korean question has no legal effect."

And not a word about the fighting itself! What does it mean? How is the recognition of the fact that North Korean troops attacked South Korea? Or not at all? Maybe the information from the Soviet embassy in the DPRK was transmitted by train, which takes at least 8 days to Moscow?

Only on June 30, 1950 did an article appear in the Soviet central newspapers with the Soviet version of the beginning of the war. It is called "IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN

OF THE USSR. It says: *"06/27/1950 the US Ambassador Mr. A. Kirk sent a memorandum to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. A. Gromyko,*

containing a statement by the US Government with a call to influence the North Korean authorities to end the war (since the USSR refused to take part in the meeting of the UN Security Council on 25-06.

1950). On June 29, 1950, Gromyko made the following statement to Mr. A Kirk:

"In connection with the statement submitted by you on June 27 The US Government, the Soviet Government instructed me to state the following:

1. According to reliable data of the Soviet government

The events taking place in Korea were provoked by the attack of the troops of the South Korean authorities on border regions of North Korea ...

2. The Soviet Government adheres to the principle of inadmissibility of interference by foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea.

3. It is not true that the Soviet Government refused to take part in the meetings of the Security Council. To the Soviet Government with all the will it was impossible to take part in the meetings of the Security Council, since, due to the position of the US Government, China, a permanent member of the Security Council, was not admitted to the Council, which made for Security Council impossible to take re judgments having legal force".

Between 06/27/50 and 07/07/50 the US ordered the use of ground troops that landed on Pusan (south coast of Korea) on July 2 - "the beginning of the intervention" - as it is said in the legend to the map in the 4th volume of "SVE".

On July 4, 1950, an article by A. Gromyko appeared in the newspaper "Izvestia" under the heading: "ABOUT THE AMERICAN ARMED INTERVENTION IN KOREA." But it was still too early for the Soviet representative to appear on the Security Council.

07/07/50 - The Security Council decided to ask all member states of this organization to place their armed forces at the disposal of a unified command under the leadership of the United States (to which the troops of South Korea were also subordinate). He is allowed to use the UN flag. Subsequently, 16 states sent their armed forces to this call, and 5 medical units. American General Douglas MacArthur was appointed commander of the UN troops in Korea (removed in April 1951 by G. Truman for failures in the war).

As already mentioned in the quotations, the USSR and the PRC considered the decisions of the Security Council to be illegal. About the fact that the Soviet representative was not in it, the book "BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE UN" says only that he was absent for 6 months (without specifying the reason). For some reason, I don't remember the "sign of protest against the refusal of the Western powers to restore the rights of China." China has been a member of the United Nations since 24.10. 1945, but before the resolution of October 25, 1971, there were representatives of the Republic in Taiwan (the government of Chiang Kai-shek) in the UN, and only after it - the PRC. However, the Soviet representative returned to the Security Council on August 2, 1950, without waiting for the restoration of the rights of the PRC (but after the expansion of the war in Korea and the adoption of the main decisions by the Council on it)! On August 8, 1950, he proposed a draft resolution to end the war, but it was rejected by the United States.

By the way, A. Gromyko in his memoirs "Pamiatnoye" (Book One, M., 1988, p. 207) reports that he offered Stalin to take part in the meetings of the Security Council in order to be able to use the right of veto on any decision, which could complicate the course of the war in Korea, but Stalin rejected it! Strange! It turns out that he was not interested in the problem of rapid unification of the country. "Blitzkrieg" did not suit him!

In order to better understand the withdrawal of the Soviet representative from the Security Council, it is useful to study his capabilities in more detail. The book cited above ("UN BASIC FACTS") states that the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, is responsible for the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council consists of 15 members: 5 permanent (China, USSR, Great Britain, USA and France) and 10 elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term. For decision making

9 votes are required, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members of the Council. This is the "great power unanimity" rule, often referred to as the "veto." If a permanent member does not support a decision but does not wish to block it by vetoing it, it may abstain from voting. While other organs of the UN make recommendations to governments, the Council alone has the power to make decisions that Member States are bound by the Charter to comply with.

However, in November 1950, apparently in connection with the problems of resolving the war in Korea, the main deliberative body of the UN, the General Assembly, adopted the resolution "Unity for Peace", according to which, in the event of a threat to peace or an act of aggression, it was endowed with the right to take action if the Security Council cannot do anything because of the lack of unity among its permanent members (moreover, the USSR began to consider it illegal).

Thus, the best option for Stalin was the temporary recall of the Soviet delegate from the Security Council. Only in this case could the Soviet Union try to maintain the image of itself as a "staunch fighter for peace" (with the expansion of the war itself in Korea). Otherwise it would have been necessary to vote for a resolution that would have stopped this war much earlier. Or it was possible to abstain from voting until the head of the whole world ... that the USSR AGREED TO WAR?!

But its quick end, apparently, was not part of Stalin's plans, because after his appearance in the Security Council, the representative of the USSR began to offer such options for ending the war in Korea, which could not be accepted by the UN either because of the changed interests of the countries participating in the conflict, or due to linking them with other requirements. For example, in November 1951, *"the Soviet Union came out with a new world*

initiative by inviting the VI session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to take an important decision "On measures against the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship between peoples" ("HISTORY OF THE Ukrainian SSR", vol. 9. Kiev, 1985, pp. 254-255). But in it the proposal not to slowly end the war in Korea and withdraw all foreign troops from there came as an addition to more "global" problems: a complete ban on the atom weapons, reduction by one third during the year of the armed forces of the member states of the Security Council, etc. Moreover, the proposals of the USSR on a peaceful settlement of the war in Korea were supported by representatives of the BSSR, the Ukrainian SSR and Poland. How did she get into this group? Because the president/head of government (B. Bierut) and his deputy (K.K. Rokossovsky) were people of the USSR? But as soon as Stalin died, a month later the UN was still able to approve a resolution purely on Korea!

The actions of the United Nations lead to another reflection. The United Nations troops launched an offensive on September 16, 1950. Resolutions were adopted in the absence of the Soviet delegate to the Security Council, i.e. at the end of June - beginning of July 1950. There were about two months left before the onset. How were the troops supposed to behave, knowing about the threat of a possible attack on them? On the Kursk Bulge, they prepared for defense, dug into the ground, created a reserve front in the rear. And in Korea? *Until the middle of September*
North Korean troops have achieved great operational success. Stalin sent congratulations. It seemed that the outcome of the war predetermined" (Volkogonov). Could Stalin have sent a warning to Kim Il Sung that the US was gathering troops from all over the world and was about to strike? For some reason, historians like to recall Churchill's "warnings" in 1941. What prevented Stalin from warning Kim

Ir Sena? Actually, the latter himself could read the UN resolutions, or were they hidden from him?

Of course, it cannot be said that the Soviet troops in They did not participate in the Korean War. From various sources it is known that in November 1950, Stalin sent the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps with anti-aircraft artillery units to the DPRK. It consisted of five divisions: two - aviation fighter, two - anti-aircraft and one auxiliary. They were located in the DPRK, but also used Chinese airfields. Volkogonov says that the troops in the corps were constantly changing (usually every 5-6 months). The goal of gaining combat experience was also pursued. The uniform was of the Chinese People's Army. The pilots learned Korean, but almost all radio traffic was in Russian. The Americans then made recordings of such a radio exchange, but they were told that they were recording

you can do anything, but not a single Soviet pilot was taken prisoner. The corps was commanded by Generals Belov and Slyusarev. 35 pilots became Heroes of the Soviet Union. The commander of one aviation regiment, Colonel Pepelyaev, shot down 19 aircraft. During the entire war, 1,309 American aircraft were shot down (according to Soviet data). Soviet troops lost 351 aircraft, 311 pilots died.

So let's sum up the results. It turns out that the offensive of the DPRK troops was not prepared with the aim of quickly and completely capturing South Korea with its subsequent retention.

First, they were not prepared

sufficient navies as

combat, and amphibious assault. SUCH IN THE WAR ON THE PENINSULES AND ISLANDS IN THE OCEAN DO NOT ALLOW MO! Soviet military advisers understood this, but Stalin himself FORBIDDEN IT!

Secondly, for some reason, either intelligence did not work well, or the protection of the enemy was poorly organized

cutting in the rear. Perhaps both. How else to explain that the US troops carried out an amphibious assault of the WHOLE CORPORATION in the rear of the DPRK troops? Moreover, the reality of the offensive of the UN troops was announced IN ADVANCE (two months in advance)!

By the way, the landing of large amphibious assault forces is a complex and responsible matter. The ground forces have a concept - "tank-dangerous direction." The commander of any rank in the organization of defense is OBLIGED to determine it in the first place with the corresponding allocation of forces and means (minefields, other barriers, anti-tank artillery, grenade launchers, etc.). When protecting the coast, it is also useful to identify "landing dangerous" places. Not the entire coastline may be suitable for this. In one place there is a steep coast, in another there are swamps and no roads, in a third there are shallows. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the tides, the weather, the distance to the starting bases, the location of the strongholds of the troops, etc.

In Korea, the eastern coast is the slope of a mountain range with heights up to 1.6 km. Tanks have nowhere to turn around. Flat territory - from the west. In the same place, just south of the 38th parallel, there is the port of Incheon (since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, it has been better known in Europe as Chemulpo). In Incheon, US troops landed in 1945. Could they have carried out reconnaissance of the rest of the coast with a view to a possible landing in the future? Hardly. South Korea dos

hid them almost unexpectedly, one might say, for nothing. And, as you know, don't look a gift horse in the mouth. Especially since the US troops had to leave Korea. And they didn't expect attacks at all (what's the point if they already "gave away" ALL Korea in 1945)?

That the Americans didn't really care about defense of South Korea, says in his memoirs

yakh I. A. Kan (OGONEK magazine, January, 1991, No. 1, p. 25-27):

"- June 28 (1950) I arrived at the border Hwachan County (Hwacheon? Hereinafter, the names used in the "ATLAS OF THE WORLD" are indicated in brackets. The Korean language is very rich in shades of sounds and comprehension errors are possible). Frankly speaking, I was quite puzzled by the complete absence of traces of hostilities on the northern bank of the Khwachen River. (Hwacheon?), along which the demarcation line passed. On there was no destruction on our side, no craters from explosions of shells or mines, not a single one killed or wounded?! South Korea began on the other side. It was there, in the city of Chunchen (Chuncheon?), the center of the province of South Gangwon (Kangwon-do?), just liberated by our valiant troops, that I set off. As I moved south, I became more and more come across the destroyed military facilities of the southerners, apparently taken by surprise - here and there there were cannons with full ammunition, dozens of uncleaned corpses of soldiers of the South Korean army ... I generally puzzled: how strange they led the Americans themselves, on the one hand, ordering Lee Seung Manu to attack the North, and on the other hand, having evacuated all troops from South Korea with the exception of one single division, the commander of which - Ting (maybe Ding?) - on top of everything else was captured ?!"

So, where could the Americans land in 1950? First, somewhere on the west coast of Korea. Secondly, somewhere in the rear of the advancing troops of the DPRK. Thirdly, in a place that, in many respects, is suitable for the landing of a large mass of troops. For example, a landed corps consists of several divisions (at least two) with other auxiliary units and subunits (such as an anti-aircraft regiment, etc.).

Such the best place, of course, is the port of Incheon (Chemulpo). Where the landing was made.

In the MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA DICTONARY (M.: Voenizdat, 1983) in the section on the Incheon landing Operations" provides the following data: the American troops landed as part of the 10th Army Corps numbered 70 thousand people. There were 3,000 North Korean troops in the port. The landing date is given as September 15, 1950 (Friday). Accepting the Soviet system

mu wartime states, it turns out a ratio of about a few divisions (in the United States) against two regiments (in the DPRK). Further, the dictionary says that the Americans captured Incheon and launched an offensive against Seoul, which is located not far from Incheon to the east. The soldiers of the Korean People's Army (KPA), together with the inhabitants of Seoul, heroically defended themselves for two weeks (until September 28, 1951). During this time, the KPA command managed to withdraw the main forces of the army from the south. on North.

However, N. Khrushchev cites a different opinion: *"The troops were landed, and very difficult conditions were created. In fact, the entire army that was in the south was cut off by this landing, and all the weapons that were there went to Lee Syngman ... Hanging threat of catastrophe over North Korea."*

Who is right? By the way, already from the first operations of the Nazi Wehrmacht, the main tactics of troop action were attempts to flank outflank strongly defending strongholds (i.e., attempts to create "cauldrons"). It makes no sense to "lay down" your troops while "gnawing through" the enemy's defense lines if there are gaps along their edges. At the same time, fighting in a big city is difficult in any case. For example, during the Battle of Stalingrad, Sergeant Pavlov and his soldiers held one house for 58 days. It is hard to believe that the Americans did not let part of the troops into Seoul.

Be that as it may, let us return to the Inchon landing of the US troops. As stated in the "Dictionary", there were troops of the DPRK in Inchon. But this is just a couple of regiments. And another question - what. Regiment regiment strife. As a result, it can be seen that an effective defense in Inchon was not organized. Why? Did the Soviet military advisers not understand this? Perhaps they understood, but before the start of the war, ALL of them were withdrawn! Talk about it

rit N. S. Khrushchev in his memoirs (OGO NEK magazine, January, 1991, No. 1, pp. 27-28):

"It was completely incomprehensible to me why Stalin recalled all our advisers who were in divisions, and perhaps even in regiments, when Kim Il Sen was getting ready to go. He recalled all the advisers, who advised and helped build the army. I then told Stalin about this, and he was very reacted hostilely to my remark: "No need. They may be captured. We don't want to there was evidence to accuse us of being involved in this case. This is Kim Il Sung's business." Thus, our advisers were not there. It set army in difficult conditions. I really sympathized with Kim Il Sung and again suggested to Stalin: "Comrade Stalin, why don't we provide more qualified assistance in the form of advice to Kim Il Sung? ...Here Malinovsky. He now commands the Far East military district. Why not somewhere in Korea now plant Malinovsky so that he is incognito developed military operations, would give instructions and thereby helping Kim Il Sung?" Stalin very responsive to my comments. I was amazed: after all, Stalin blessed Kim Il Sung, not held him back along the way."

Indeed, strange. Let us recall what Stalin wrote on January 30, 1950 to Ambassador Shtykov: "... Such a big undertaking needs to be prepared. The matter must be organized.

so that there is no big risk..." That is, how? To take over South Korea quickly and without any problems? Should the war be organized in the form of a "blitz krieg"? But where does the threat of encirclement come from then? The divisional headquarters ride behind the troops. The theater of operations is small - about 450 km from the 38th parallel to the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula. Who could surround the headquarters of the advancing troops? This could be done only by using a large amphibious landing from the rear of the advancing. South Korean troops were not ready for such a thing! Their naval forces once much later accounted for less than 14.1% of all those participating in the war. And for the landing of divisions, large landing ships are required with many no less large guard and escort warships. It turns out that Stalin assumed or hoped in advance that the troops of the DPRK would be surrounded by someone? By whom?

The telegram of Kim Il Sung to Stalin dated 07/08/1950 also speaks of the absence of Soviet military advisers in the troops of the DPRK at the beginning of the war. In it, he thanks Stalin for his help and asks for permission to use 25-35 Soviet military advisers at the headquarters front of the Korean army and the headquarters of army groups. Stalin allows, but specifies that they should be in civilian uniform and as correspondents for the newspaper Pravda. However, according to Khrushchev,

lin did not really want the presence of Soviet advisers in

army of the DPRK. With their departure, it was possible not to rush to drink. Be that as it may, whether they appeared at Kim Il Sung or not, the Americans were able to successfully land troops on 09/16/1950.

Third, the Soviet representative was removed from the UN Security Council, which opened the way for faster entry into the war of others countries, especially the USA. Stalin could well be afraid

that the Americans alone will not dare to fight on the side of South Korea. Lure tactics?

Some information about the role of the United States in this war was given by Stalin in the memoirs of N. S. Khrushchev. He's writing:

*"It seems that in 1950, ... or a little earlier [more precisely, in March 1949], Kim Il came to Moscow
Sen with his delegation. He had a conversation with Stalin and there he raised the question of what they would like to probe bayonet South Korea. ... Kim Il Sung reported
Stalin and was absolutely sure of the success of this case. I remember Stalin expressing his doubts at the time: he was worried about whether America would get involved or miss it. over the ears..."*

And the possibility of the United States refusing to participate in the war would have been. Khrushchev, in his memoirs of the course of the battles, writes: *"then the American press said that if Busan was busy on the move, it was allegedly decided not to intervene by the US military
But that did not happen".*

So, Stalin was very worried about the decision of the Americans! But this anxiety can be of one of two types: "God forbid the United States gets involved, and the capture of South Korea may not work out!" or: "God forbid, the US DOES NOT GET INVOLVED, and the whole plan to divide Korea will go to hell!" Which of them worried Stalin? If the former, then why was it necessary to divide Korea back in 1945? It turns out that the second one worried?! And was a Soviet delegate removed from the UN Security Council to lure the Americans? And to facilitate the landing of American troops, were Soviet military advisers recalled? Let us recall how Stalin reacted to Khrushchev's questions and proposals? "Very hostile", "very sharp"! In other words - "do not interfere!", "It's my business!". But when the Americans "got involved" very well, they even began to approach the borders of China and

USSR, Stalin even calmed down somewhere (according to Khrushchev's memoirs):

"I remember very well how Stalin, in connection with an exchange of opinions on the situation that had developed in North Korea, said: "Well, what? Let now will be our neighbors in the US Far East. They will come there, but we will not fight with them now. We are not ready to fight." (And no "hostile" or "acute" reaction! Thus, as if saying: "Don't worry, everything is going according to plan").

However, Volkogonov notes that Moscow became agitated when the Chinese delayed their entry into the war. Comparing this fact with Khrushchev's reminiscence cited above, one can assume that Stalin had two plans for the war in Korea: a minimum plan (to draw the Americans into the war) and a maximum plan (to draw the Chinese into it as well). However, for Stalin, China's delay in its entry into the war may have been unexpected, since the Chinese participated in it from the very beginning. I. A. Kan testifies to this in his memoirs: (OGONEK magazine, January, 1991, No. 1, pp. 25-27):

"... At that time I was working as the Vice Chairman of the Committee of the WPK of Gangwon Province (Kangwon-do?). In May 1950, I went on a business trip to Yeongcheon County. (Icheon?). Here, in the immediate vicinity of the 38th parallel, two divisions consisting of servicemen of exclusively Korean nationality.

Fourth: why active hostilities with large movements of troops passed practically only in the first year of the war, and then TWO years of "local" fighting? The Americans, apparently, were not particularly eager to capture North Korea (because of the proximity of the USSR and China, and if they enter the war with full rights?). Kim Il Sung, without consent

Stalin, could not negotiate. And Stalin himself cannot decide whether to conclude a peace treaty or continue the war (when meeting with Zhou Enlai).

But war is a very costly business. However, Stalin's decision to start a war in Korea, and then delays
The fact that negotiations lasted for two long years suggests that he gave it an important place in his plans. Which? In the article "PROHIBITED WAR" they speak
some possible reasons: firstly, to make the Chinese leader Mao Zedong more obedient after China is directly involved in the war with the US. And this, of course, forced the Chinese not to abandon the alliance with the USSR. Secondly, the focus of the war in Asia could help Stalin to consolidate his influence on the communist leadership of the Eastern European countries, making them more obedient because of the threat of a war between the West and the Soviet troops stationed in these countries. Moreover, because of the very performance of hostilities by the Western allies in Korea (i.e., because of their heavy losses thousands of kilometers from Europe), their possible assistance to the leaders of the Eastern European countries became more

far less.

But these are not all possible reasons, more precisely, these are not the main reasons for the war in Korea. At a secret meeting without minutes, Stalin said: "We are NOT READY to fight!" What did he mean by this? Not ready, but getting ready? What will happen when the preparation is over? And then, what does "we" have to do with it if Korea is at war?

It has already been said above (in the chapter on post-war aviation) that since the end of December a new problem has arisen for Stalin—the unpreparedness of long-range piston bombers for modern warfare. The fact that Soviet pilots successfully shot down American B-29s

was good news for North Koreans. But this was a clear example of the fate of the Soviet Tu-4 and Tu-85, if the war between the USSR and the USA began then. And judging by the correspondence between Moscow and Beijing, Stalin originally planned to start a war with the United States somewhere at the beginning of 1951. Moreover, according to the magazine "AVIATION AND TIME" (1996, No. 5), in the late 40s

years, the Soviet military seriously considered vari

one-way combat flights of piston bombers to the United States, after which the crews had to leave the planes in a given area of the ocean, where they were supposed to be picked up by submarines. But it must be said right away that such flights

could be extremely risky for pilots. And not only because of the opposition of American air defense systems. The hope for submarines could be too problematic. American experts believed that out of their total number (335 pieces), only 9 former German ones were able to perform tasks in the oceans (due to the presence of a snorkel - a device for operating an engine under water). And if

Given the widespread use by the US Navy of aircraft carriers with the latest means of radar, its countermeasures against Soviet submarines could be very successful.

But this was not what stopped Stalin, but as it was already it was considered, he was frightened by the statistics of air battles that arose in the period from December 1950 to early February 1951. He apparently decided to watch their further progress. And by mid-February 1951, however difficult it was for him, Stalin was forced to abandon the idea of starting a war with the United States and its allies. In particular, he himself stated this in an "interview" with a faceless correspondent of the newspaper "PRAVDA" on February 17 of that year.

To the question of a "correspondent": *"Do you consider a new world war inevitable?"* he replied, *"No. By at least for the time being it can't be considered inevitable..."* At the same time, the level of "unbridled" propaganda of the USSR's struggle for peace decreased and other events took place, indicating that Stalin refused to start a new world war in 1951.

Regarding his readiness to start a war in 1951, there is also a message on p. 380-381 in the book by Giuseppe Boff "HISTORY OF THE SOVIET UNION" (vol. 2, 1941 - 1964. Translated from Italian. M.: International relations, 1990):

Stalin, meanwhile, took a number of steps, because of which to avoid unleashing a war became more and more difficult. In January 1951 he personally participated in the meeting for which the entire composition of the General Staff and the ministers of defense of the European countries of people's democracy were involved; it analyzed the state of readiness of the armed forces of these countries. Stalin asserted at this conference that one could count on only for 3-4 years of respite; he saw in the war in Korea only the first test of strength, in which two opponents try each other out. In conclusion it was a secret agreement was signed under which the allies of the USSR pledged to transfer their armies under direct Soviet command in the event of a war. (The book says it's a secret

meeting, it became known from the Czechoslovak

historian Kaplan, who reported it on the basis of reliable documents.)

Could there be such a meeting or not? Let's say it was. And in the course of events, it generally SHOULD BE. By the way, General D. Volkogonov found Stalin's telegram to Beijing with the consent to start a war, without even waiting for 3-4 years of "respite"! Know something

who! Again we are talking about some kind of "respite"?
About the possible start of the war "not earlier than 1942"? And ready for what?

Note the dates: in January 1951, Stalin still agreed to start a war. And on February 17, on the front page of the newspaper, Stalin published a long interview with a correspondent of Pravda, in which he stated that he did not consider a new world war to be inevitable, "at least at the present time . " Oh, and difficult decisions had to be made by Stalin this month! Such preparation failed! But he was forced (for the happiness of all "progressive" and other mankind). And went from the Soviet Army home "younger" call

new ages, which have been kept since the time of the last war! (Father said that the returning guys rested for a long time, "riding bicycles.")

But Stalin did not stop the war in Korea. And to the very his death did not give consent to the signing of the peace treaty. This shows that he did not refuse a new world war. But in the changed conditions, he no longer needed an active war in Korea. It was decided to temporarily "turn it off". That is why he suggested that negotiations be held, but in such a way that they drag on as long as possible, best of all, indefinitely, until the right moment arrives.

But he never came. With the death of Stalin whether the reasons for the delay in the negotiations, which made it possible to sign a truce in July 1953.

In addition, apparently, other reasons also worked. In the USSR, the creation of a strategic bomber was delayed, and the United States was preparing for the mass production of its B-52 bomber, which began in 1954. In general, the attack of the DPRK on South Korea greatly frightened not only the United States, but also the countries of Western Europe and Canada. They have become more active in creating joint systems

defense. In addition, due to the rapid progress of the strategic fields of technology, especially nuclear missile weapons, a moment could come when it would be completely useless to start a new world war.

myem.

But Stalin himself did not stop the war in Korea, although each month of delay worsened the strategic balance of power between the USSR and the USA with their allies. And under these conditions, any local war is useful, for example measures, as a means of destroying American aircraft and other military equipment, as well as their combination

yuznikov.

Indeed, in the early 1950s there were no hostilities between the USSR and the United States, and the United States was already losing hundreds of warplanes. Including long-range bombers, previously released by the thousands in England and the USA. In addition, many other service aviation and naval forces were also distracted. Continuous dominance in the air requires a large expenditure of both ammunition and oil products, which must be imported somewhere. Not to mention the ground forces. By the way, in the 13th volume of the "BSE" it is said that among the troops of the "southerners" the US troops were (it is not indicated at what stage of the war):

for ground forces - 50.3 % (over 1 million people; up to 1000 tanks);

Naval — 85.9 % (more than 200 ships); in the air force - 93.4 % (more than 1,600 aircraft; 104,078 sorties were made).

(Notes taken **from** SOVIET MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA, 1976)

The reverse calculation shows that the troops of the "South Korean military, who planned and carried out the attack on the DPRK", and then retreated almost to the southern coast of their country in a short time, among the troops of the "southerners" sometime later (when

did the Americans recapture South Korea and carried out mobilization?) amounted to no more than:

for ground forces - 49.7%; for naval forces - 14.1%; in the air force - 6.6%.

But, most likely, there were many less than the indicated percentages, since the troops of 16 more states participated in the war. This, in particular, is mentioned in various memoirs of former participants in those events. For example, the former Soviet pilot B. S. Abakumov, already mentioned in the chapter on aircraft, provides information about

that they were captured by pilots from different countries

(for example, England or Australia). Many of them would or natural mercenaries who signed special contracts for a certain number of sorties. But they were distinguished by their ability to conduct air battles. Assessing the skill of the enemy, Abakumov makes the assumption that the former pilots of the Nazi Luft Waffe were the best at maneuvering.

It is possible that another goal of the ongoing Korean War was to study combat experience in the use of new military equipment. After all, before it, the USSR continued to develop and manufacture not only piston bombers, but also piston fighters (La-11). Only dogfights in Korea

they said that it is necessary to immediately switch to a reagent new aviation.

And besides, the battles had an impact not only on technology, but also on people. And it's one thing to beat out the aggressor somewhere near Kursk, and another thing to voluntarily die thousands of kilometers from home, and even under conditions of physical overload. It has already been said above that the troops of the Soviet Fighter Aviation Corps in Korea were constantly changing. The purpose of the replacement was to gain combat experience. But several

Veterans note in their memoirs that pilots usually did not share their experience with newcomers when changing, and this had a negative effect on the results of battles. And Lieutenant Colonel B. Abakumov also mentions the medical reason for returning to the USSR - the occurrence of pain in the heart of the pilots. For this reason, in October 1951, the doctors suggested that he return home. But the command asked to stay until the imminent official replacement. He agreed, but flew with "medical support" - every day he was injected intravenously

glucose and pricked alternately strychnine and arsenic

But this is important! In Korea, it was still possible to indoctrinate about the aggressiveness of US imperialism. But if a war broke out directly between the USSR and the USA, then it could not end quickly under those conditions. The battles were to take place practically all over the globe. And here the question is, how much would the soldiers have enough personal desire to fight. And it would not require a very large "medical support", which would also have to be prepared.

On this subject, American filmmakers even staged a feature film - "NUCLEAR RACE OF LIGHT". Although the action in it was invented for the conditions of the widespread use of rocket weapons, strategic bombers also went into battle. And the main

the meaning of the picture is not to show military strikes from one side or the other, but how soldiers, officers, generals and top leadership behave. In particular, many protagonists (Americans, moreover), realizing the disastrous nature of nuclear war for the entire

planets, trying to stop it by their non-participation

or refusal to carry out combat orders. Stalin could not allow such a thing in the implementation of his plans. Accordingly, he had to work out the ideological training of the performers -

troops. Something on this topic will be discussed further. And here I propose to pay attention to one more circumstance connected with the war in Korea, but already in theoretical terms.

The case concerns the term "provocation". Soviet ideologists for a long time assured the world community that this war arose because of South Korea's unwillingness to enter into unification talks.

because of the fact that its leaders staged various provocations urged on by the imperialists of the United States. Who allegedly sought to create a hotbed of tension on the Korean Peninsula

ditch.

And the Americans, in turn (and not only them), in actions of the Soviet Union saw a threat to the whole world. So who provoked whom and why?

The following is devoted to reflections on this topic. chapter with a completely unexpected development.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PROVOCATIONS

Almost all the time of the existence of the USSR, the basic, constantly repeated idea of the Soviet ideologists was the idea of the need to fight for peace. At the same time, it was explained that the opponents of peace are only doing what they are hatching plans for a new war, they want to unleash it as soon as possible and for this they arrange various provocations. But you can't succumb to them, and you must fight back. And so that provocations do not develop into a new world war, it is necessary to strengthen in every possible way

lyat the Soviet armed forces.

However, after the collapse of socialism, the number of "warmongers" for some reason sharply decreased. And the term itself has practically disappeared from everyday life. Only occasionally in international surveys are individual totalitarian states mentioned. This allows a more sober look at the actions of the Soviet Union itself. Including from the point of view of the struggle

with provocations.

The previous chapter dealt with Korean war and its background. It turned out that its main goal was not at all the need to unite the North and the South, but something else. And although a variant of its explanation has already been given, this idea has not yet been officially recognized. Officially, more attention was paid to the fact that the war in Korea had sharply increased international tension and brought the world to the brink of catastrophe. And on

Soviet ideologists and officials persistently connected the beginning of the war with the provocations of the South Korean military. This theme was also widely used in the documents of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including in the speeches of Minister Andrei Vyshinsky himself at the UN. Moreover, it was especially emphasized that the South Korean leaders were pushed by the imperialists of the United States.

And it should be noted that the provocations of the South Koreans still took place. But, as various recent publications show, the situation in those years was not so simple. In particular, a fairly detailed analysis of US attitudes towards the problems of East Asia in the late 1940s is given in the article "KOREAN WAR 1950-1953 : MODERN RETHINKING"

In the journal "PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST", 1991, No. 2. Its author is the deputy editor-in-chief of the journal B. Slavinsky,

It turns out that by 1950 the American government had come up with the idea of recognizing the US "defense perimeter" in the Pacific along the line from the Aleutian Islands through Japan and Okinawa to the Philippines. This testifies to the fact that in those years a conviction was formed in the leading circles of Washington that it was necessary to refuse involvement in affairs on the mainland of East Asia. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommended the withdrawal of troops from South Korea, which was done by Washington in June 1949. Only 500 advisers remained there. The American leadership at that time paid more attention to the threat of the defeat of the Chiang Kai-shek regime on the island of Formosa (Taiwan) and the legal consolidation of the presence of American troops in Japan. These questions were devoted to the January and June 1950 meetings of the Supreme

military command of the Pentagon and the US State Department, held both in Japan and in Washington.

And in the Soviet Union for a long time it was considered that they considered plans for unleashing the Korean War. That is, they were cited as evidence of the provocative activities of US imperialism. In fact, the Americans, on the contrary, sought to restrain Syngman Rhee's attempts to artificially maintain tension on the Korean Peninsula, who understood that without American military assistance, his regime could collapse. Neighboring China provided a clear example of such an outcome. Therefore, Syngman Rhee vehemently opposed the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. And when they were nevertheless withdrawn in June 1949, the South Korean leader tried in every possible way to draw the attention of the United States to the situation in Korea and, to this end, authorized hundreds of armed provocations in the area of the 38th parallel, which could potentially draw the United States into the war.

beyond their will.

To avoid undesirable developments on the Korean Peninsula, the Americans were forced to promise additional economic and military assistance to Seoul. It was for this purpose that J. Dulles visited South Korea in June 1950, and on the very eve of the Korean War (June 18, 1950) he visited the region of the 38th parallel.

And the Soviet ideologists this trip of Dulles for a long time the time was explained by checking the readiness of the South Korean troops to attack the DPRK, and the topic of provocations by the South Korean military, which was blamed for starting the war, was discussed with great care.

But as the materials of the previous chapter showed, ALL The Korean War can be seen as a major

our provocation at a higher level of international politics.

Did the Americans understand this? And if so, why did they let themselves be dragged into this conflict? On the one hand, they understood. For example, in the article FORBIDDEN WAR (Rodina magazine, 1990, No. 5, author S. Volovets), the then US Secretary of State Dean Acheson is quoted as saying at a meeting in the Pentagon on December 3, 1950 : *"The strongest head*

the pain is that we're fighting a front country. Our real enemy is the Soviet Union, while we are fighting a secondary enemy. If we If we continue to fight the Chinese Communists, how much energy will we have left to confront the USSR, which is getting all the benefits from this war? If we keep wasting power

and resources in the war with the Chinese, we will not be able to strengthen our defenses in Europe."

But then why didn't the Americans refuse to take part in the Korean events? First, by 1950 their policy in China had collapsed, which was painfully perceived by the American leadership. Under these conditions, further retreats could hurt the prestige of the Washington administration. Secondly, let us turn to the interpretation of the word "provocation". In the 3rd volume of the "DICTIONARY OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE" (M.: 1984) it is explained as *"incitement, inducement of someone (individuals, groups, organizations, etc. (and government leaders?) to such actions, which will lead to severe, disastrous*

consequences for them (military provocation) (does not stand for !)".

Let us now briefly recall how the American participation in the Korean War expanded.

On June 25, 1950, it became known in Washington that North Korean troops had crossed the 38th parallel. IN THE USA

they perfectly understood that the leaders of the DPRK coordinated all their actions with Stalin, therefore, from Washington, they turned to Moscow with a request to influence the leaders of the DPRK so that they would stop their offensive. Moscow officially replied that, according to its information, this was an internal affair of the Koreans, in which it did not want to interfere. This response went through international channels. What was left for the Americans to do? Stop all actions against Korea? And this after the collapse of American policy in China? Or try to somehow stop the outbreak of the war, using, for example, the means of the UN?

By the way, the UN was obliged to respond to the outbreak of war in accordance with its statutory provisions! Moreover, in such a way as to stop military operations and move on to peace negotiations. But there is no Soviet representative in the Security Council (UNSC)! Under these conditions, the solution could only be the one proposed by the United States. The Americans could offer

one out of two:

1) generally refuse to participate in Korean events (and suffer yet another defeat in foreign policy);

2) accept a number of appeals aimed at ending the war and organize assistance to the government of South Korea, while becoming a direct participant in those events.

In fact, the second option was adopted, and the UN Security Council approved it. How should the Soviet Union have reacted? One could join the decision of the Security Council and influence Kim Il Sung to he gave the order to stop the offensive and withdrew his troops north of the 38th parallel. Or at least keep silent, since the war in Korea is an internal affair of the Koreans. But why, then, was it necessary to start all this, including the division of Korea itself in the summer of 1945?

Therefore, Stalin acted differently. He is through the MFA The USSR accused the UN Security Council (that is, actually the USA) of illegal actions and did not demand that Kim Il Sung end the war.

But this can already be seen as a thrown foreign policy glove. But there were no Soviet troops in Korea at that time, and the Americans could have the illusion of an early victory by military means. And they were allowed to reach the borders with China. But then divisions of Chinese "ext" appeared at the front.

revoltsev" and Soviet military assistance in the form of an air defense corps. For the Americans, the timing of military victory began to be pushed back. The conflict took on a protracted character, the international situation

more complicated.

This is where we stop the review of the development of events and ask ourselves a question on the topic of the chapter: "Who was the main provocateur?"

Minor (on an international scale) provocations were organized by the authorities of South Korea. Their termination was possible in two ways: through negotiations or as a result of hostilities.

And the actually implemented second path turned out to be in the immediate vicinity of the outbreak of a new world war. And if we remember who proposed dividing Korea, then the conclusion suggests itself that the leadership of the Soviet Union at that time (that is, the "great fighter for peace" Comrade I.V. Stalin) was interested in such a development of events. Otherwise, it will be necessary to recognize Lee Syngman as the main provocateur, who by his actions persistently sought his own overthrow at the hands of the North Koreans.

Could Stalin plan such a course of development events after such a devastating war? Soviet ideologists categorically denied this. But after all, any war is a continuation of the policy of another

by our means. Therefore, it makes sense here to consider in more detail the actions of the Soviet Union in foreign policy over a longer period of time, for example, from 1939 to 1939.

However, before embarking on such an overview, it is useful to clarify knowledge of the theory of provocations. We have already familiarized ourselves with some practices on the example of the development of the situation around Korea in 1950. When getting acquainted with other events, we will need a classification that official science does not even suspect. roars.

I offer three classes (sorts) of provocations.

The first class, of course, should include "real", 100% provocations. For example, like the entire Korean War with the prehistory of its occurrence. That is, such provocations, where one can observe how one side (one country) incites (encourages) the other to certain actions that entail

desired consequences for her.

I propose to classify the real events, the executors of which were not instigated by some other side (country), they themselves achieved some of their own goals. But the enemy was free in interpretation and in the methods of counteraction (the so-called "second-rate" provocations). Examples: Lee Syngman's "initiatives" before June 25, 1950 or the actions of the Japanese in the late 1930s on the borders of the USSR and Mongolia ("Khalkhin-Gol", "Khasan"). But it can be noted that all the examples listed do not fully fit the explanation of the very term "provocation" from the dictionary. The actions of the Japanese can be attributed to reconnaissance in force to clarify their own plans. Lee Syngman's actions are to try to keep the Americans in South Korea. But all the same, Soviet officials called those and other actions

"provocations", although the side that is harder on

suffered, is either not considered here at all, or is implied in the image of the "provocateurs" themselves. But then who provoked them? Themselves? Or is it not a "provocation"? Maybe they should be called something else? But to simplify further analysis, I propose

leave this term to them, but with a clarification: "wto horny class".

And in the third I propose to place provocations recognized by one side, but denied by the other and not confirmed by "independent experts" or questioned in the future ("planned fictitious"). For example, Finnish provocations at the end

1939, which were the pretext for the Soviet-Finnish war.

For many years, the sharp aggravation of the situation in Soviet-Finnish relations in 1939 on the Soviet side was explained by the provocative and aggressive preparations of the leaders of Finland, who allegedly wanted to create a "Great Finland" at the expense of the territory of the USSR and for this purpose built a powerful defensive zone on their land (t . n "Mannerheim line").

But firstly, any military strategist will notice that the presence of a powerful system of fortifications in front of the advancing troops is a very strong obstacle to the offensive. Barrier structures before the offensive, on the contrary, are removed (so as not to interfere).

Secondly, Finland could put up no more than 300 thousand troops. Such an army can indeed be attributed to a large group. But who was she to fight? With an army that next year lost more than 10 times more prisoners alone. In addition, offensives require special means of breakthrough—tanks. Finland already had 60 of them. How many offensive battles they could have

calculated if, for example, according to some data,

in just one day on November 16, 1941, the Germans lost 32 tanks only on one of the sectors of the Soviet-German front at the Dubosekovo junction.

In other words, if we soberly assess the situation, then Finland had no chance at all of a successful attack on the Soviet Union! Then what sense could lie in the Finnish provocations? In order to provoke (induce) the Soviet leadership to organize an offensive through the "Mannerheim Line" and thereby

to prove the correctness of the costs allocated for its construction? Did someone in Finland doubt the necessity of this system of fortifications? These questions will not be answered here. I don't even see the point in discussing them. Let's take a look at the dates.

According to an employee of the Soviet General Staff at that time, the future Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilevsky A.M. ("THE MATTER OF ALL LIFE", book 1, 6th ed. M.: 1989, p. 96), the first provocations from the Finnish side occurred on November 26, 1939 near the village of Mainila (fire was opened on Soviet border guards). Let's imagine: three soldiers with a dog are walking along the control strip in the Karelian forest: Suddenly, someone fired at them. Could this be? Maybe! What were they shooting from? According to the "BRIEF HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION" (M.: 1965), *"it came to artillery shelling from the Soviet territory"* (p. 46). On three border guards from cannons? Or from one? Maybe the gunner made a mistake, set the wrong sight or turned the wrong one? (By the way, this happened to me personally once during training shooting in February 1983, I think. But then no one was killed. And only one mine of a 120 mm tank caliber turned out to be "erroneous".) In addition, large forest areas - this one is not

favorable natural conditions for gunners: direct
you can't shoot far with my aiming, but shooting from behind

covered firing positions requires a special adjustment system (i.e., for small targets, it is completely useless anyway).

And what happened in the following days after November 26, 1939? According to Vasilevsky's memoirs - *"these provocative actions resumed*. But "after the blowing days" there were only three: 27, 28 and 29, because on November 30, 1939, units of the Red Army, consisting of two corps, reduced to the 7th Army, launched an attack on the "Mannerheim Line". Moreover, on November 28, the USSR unilaterally tore up the non-aggression pact with Finland and severed diplomatic relations with it.
relationship.

Let's think: well, someone shot from rifles, a meth bullet or a cannon through a snow-covered forest. And in response to this, it is necessary to send regular troops across the border in the amount of up to 10 fully equipped divisions with full weapons? To find and punish the guilty? Yes, and break off diplomatic relations?

And by the way, how did the sent corps fight - how did it work out or according to a certain plan? It turns out that the Red Army began to advance in accordance with a previously developed plan, which, moreover, was revised twice. This was openly written in various sources devoted to that war, for example, in the "BRIEF HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR SOVIET

GO SOYUZ" and in the memoirs of Marshal Vasilevsky, who noted (p. 94): *"We (employees of the General Staff) had to do a lot of work in connection with the imminent military conflict between the USSR and Finland and in the course of it. In particular, the "Main Military Council The Red Army considered the issues of the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces in the event of a military conflict **provoked by Finland** . (Did you know in advance!) The General Staff proposed a private plan developed by them even earlier ... a private plan **for repelling***

aggression... (No, no! Only for the case of repulsing aggression! The USSR just doesn't attack anyone!) *However, the Main Military Council did not accept this plan and instructed the commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District, commander of the 2nd rank K. A. Meretskov, to develop a new version of the plan for covering the border in the event of a conflict.* [Yes, why bother with this Finland! She only has 60 light and obsolete tanks! In addition, she will be the first to attack (or provoke)!]
Designed by

commander and headquarters of the Leningrad Military District option the counterattack was presented within the time specified by I.V. Stalin and approved (I wonder what was the name of the Finnish "Richard Sorge", who reported the exact date of provocations from Finland? And was he?).

Well, on November 26 (not in accordance with the plan?) there were some provocations, from which the countdown of the military conflict began.

It was no coincidence that I dwelled in detail on some of the events of 1939, although they took place long before 1946 and have no direct connection with the Korean War. But I want to note that some actors from the Soviet leadership in 1939 and 1950 turned out to be the same: I. Stalin, A. Vasilevsky,

V. Molotov and others.

They were also in the highest government positions in August 1939, when the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed, which can be fully attributed to the provocation of the 1st class, which pushed Hitler to attack Poland. And this is already a fact that is documented — for example, in the Ukrainian State Museum of the Great Patriotic War on the banks of the Dnieper there is even a special room with secret protocols to the Soviet German treaties showing how Stalin and Hitler divided Poland.

And they were among the highest Soviet state leaders on June 22, 1941. But there are still disputes about this date. To be more precise, discussions now sometimes arise that did not exist at all before. And the disputing parties have not yet come to a final, officially confirmed conclusion. And although this is not my topic, but a strange fact fell into my hands, which had not yet been discussed by anyone. It is directly related to the topic of this chapter. And it concerns the date June 19, 1941. Here it could be discussed immediately. But

its reality is so incredible, and its importance on so large that it is considered in isolation from other events of those days are undesirable. And it's better to start with reasoning about the logic of explaining events at the beginning of the war.

Every year the memory of it more and more passes into the category of theory considered by historians - it is natural that, along with the passing generations, the bitterness of nightmarish losses and terrible circumstances is blunted. But the newly coming generations still need to explain the past. And here the problem arises - how to do it? Or baziro's explanation

based on previously recognized conclusions, or amend them on the basis of "newly discovered circumstances". You can not change anything in them only in one

otherwise, if they are logically connected and not generated give additional questions.

As for the causes and course of the Great Patriotic War, they are usually stated in such a way that additional questions are indispensable. For example: on the one hand, he is sure that the Soviet leadership saw a threat of military danger from Germ

research institutes and carried out the maximum possible preparation. But at the same time, many of its details are usually not specified. And the question arises - if they were prepared, then why did the preparation turn out to be so ineffective? And why is this

Was the German attack suddenly UNEXPECTED? And if we turn to the details, which nevertheless are sometimes given in the explanation, they do not so much remove, as they give rise to new questions. For example, the reason for the appearance of Directive No. 1 of the High Command on a possible German attack on June 22-23, 1941 is called "irrefutable evidence", which appeared on the evening of June 21. Here is a quote from "BRIEF HISTORY ... (WAR)" (Moscow, 1965, p. 59):

"The directive to put the ground and air forces on alert was handed over to the military councils of the western border military districts of the Red Army only at half past one

on the night of June 22, after irrefutable information was received about the impending perfidy of fascist Germany against our country.

Or a quote from the textbook "HISTORY OF THE USSR" for grade 11 (M., 1990, p. 18): "On the *night of June 22, when the Soviet command no longer had any doubts that a German attack on our country was possible, the directive on*

bringing troops to combat readiness.

Marshal G. K. Zhukov, in his "MEMORY AND REFLECTIONS," specifies that he drew up the text of this directive in Stalin's Kremlin office on the evening of June 21 together with General Vatutin and after discussing it with Stalin himself.

On the one hand, the actions are quite logical and the way they should have been. For to completely hide the advance of the mass of enemy troops to the original paradise It is practically impossible to advance along the border. Information about this MUST go to the leadership of the country. And according to the explanations of historians, they acted. But none of the historians paid attention mania for obvious absurdity - for how inadequate but this leadership (i.e. Stalin) behaved - according to

after consideration with the generals of the "irrefutable evidence" of the beginning of the war: HE CLEARLY WENT
SLEEP!!!

Here is a quote from the same textbook on the History of the USSR for grade 11. (p. 14-15): *"There are still no convincing explanations of Stalin's behavior in the last days before war. ... It seems that time will lift the veil and over this secret. But somehow, wrong assessing the situation, Stalin found himself in captivity of error, which cost the Red Army and the Soviet people. Stalin calmly went to bed in the tragic night of June 22. He was sure that the war would not start gone."*

Marshal Zhukov himself writes about this ("MEMORY AND REFLECTIONS", volume 2, M., 1986, p. 8):

"The People's Commissar ordered me to call I. V. Stalin (around 4:00 am). I'm calling. Nobody answers the phone. I call continuously. Finally, I hear the sleepy voice of the guard general on duty.

— Who is speaking?

- Chief of the General Staff Zhukov. I ask you to urgently connect me with Comrade Stalin.

- What? Now?! - the head of security was surprised. — Comrade Stalin is sleeping.

" Wake up immediately: the Germans are bombing our cities!"

There is silence for a few moments. Finally in the tube answered dully:

- Wait.

About three minutes later I. V. Stalin.

I reported the situation and asked for permission to start retaliatory hostilities. I. V. Stalin they say cheat. I can only hear his breathing.

- Do you understand me?

Silence again.

In other words, it is officially recognized that

rum June 22, Stalin did not have irrefutable evidence of the German attack and for a long time did not give permission for retaliatory actions. And consider this fact. vaetsya as one of the causes of nightmarish losses.

And not a single historian paid attention to the obvious illogicality of SUCH explanation of events.

It turns out that on the evening of June 21, Stalin had no refutable evidence of the German attack, discussed them with the generals, signed the directive, after which he calmly went to bed, confident that the war WILL NOT START!?!?. And on the morning of June 22, when he was awakened and informed that the attack had taken place, he did not believe it for a long time, completely forgot about yesterday's irrefutable evidence, discussing them with the highest

military leaders and for some time did not know what to do, until the number of messages turned into a new quality - the understanding that the war was still on

hushed.

INCREDIBLE!!!

Could this be?

If you follow normal logic - never!

Following the normal logic of such explanations two conclusions emerge:

1) or irrefutable evidence really was on the evening of June 21, but then the top leadership of the country should have acted differently;

2) or hard evidence in the evening June 21 was not. But then the meaning of Directive No. 1 becomes incomprehensible. Why was it sent? Although, Of course, one can immediately object to such an "impudent" formulation of the question - the reason is indicated in the directive:

"1. During 22.23.6.41, a sudden fall of the Germans on the fronts of the LVO, PribOVO, ZapOVO is possible, KOVO, OdVO. The attack may begin with provocative actions.

*2. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any
any provocative actions that could cause
major complications (in other words, do not open fire!). At the same time, the
troops ... (listed) of the districts should be in full combat readiness to meet
possible surprise strike by the Germans or their allies
cov..."*

Yes, it talks about a possible attack. But
in the presence of really irrefutable evidence of the outbreak of war, such
directives are not transmitted. In the remaining few hours, the only thing that can
still help is the issuance of a combat alert order by telephone. But this was not
done. It turns out that the generals who gave such a directive to TELEGRAM FOM
(well, at least not by messengers) did not really believe in the start of the war and
were sure that there was still time.

Moreover, questions are also generated by another oddity of Directive No. 1
- the mention of some provocations. If we follow normal logic, then

it is literally impossible to imagine how they could
look.

The fact is that provocations are usually organized by the side that plans the
attack. Moreover, they (provocations) are carried out ON YOUR OWN TERRITORY!
Otherwise, all their meaning is lost. Suppose the Germans really started the war
with some kind of provocation. Can you imagine what they could have been like
(taking into account the fact that they were supposed to take place on Soviet
territory)?

For example, like this: the Germans, rolling out to firing positions
hundreds of artillery batteries, ordered to shoot one gun with several shells. And
then they would have waited to see how the Red Army would react to this? Or so:
having brought hundreds of "armed to the teeth" battalions to the initial areas for
the offensive, they ordered one platoon to go on the attack, to shoot a little.

And then they would wait again, what would be the response?

Is there any logic in such reasoning?

Any person who has experience of serving in the army will answer - "bullshit." If the troops are withdrawn to the initial areas for the offensive in the evening, this means that in the morning they will all IMMEDIATELY go on the attack. No "provocations" are absolutely necessary here, even harmful. That is why these areas are called "original", because "combat work" begins with them.

ta", i.e. an attack with all available forces and means located in these areas in a state of readiness for battle. It's like a grenade with the pin pulled out. It is like a compressed spring or a stretched string with an arrow in the bow. It is impossible to keep them for a long time. The withdrawal of a mass of armed troops to the initial areas near

borders with another state means that up to the mass not even a day, but a few hours remain. In this situation, the only right decision is an order by telephone to all daily duty officers of all units and formations: "Combat alert!" And then the military themselves know what to do.

But history cannot be changed. And if the official explanations are just that, then one of two things remains:
or turn a blind eye to the logical inconsistencies in them,
or try to jointly consider the maximum possible number of facts in order to find other explanations that have a logical connection and are consistent
eloquence.

The first method is followed by many official historians to this day. The second method is more complicated, and its minimum implementation should affect the actions of the Soviet leadership for at least the prewar month from May 21 to June 22, 1941. And such an

there is a possibility, if we take as a basis the entries in the journal of visitors to the Kremlin office of I.V. Stalin for

May-June 1941 (Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, fund 45, inventory 1, file 413), published in the Moscow journal "HISTORICAL ARCHIVE", 1996, No. 2. And add other sources and other events to them. (By the way, the authors of the publication of the magazine on visitors to Stalin's office in the Kremlin strongly

encouraged historians to use these records

to clarify various events, including by hours and minutes. However, there weren't many people who wanted something.) And it's best to consider all this in the framework of a "report" on the days of the pre-war month in the form of a separate chapter.

(NOT) SECRET REPORT FROM MAY-JUNE 1941

However, I would like them not to forget something else: the causes of failures and mistakes in the first days of the war should be analyzed more seriously, deeply, with all responsibility... These mistakes are largely on our conscience, on the conscience of leaders at all levels. And so that they do not repeat themselves, they should not be hushed up, not shifted on the souls of the dead, but courageously, honestly confess to them. For the repetition of the past will already be called a crime.

*Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union
N.G. Kuznetsov. "Before the War"
(magazine "OCTOBER", 1965, No. 8, 9, 11)*

May 21, 1941 (Wednesday)

On this day, Stalin's guests were late. The first to come was his 1st deputy and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov. He stayed all evening and was the last to leave at one in the morning. At 22.30 for 25 min. 1st Deputy People's Commissar for Construction P. A. Yudin appeared. After 5 min. after him, another of his deputy and People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, L.P. Beria, came to see Stalin. He also stayed the whole evening and left with Molotov. But Beria did not come to Stalin alone, but with his first deputy for the NKVD, V. N. Merkulov, who left after 50 minutes. (at 23.50). Exactly at midnight in Stalin

two people appeared in the cabinet - aviation designer A.I. Mikoyan and secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks G.M. Malenkov. Mikoyan spent 45 minutes with Stalin, while Malenkov went out with the last ones at one in the morning.

With Mikoyan, Stalin could discuss only one topic - the production and development in the troops of his fighter-interceptors MiG-1 and MiG-3, which

whether into service in the border military districts and

fleets, as well as in the air defense forces. And it is quite logical that during the conversation the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Malenkov, who at that time had several other posts: a candidate member of the Politburo, a member of the Orgburo and the head of the personnel department of the Central Committee, was present. But his main occupation, apparently, was membership in the predecessor of the Headquarters - in the Main Military Council

(GVS), which was created on March 13, 1938 under the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and was engaged in the improvement of weapons, as well as issues of strategy and tactics for the use of troops. The composition of the GVS changed, most often due to repression. Since July 1940, according to the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, it included:

1) Marshals of the Soviet Union: S. K. Timoshenko (chairman), G. I. Kulik (artillery issues), B. M. Shaposhnikov (apparently, strategy and tactics),

S. M. Budyonny (Deputy People's Commissar of Defense);

2) generals: K A. Meretskov (strategy, tactics and combat training of troops), G. K. Zhukov (former commander of the Kyiv Military District and Chief of the General Staff), D. G. Pavlov (commander of the Belarusian Military District);

3) secretaries of the Central Committee: A. A. Zhdanov (member of the Politburo) and G.M. Malenkov (candidate member of the Politburo);

4) aviation specialist: Ya. V. Smushkevich (replaced by P. V. Rychagov);

5) specialist in ideology: People's Commissar of State Control, future head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army (1941-1942) L. 3. Mekhlis.

Since the 1980s, several pre-war directives from the people's commissar of defense have been published. Usually they had two signatures: the people's commissar himself (Tymoshenko) and the chief of the General Staff (Zhukov). And some have another signature - Malenkov. From this we can conclude that for him membership in the GVS was a very important occupation. And it turns out that it was through him that purely military questions were connected with the problems of armaments production. This is also indicated by the fact that Malenkov visited Stalin more often with specialists from the military industry, primarily from the aviation industry. Thus, he can be called the curator of the production of weapons from the Central Committee.

And if we analyze the entire composition of the pre-war visitors to Stalin's office, it can be concluded that the problems of military aviation worried him very much. This observation is interesting in itself. The fact is that any military questions are not of particular importance in peacetime if war is not expected in the near future. But if a war is being prepared, then the preparation of a large amount of the most modern military equipment becomes a very important task. And this can turn into a serious problem if any technical branch is experiencing rapid progress - which happened with aviation in the 30s and 40s. Progress in it turned out to be so fast that prototypes used to become obsolete before they reached mass production. It remains to consider the question - was the Soviet leadership preparing for a big war? The answer to it is unequivocal: yes, it was being prepared.

Here, for example, is what A. I. Shakhurin writes on this subject in his book "WINGS OF VICTORY" (M., 1983, p. 42): "By the time *I was appointed People's Commissar aircraft industry* [January 1940], *it was completely clear that we cannot avoid war. Nobody was wrong*

Xia and in relation to the alleged enemy. This could only be Hitler's Germany. Moreover, on many pages of his book, he repeatedly emphasizes the enormous, from the point of view of Stalin, the importance of rearming military aviation, and even in a very short time. In particular, such facts are cited as the transition of teams for testing new aircraft to round-the-clock work, the construction of new and

giving to the people's commissariat many existing factories with tens of thousands of employees (which more than doubled the capacity of the aircraft industry compared to 1939), daily (since the beginning of 1941) written report to the Central Committee on the production of aircraft and engines, the transfer of work all aircraft and engine factories by the beginning of 1941 on a daily schedule, creating

the establishment of a dispatch department in the people's commissariat that controlled the work of each workshop, etc. And at the end

1940 Stalin proposed to Shakhurin to bring the production of new combat (!) Aircraft in June 1941 to 50 per day - despite the fact that in 1939 and 1940. People's Commissariat, using overtime work, produced an average of less than 20 cars per day. 50 combat aircraft per day is 1,500 per month (including weekends) or 18,000 per year. And this task was completed. In July

In 1941, 1807 aircraft were manufactured (60 per day), in September - 2389, and after the evacuation, the launch was increased to 100 or more.

Or here is what is said on the same topic in another source - the article "IL-4: SO IT WAS SO" (magazine "AVIATION AND TIME", 1998, 1, p. 4): "The country was preparing for a grandiose war, or was reflect someone blow, or to attack someone. Need for a fight Aircraft began to be calculated not in thousands, but in tens of thousands of units. July 17, 1939 People's Commissar defense K. E. Voroshilov sent to I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov the draft resolution "On the development

aircraft factories of the NKAP" (letter No. 80692). The document provided for an increase in the capacity of existing plants, as well as the construction of 4 new

in order to eventually produce in 1941 ... total

29,200 combat aircraft, excluding naval aircraft. Moreover, it was emphasized that the indicated capacities are not

fully meet the needs of the Air Force for 1941

d. These figures are striking: the production plan for one

only a year was almost 8.5 times higher than the total

the number of all German aircraft participating in attack on the USSR on June 22!

Shakhurin clarifies that a new plan for the development of aircraft-building plants was adopted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in September 1939. It provided for the construction of nine large plants and the construction of nine new ones. In addition, six new aircraft-building plants and reconstructed all old.

But, of course, in connection with the German offensive, it was not possible to fulfill the plan in 1941. According to official data for the second half of 1941, 8,200 combat aircraft were produced in the USSR. For the whole of 1941 (according to Shakhurin) - more than 15,000. In 1942 - more than 25,000. (For comparison: in Germany for the whole of 1941, 8,400 aircraft were produced, and in 1942 - 11,600.) So, in 1939-1941. the development of military aviation for the Soviet hand

management was one of the priority areas. Shakhurin emphasizes that he was in Stalin's office almost every day, and notes that Stalin was engaged in aviation operations almost daily.

lany.

And not only did the production of combat aircraft, especially new models, increase sharply, but you measures were taken to accelerate their development. To this end, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks held a special meeting in February 1941, at which Stalin spoke. O

Ko Shakhurin notes that *"then we did not yet know when the war would break out, although preparations were underway for it full swing. We worked with a huge perekalka, with incredible tension"* (p. 94).

But a strange situation arises: on the one hand, According to the plans of the Soviet leadership, hasty preparations were made for the war, in which Germany was clearly identified as a possible adversary. And on the other hand, it (the Soviet leadership) did not believe at all in a possible attack by it (i.e. Germany), which explains the nightmarish losses in the initial period of the war, in particular, 1200 aircraft in one day on 06/22/1941 . Moreover, historians usually limit themselves to this number. But if we continue the terrible statistics, it turns out that by June 27, 1941, the total losses in aircraft reached 3,715 aircraft (an article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Gerasimov "NAVIC AVIATION IN THE YEARS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR" - "MARITIME COLLECTION", 1998, No. 9). And they continued to grow. In particular, for example, out of more than 1,000 DB-3 (IL-4) long-range bombers alone in the western military districts, by 06/22/41 by the end of July (taking into account the replenishment of losses), 75 serviceable vehicles remained. Thus

it turns out that only in the first week of the Soviet aviation lost over 4,000 aircraft - more than all the German aircraft that attacked the USSR on 06/22/41.

But not only planes had to be lost. Here is what Shakhurin writes about the loss of factories: *"directly before the war, a huge number of decisions and resolutions were adopted on aviation issues: in 1940 there were more than 300, and in 1941 - 488. Not all we made it. Not all factories were built far from the western borders; there were objects in Belarus, and in the Baltic States, and other places, in the first weeks and months of the war occupied by the enemy. Not all of us managed to transfer later. Something left for the enemy..."* (p. 80). Is on

for example, photographs of Mikoyan fighters that the Germans got in their original packaging.

The non-production of aircraft can also be attributed to losses due to the fact that many factories had to be urgently evacuated from the European part of the country to the east. Often the evacuation took place under bombing or even under fire from approaching German troops. Except

moreover, under the German occupation fell the only

The places of production of some types of materials, for example, aviation wood, air plywood and delta wood, were supplied by enterprises of Belarus and the Leningrad region before the war. It was necessary to evacuate all factories that produced section steel, bearings and pipes, in connection with which, in the first weeks and months of the war, their production ceased altogether. In other words, the preparations for the war turned out to be largely not what was needed. Shakhurin honestly notes this and is surprised himself; *"Why are some*

issues raised at a meeting in the State Planning Committee of the USSR and in People's Commissariat of the aviation industry, there were only when the war had already begun? But answers he was too evasive: "None of us imagined that the war would break out so suddenly. Nobody could assume that very soon we will lose almost half of the European part of the country, economically important. The mood was completely different ... "

But what was the mood, he does not specify, although he should have guessed why the national economy urgently needed tens of thousands of combat aircraft, which could become obsolete in a short time. And other leaders

the participants in their memoirs also did not want to touch on this topic, especially the generals and marshals. Her, as it turned out, it can be clarified only bit by bit and for some reason with great difficulty. Therefore, it is time to return to the entries from the journal of visitors to Stalin's Kremlin office.

May 22, 1941 (Thursday)

As on May 21, he had few visitors, and they were late. The reception began at 21.50 with military aviation issues, which he considered for almost two hours (until 2335) with the Deputy People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry and Chief Designer A.S. Yakovlev. Fifteen minutes after his departure (at 11.50 pm), three men appeared - Malenkov, Beria and Merkulov. They talked about something with Stalin until one in the morning. Perhaps they discussed the measures taken in yesterday's conversation.

May 23, 1941 (Friday)

Unlike the previous two days, on May 23, Stalin had much more guests - 14. And the reception began much earlier - at 17.05. Molotov was the first to arrive, who remained in the office until the very end of the reception time at 10:05 pm (excluding the 20 minutes between 5:20 pm and 5:40 pm, for which he was absent somewhere).

The first big topic of discussion for Stalin, apparently, was some problems of the Moscow economy, which he solved from 17.50 to 19.00 with the party (A.S. Shcherbakov) and economic (V.P. Pronin) leaders of Moscow. In addition, from 18.15 to 18.45 Beria and Merkulov (NKVD) joined the conversation.

At 19.00 for an almost three-hour (until 21.55) conversation with Stalin and Molotov were the top military leaders - People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff General of the Army G. K. Zhukov. Among various military topics, military transportation, as well as the design and production of weapons, were to be discussed, since an hour later seven more specialists of a very specific profile came to Stalin's office - People's Commissar of Railways (and other positions) L.M. Kaganovich (20.00-21.20) and head of the Main Artillery

Directorate of the Red Army, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. I. Kulik (20.20-21.55).

From 21.20 to 21.45 Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko, Zhukov and Kulik hold a short meeting on the production of some kind of weapon manufactured behind water No. 8 of the People's Commissariat of Arms. In a meeting at took part:

G. V. Avtsin - director of the plant number 8 named after. Kalinin;

I. A. Komaritsky - designer of plant No. 8;

E. V. Charnko - weapons designer;

M. S. Shelkov - head of the fuel industry department and deputy head of the GULAG (Main Directorate of Camps) of the NKVD of the USSR.

Of these people, Komaritsky is the most famous - his name is in the name of the ShKAS machine gun - "Shpitalny, Komaritsky, aviation, rapid-fire." It can be assumed that plant No. 8 produced weapons for combat aircraft. But on May 23, 1941, representatives of the plant visited Stalin for less than half an hour, and Stalin spent the longest time talking with the top military leaders. And the speech in the conversation, of course, should have been about military plans. Moreover, their discussion on May 23 was bound to be due to the fact that the next day, May 24, it was planned to hold a large military

new meeting with the participation of the commanders of the western military districts. The question arises: is there any information about the pre-war plans? You can answer that yes, there is.

In the MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL (No. 2, 1992) in the article "stubborn facts of the beginning of the war" published fragments of the latest version of the plan, which had the code name: "Considerations on plan for the strategic deployment of armed forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and

her allies." Subsequently, comments appeared on it in other publications, which in 1995 were collected in the collection "DID STALIN PREPARE AN OFFENSIVE WAR AGAINST HITLER?" (M.: AIRO-XX). To them

relate:

1. V. Danilov (Colonel, Candidate of Historical Sciences): "WAS THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY READY FOR A PRE-EVENT STRIKE IN GERMANY?"

2. M. I. Meltuykhov "DISPUTES AROUND 1941: EXPERIENCE CRITICAL REFLECTION OF ONE DISCUSSION".

The general conclusion of both these articles is practically the same. In particular, Colonel Danilov considers "CONSIDERATIONS ..." the main document that gives the the desire to assert the intention of the Soviet leadership to launch a preemptive strike against Germany. And although the date of the development of the document is not indicated, the analysis showed that it was prepared between May 7 and 15, 1941. And measures were begun to implement it, i.e., the well-known events to strengthen the Red Army troops on the western borders in the spring and summer of 1941 agree with the list of measures given in this plan. In particular, after describing future tasks for future fronts, it says the following: *"In order to ensure the fulfillment of the above plan, it is necessary to carry out the following measures in advance, without which it is impossible to deliver a surprise strike against the enemy, both with*

air as well as on the ground:

1) *to carry out covert mobilization of troops under the guise of reserve training camps;*

2) *under the guise of an exit to the camps, make a hidden concentration of troops closer to the western border, in first of all, to concentrate all the armies of the reserve of the High Command;*

3) *covertly concentrate aviation on the field*

airfields from remote districts and now begin to deploy aviation rear;

4) gradually, under the guise of training camps and rear exercises, deploy a rear and a hospital base.

It is believed that "Considerations ..." were prepared by Major General A.M. Vasilevsky with clarifications and corrections made by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin. The main purpose of the plan was stated as follows: *"Considering that Germany is at present*

keeps its army mobilized with its rear deployed, it is in a position to forestall our deployment and launch a surprise attack.

To warn him and defeat the German army, I consider it necessary in no case to give the initiative to the German command, to preempt the enemy in deployment and to attack the German army at the moment when it will be in the deployment stage and will not have time to

organize the front and the interaction of the armed forces "

(archive of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, fund 16, inventory 2951, file 237, sheets 4-5).

Colonel Danilov gives the name of the plan - "Thunder". According to it, it was believed that the advantage was on the side of the Red Army (152 divisions against 100 German divisions). The main blow was supposed to be delivered by the forces of the Southwestern Front in the direction of Krakow-Kato Vice, cutting off Germany from her allies. An auxiliary strike was planned by the forces of the Western Front in the direction of Warsaw. On the remaining sections of the state border from Finland to Romania, it was ordered to conduct an active defense with a readiness to strike against Romania. And if such a plan was accepted for implementation, then before the conversation on its implementation with the commanders of the future western fronts on May 24, Stalin was obliged to

but discuss it with top military leaders. Which, apparently, was done a day earlier, i.e.

May, 23rd.

By the way, there is another source of information about pre-war army planning, repeatedly published in mass circulation - the memoirs of Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky "THE MATTER OF ALL LIFE" (quotes from the second edition of 1976), who in May-June 1941 was a major general and a worker

became deputy chief of the operational department of the Soviet General Staff.

First, he explicitly states that during the last few years before the war, one of the tasks of the General Staff was to develop a plan for a war with Germany (pp. 99-106) :

plan to repel possible aggression

time has already been completed. During all recent years, the preparation of the plan was directly supervised by B.M. Shaposhnikov, and the General Staff by that time completed its development for submission to the Party Central Committee for approval. Shaposhnikov.

May 7, 1940 he was awarded the title of Marshal Soviet Union. We worked on the draft report together with N. F. Vatutin and G. K. Malandin.

... We worked very amicably and tensely. The opera plan occupied all our thoughts in those months. Most the probable and main adversary in it was called Nazi Germany. It was assumed that Italy, ... Finland, ... Romania, ... and Hungary could act on the side of Germany. B.M. Shaposhnikov believed that the military conflict could be limited to the western borders of the USSR. ... The plan proposed to deploy ... our main forces ... in the sectors of the North-West

greedy and Western fronts. To ensure the southern direction should have been ... also two fronts, but with fewer forces and means ... About possible
The report did not say anything about the start of the war. These are its general contours. This project and plan... reported directly to I. V. Stalin in September 1940. (Stalin reoriented the main southwest direction.) In accordance with this General Staff was instructed to rework the plan, providing for the concentration of the main group of our troops in the southwestern direction. Further, Vasilevsky notes that the terms for reworking the plan turned out to be very short. All questions should have been resolved by December 15, 1940 in order to

On January 1, 1941, the command and staffs of the western districts could begin to develop district plans
new

Working on the plan "with unrelenting
eat "continued in the General Staff and all the peaceful months 1941. Directives were sent to the leadership of the Red Army with the tasks of practicing offensive operations. And adjustments were made to the previously developed plan. In conclusion of the review of pre-military planning, Vasilevsky specifically notes (p. 113): *"It was also assumed that our troops*

will enter the war in all cases fully prepared and in the composition provided for by the plan
groupings that mobilization and concentration
troops will be produced in advance. The operational plan for repelling aggression was carefully coordinated
with the mobilization plan of the Red Army and the country generally; worked out calculations and schedules for the transportation of troops and everything necessary for them from the depth countries to the areas of concentration and appropriate measures have been taken to ensure transportation through the People's Commissariat of Railways. The plan was worked out

only the General Staff ... but also with the command troops of border military districts. For this purpose in February-April 1941, commanders of troops, members of military councils, chiefs of staff and operational departments (western) were called to the General Staff military districts. And then there are words that are worth paying special attention to: "At the same time, it was envisaged that the troops

the beginning of the enemy's actions, being fully equipped based on wartime states, deployed huddle on prepared defensive lines along the border and together with fortified areas and border troops will be able, in case of emergency, to cover the mobilization of WTO troops horny echelon of the border districts, which, according to the mobilization plan, were assigned for this from several hours to one day.

To mobilize troops in a matter of hours the second echelon of the emerging fronts, in the same areas strategic stocks of weapons, uniforms and ammunition should be concentrated in advance. But this is a very responsible undertaking to take strategic reserves to the borders in advance. And if the war does not take place? Return inventory? And the national economy will be paralyzed by the transportation of military (unprofitable) cargo back and forth? Such measures

It only makes sense to carry out acceptances in one case - if war is really being prepared. Colonel Danilov notes that the measures from the plan were carried out, and this proves that the war was being prepared for 1941. And Vasilevsky himself confirms this (p. 113): *"The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff not only*

made adjustments to the developed operational and mobilization plans to repel the inevitable attack on our country, but on instructions The Central Committee of the party and the government carried out the

a number of very important events from these plans.

And then he cites some of them. Part of them,

can, of course, be attributed as preliminary "to

just in case" - such as the transfer to the western borders in

May-June 1941 of the 16th, 19th, 21st, 22nd armies and the 25th rifle corps. But then they began to

measures were taken that clearly indicated the very imminent start of the war, in particular the creation of front-line command posts. But this will be discussed further. And here it makes sense to discuss the contradictions in Vasilevsky's revelations. On the one hand, the Soviet General Staff and the Ministry of Defense in 1940-1941

devoted all their vigorous activity to the creation and implementation of a war plan on the western border. The reason was considered to be the "inevitable attack" of Germany on the USSR. Moreover, judging by the words of the marshal, it was supposed to take place in 1941 (p. 112): *"From February 1941, Germany began to transfer troops to Soviet borders. Enrolled in the General*

headquarters, People's Commissariat of Defense and People's Commissariat of Foreign cases, the data more and more testified to the imminent threat of aggression.

However, a strange situation arises: how can it was necessary to create and implement a plan to repel the "inevitable" aggression in such a way that, with its actual In the beginning, it turned out to be completely unrealistic and was never used for its intended purpose. Since June 22, 1941, the troops have been operating not according to pre-developed plans, but according to a greatly changing situation, creating impromptu battle plans. And this is provided that the "inevitable aggression" that was supposed in advance for some reason began quite unexpectedly. In other words, not as planned? And in general, how can one plan the aggression of a foreign (uncontrolled) enemy? You can only plan the actions of your troops. But since at the head of the entire national economy

The main plan for 1941 was the army's planning for a war on the western border, then the conclusion arises from this - all the talk about "inevitable aggression" is a verbal cover for their own military plans, and no one believed in a real German attack. Only in this case everything becomes logical. And this is confirmed by an analysis of the events of the prewar month.

May 24, 1941 (Saturday)

This day can be called the day of the big military conference, which took place in Stalin's office for two and a half hours from 18.50 to 21.20, and at which the issues of combat training of the five western military districts were to be considered. At what the topic of combat aviation tasks was highlighted. From the administration of each district, their commanders, members of military councils (corps commissars) and district aviation commanders arrived at the meeting. As mentioned above, the meeting started at 18.50. But in front of him, the Stalinist office entered: at 18.00 - Molotov and Timoshenko, at 18.10 - Zhukov and his first deputy, General Vatutin. All the military left Stalin at 21.20, Molotov remained. At 21.25, for about an hour, the head of the department of the Balkan countries of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A. A. Lavrishchev, came to Stalin. And from 22.20 to 22.45 Stalin summed up the day with Molotov.

The fact that issues related to the preparation and conduct of a preemptive strike could be discussed at a meeting on May 24 was noted in their articles by Melnikov and Colonel Danilov. But there is no commentary on Stalin's hour-long conversation that day on the Balkan countries, on whether it could be related to the military plan. There is information from other sources that could.

In the collection already mentioned above "DID STALIN PREPARE AN OFFENSIVE WAR AGAINST HITLER?"

there is an article by M. Nikitin "ASSESSMENT BY THE SOVIET

INTRODUCING THE EVENTS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR", in which the author touched upon the direction of the pre-war Soviet policy towards Finland, Romania and the Middle East. In particular, it is alleged that the Soviet leadership tried to split off its Eastern European allies from Germany: *"At the end of May 1941, Moscow brought to the attention of the Romanian*

government that "is ready to resolve all territorial issues with Romania ... if Romania joins the Soviet policy of peace, i.e. come out of

Tripartite Pact. May 24 refers specifically to "the end of May", and such a statement could not exist without Stalin's approval. Therefore, it is quite possible that he discussed it on the evening of May 24 in a conversation with a specialist on the Balkan countries.

In addition (as M. Nikitin notes), some The authors believe that the Soviet leadership counted on the German offensive in the summer of 1941 in the Middle East. And Berlin did not just count, but tried to believe that in this case there would be no opposition from the Soviet Union. Within this guide

the meaning of the events held in May becomes clear

1941 Soviet-German consultations on the Middle East, which were conducted in Ankara on behalf of their governments by the Soviet ambassador S. A. Vinogradov and the German ambassador F. von Papen. On them the Soviet side

She stressed her readiness to take into account German interests in this region.

The same goal, according to M. Ni

kitina, it was planned to reach on direct Soviet

German negotiations, which strenuously offer

were on the Soviet side from mid-June 1941. On June 18, Molotov notified Berlin of his desire to come for new negotiations. And he repeated the offer to the German ambassador in Moscow, F. von Schulenburg, on the evening of 06/21/41. But on June 22, all these attempts lost all meaning. And their goal could be the only thing

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"push" Hitler to "get bogged down" in the war with the British in the Middle East and thereby weaken our

grouping on the western borders of the USSR. There are suggestions that the Soviet leadership was counting on something similar in the spring of 1940, expecting that France and England would put up good resistance to the Wehrmacht, which would lead to a favorable situation for the offensive of the Red Army in the summer of 1940.

that such plans could exist is indirectly indicated by the execution in the USSR in April-May 1940 of a large group of Polish officers and other specialists.

stov, who could turn out to be undesirable persons in the event of the "liberation" of Poland. But the Wehrmacht, contrary to expectations, quickly coped with the armies of France and England, because of which Moscow had to revise the war plan on the western border (information from the article by Ph.D. B.V. Sokolov in the above collection) .

Considering the questions of Soviet policy in the Balkans and the Middle East at that time and in their light, the Soviet-German problems, one cannot pass over silence.

We also accept the principled position of the Soviet leadership, stated by Molotov to the German Ambassador Count Schulenburg on November 25, 1940, which Schulenburg detailed in his telegram to Ribbentrop in Berlin the next day. It was first published in 1948 by the US Department of National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union. 1939-1941. Documents from the Archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They were published in Russian in 1991 by the Moskovsky Rabochiy publishing house under the heading "SUBJECT TO ANNOUNCEMENT (USSR-GERMANY, 1939-1941)". Moreover, the text of many documents of the first half of 1941 indicates that the relevance of the "statement of November 25" remained until 06/22/41. Due to such importance with the telegram

Schulenburg of November 26, 1940 should be read in full. (Note: explanatory words in square brackets have been added to the text.)

*"Ambassador Schulenburg to Ribbentrop
Moscow, 11/26/1940 - 5.34
telegram No. 2362 dated November 25
Urgently! Top secret!
To the Imperial Foreign Minister in person!*

*Molotov invited me to his place tonight and
In the presence of Dekanozov [the USSR ambassador in Berlin]
stated the following:*

*The Soviet government studied the content of the statement
of the Reich Foreign Minister [i.e. Ribbentrop], made by the Reich
Foreign Minister during the final conversation on November 13
[at the negotiations in Berlin], and took the following*

position:

*The Soviet government is ready to accept the project
four-power pact [Germany, Italy, Japan (i.e. "Axis") and the USSR]
on political cooperation and
economic mutual assistance, outlined by the Reich Foreign
Minister during a conversation on November 13, 1940, on the
following terms:*

*1. It is envisaged that the German troops will immediately
leave Finland, which, according to the (Soviet-German) treaty of
1939, is part of the Soviet
zone of influence. At the same time, the Soviet Union guarantees
peaceful relations with Finland and the protection
German economic interests in Finland
(export of timber and nickel).*

*2. It is envisaged that within the next
months the security of the Soviet Union by
[Black Sea] Straits are guaranteed by the conclusion of a mutual
assistance pact between the Soviet Union
and Bulgaria, which is geographically located within*

the security zone of the Black Sea borders of the Soviet Union, as well as the construction of a base for the ground and naval forces of the USSR in the Bosphorus region and the Dardanelles on a long-term lease.

3. It is envisaged that the area south of Batumi and Baku in the general direction towards the Persian the bay is recognized as the center of the territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union.

4. It is envisaged that Japan will refuse from their rights to coal and oil concessions to Northern Sakhalin.

In accordance with the aforementioned draft [secret] protocol on the delimitation of spheres of interest, outlined by the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, should be modified in such a way that that the center of the territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union be moved south of Batumi and Bagsu to general direction towards the Persian Gulf.

Likewise, the draft [secret] protocol or agreements between Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union with regard to Turkey should be supplemented in such a way as to guarantee a basis for some number of naval and ground forces USSR in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles on a long-term lease. It is proposed that, in the case of an application Turkey about its desire to join the Four Power Pact, three powers (Germany, Italy and the USSR) guarantee independence and territorial the integrity of Turkey.

The protocol must state that if if Turkey refuses to join the four-power pact, Italy and the USSR will jointly work out and practically apply military and diplomatic sanctions. Regarding this, there should be

entered into a separate agreement.

In addition, you must agree:

a) the third secret protocol between Germany and the Soviet Union regarding Finland (see paragraph 1);

b) the fourth secret protocol between Japan and the Soviet Union on Japan's renunciation of oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin (in exchange for appropriate compensations);

c) the fifth secret protocol between Germany, the Soviet Union and Italy, with the recognition of the fact that Bulgaria is geographically located inside the security zone of the Black Sea borders of the USSR and that the conclusion of the Soviet-Bulgarian treaty on mutual assistance, which in no way affects the internal regime of Bulgaria, its sovereignty and independence, is politically necessary;

In conclusion, Molotov declared that the Soviet the proposal provides for five [secret] protocols instead of the two scheduled by the Reich Foreign Minister. He (Molotov) will be very

I am grateful to the German side for the response statement

leniya.

Schulenburg".

Reading this document leads to terrible fantasies, for example, the Soviet troops, together with Mussolini's army, "bring to life" Turkey. Or else: the main participant in the Comintern, the Soviet Union, is an active participant in the "Anti-Comintern Axis"! And as an ally of Japan, he is helping her government to "develop" Southeast Asia! And what does "the center of the territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union in the general direction towards the Persian Gulf" mean? War with England? Were these aspirations worked out by the future Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General Shtemenko, at the command-staff game in

Transcaucasian military district in a matter of days before June 22, 1941?

Stalin's "flirting" with the Axis powers continued until the very beginning of the war on 22 June. In particular, in April 1941, the Japanese representative Matsuoka visited Moscow. On April 13, 1941, Schulenburg sent telegram No. 884 to Berlin, in which

noted the following:

"2. When asked by the Italian ambassador whether during the negotiations between Matsuoka and Stalin, the question of relations between the Soviet Union and the Axis, Matsuoka replied that Stalin had told him that he was a convinced supporter of the Axis and opponent of England and America."

However, the German government was in no hurry to agree with the proposals of the Soviet Union of November 25, 1940. Moreover, it was in December of the same year that Hitler signed the Barbarossa plan for war with the USSR. And as the date of its beginning approached, Berlin's opposition to the directions of the Soviet proposals became stronger and more active. In particular,

German government:

- did not withdraw its troops from Finland, but, on the contrary mouth, reinforced its grouping there;
- sent his troops to Bulgaria;
- was in no hurry to help Stalin in putting pressure on Turkey, etc.

The Soviet leadership, of course, saw Berlin's disagreement with their proposals, but it is from them did not refuse and did not take serious steps to reach a compromise. And also periodically reminded Berlin of the unresolved proposals on 11/25/40.

It can be assumed that this was done on purpose, since in the same period (1st half of 1941) the Soviet government carried out a number of measures for the strategic deployment of troops in

down borders. In May-June 1941 this process continued intensively, as evidenced by the visitor's log of Stalin's Kremlin office.

May 25, 1941 (Sunday)

Stalin did not receive anyone in his office in the Kremlin. Four weeks remained before the German attack. On this day, the German command began the most massive transportation of troops to the east.

A quote from the memoirs of Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, who at the beginning of the war was commander of the 9th mechanized corps ("SOLDIER'S DUTY", M., 1988, pp. 8-9):

"During the district field trip [of the district commander, General Kirponos in May 1941], *I talked with some comrades from the highest command staff. These were generals I.I. Fedyuninsky, S.M. Kondrusev, F.V. Kamkov ... They, like*

I got the impression that we're on the eve war with Nazi Germany. Once I spent the night in Kovel at I. I. Fedyuninsky. He turned out to be a hospitable host. The conversation is about the same: a lot of carelessness. From the headquarters of the district, for example, following the order, the expediency of which is difficult was to explain in that disturbing situation. The troops were ordered to send artillery to the ranges located in the border zone. Our corps managed to defend its artillery ... And this helped us in the future.

Indeed, from the point of view of the preparation of defense such a decision is completely incomprehensible, but from the point of view of the secret preparation of the offensive ... preliminary solid concentration of guns that transport ruyutsya slowly, very useful.

May 26, 1941 (Monday)

The reception schedule on May 26 turned out to be similar to the previous Wednesday or Thursday. There were few visitors (seven), and they were accepted by Stalin late - from 21.15. On that day, he held, as it were, two mini-meetings: one a little over two hours (from 21.15 to 23.25), the second less than an hour (from 23.25 to 0.15). The theme of the first would again be questions of military aviation. Was it attended by: Malenkov, People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry V. I. Shakhurin and two of his deputies - A. S. Yakovlev and P. A. Voronin. At 23.25 aviation specialists left, Malenkov remained. Beria, Merkulov and the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Belarus P.K. Ponomarenko came to the second meeting.

May 27, 1941 (Tuesday)

Stalin had few visitors, and as usual, they were all late. Molotov was the first to arrive at 8:40 pm and stayed until the very end of the reception at 1:50 am. At 21.30, Stalin's deputy for economics, chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, N. A. Voznesensky, appeared at Stalin's. Through 5 minutes - Beria. The four of them discussed something for less than half an hour. At 22:00 Voznesensky left the office, and 15 minutes later, Beria. At 10.45 pm, I. K. Sedin, People's Commissar for the Oil Industry, came to see Stalin. At 23.20 Kaganovich joined them. Can It can be assumed that the conversation was about the production and supply of petroleum products, including their transportation, especially military ones, since at 0.20 at night the head of the military communications of the Red Army, N. I. Trubetskoy, entered the office. He stayed with Stalin for 15 minutes. After him, Sedin and Kaganovich left the office. Molotov came out last.

There is information that in 1940 - in the first half of 1941, the Red Army experienced a shortage of high-octane gasoline, which was used in

aviation and for the bulk of tanks. The shortages arose due to the embargo that the United States established after the start of the Soviet-Finnish war at the end of 1939. It is believed that this is what forced the People's Commissar of Defense to reduce the training of tank mechanics-drivers and pilots to 10 hours (which later was one of the reasons large losses of tanks and aircraft).

Other events: On May 27, the General Staff gave the Western instructions to the border districts on the urgent construction of field front command posts. At this time, the transfer of additional troops to the western border continued.

May 28-29, 1941 (Wednesday - Thursday)

In the Kremlin office non-reception days. Military printing houses began mass production of the "Russian-German Phrase Book" for field troops (soldiers and commanders).

May 30, 1941 (Friday)

Three people visited Stalin within two hours - Molotov, Finland's envoy to the USSR Yu. Stalin talked with the Finnish envoy for 17 minutes. There is information (from an article by the already mentioned M. Nikitin) that in a conversation with Paasikivi he started talking about friendly Soviet-Finnish relations, which he intended to back up with the supply of 20,000 tons of grain. The goal was the same as in relations with Romania - to split Finland from Germany, but this attempt failed. From 16.50 to 20.10 Stalin holds another

military aviation meeting, which is attended by:

P.F. Zhigarev - Head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army;

A.M. Shakhurin - people's commissar of the aviation industry;

A.S. Yakovlev - his deputy;

P.V. Dementiev is another of his deputy;
A. T. Tretyakov - Director of Aviation Plant No. 3;
M.I. Gurevich - aircraft designer;
F.F. Petrov - designer of artillery

ruzheniya.

In addition, Malenkov, who came to Stalin for 5 minutes, was at the meeting. earlier (at 16.45). Molotov appeared at the end of the meeting. He and Malenkov for 10 min. delayed and left at 20.20.

June 1-2, 1941

(Sunday Monday)

In the Kremlin office non-reception days. Before the German attack 3 weeks.

June 3, 1941 (Tuesday)

It seems that a series of military, military aviation and internal affairs with a military bias was diluted with purely peaceful problems: for an hour and a half (from 18.00 to 19.30) Stalin received the People's Commissar of Education of the RSFSR V.P. Potyomkin and the historian Academician E.V. Tarle. Although there is a suspicion that changes in ideological work could be discussed in connection with upcoming events in foreign policy. At that time (in June), intensive work was going on to restructure propaganda in the Red Army in order to explain military operations against Germany in order to liberate the European countries from its occupation. And in this regard, it was necessary to make changes in the ideological work with the entire population, including school education.

At 19.45 for 10 min. Stalin was visited by People's Commissar for Foreign Trade AI Mikoyan. Then the topics of the conversations became again smoothly switch to military issues. At 20.05 for 20 min. Malenkov came in, followed by Khru

schev (20.25-21.00). And at 20.45 purely military specialists appeared - Timoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin. They talked with Stalin for almost three hours, until 11.30 pm. What about the last 50 minutes. They were joined by People's Commissar for the Aviation Industry Shakhurin, who stayed at Stalin's for 15 minutes. (until 23.45).

June 4-5, 1941 (Wednesday - Thursday)

Stalin did not receive anyone in the Kremlin office. But there is information that on June 4 a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee was held, at which, in particular, it was decided to create by July 1, 1941 in the Red Army "one rifle division, staffed by personnel of Polish nationality and knowing the Polish language" (total number of 10298 people) (paragraph 183 of the protocol, source - "NEW AND NEWEST HISTORY", 1993, No. 2, p. 24). The author of the journal is Ph.D. ist. Sciences B. V. Sokolov insists that this fact is a clear proof of the very close start of the war of the USSR in the western direction (ie with Germany).

There is information that on June 4 a meeting of the Main Military Council was held, at which a draft directive on the tasks of party political work in the army was considered ("BRIEF HISTORY ... (WAR)", M., 1965, p. 58). Malenkov supposedly did not like that *"the document is presented in a primitive way, as if we were going to fight tomorrow."* Such an opinion can be considered in ... different ways. It is also possible that about a month before the planned date for the start of the war, it was still too early to state these goals directly. And the document was sent for processing.

Date "June 5, 1941" stands on a top secret document of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Special Military District. The document was signed for the deputy head of the department, Lieutenant Colonel Mash

kov and the head of the 3rd branch of this department, Major Samoylovich. The document is called: "REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE WESTERN SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT ON THE CONCENTRATION OF NON-GERMAN TROOPS IN THE BORDER REGIONS WITH THE USSR." (Published in the collection "HIDDEN TRUTH OF THE WAR: 1941". M., 1992, pp. 42-48). The document contains the following sections:

- About military units;
- Military transportation and movement;
- Observations of the Soviet territory (according to military observation data);
- Intensive preparation of the theater [of military operations];
- Miscellaneous;
- Conclusion.

Some quotes from the document: *"Undercover and other data received for the specified period [May 25 - June 5] confirms the dislocation: in Ostrolenka - 903rd Infantry Regiment and up to the Artillery Regiment; in Rozhan - 203rd, 512th and 513th infantry regiments; in Tsekhanov and Mlava - assault battalions detachments; in Sedlec - the 537th cavalry regiment, in Warsaw - the 44th infantry regiment ...*

According to a defector, a cavalry soldier squadron of the 478th division, stationed in Vlots Lavek, the transfer of German troops to our borders continue. From Warsaw on the highway to Vyskov, Island, Brock at night infantry moves daily, artillery and tanks...

Based on a number of undercover and other data theater training in the band against ZapoVO, especially from May 25, is carried out more intensively and is characterized by the following:

...

Movement of civilians in the border zone minimized. The whole strip in the immediate proximity to the border reinforced with artillery and machine gun positions, with a complete organization telephone communication between batteries, command and observation posts.

Recently, artillery combat shooting exercises.

The population of the border strip ... was evicted to the deep areas.

....

The population of villages and cities received official instructions that if anyone during war will give in to panic, it will be shot down

pour on the spot.

All civilian medical institutions ... are occupied under hospitals.

.....

Covert mobilization of officials ends for future positions in the western regions of the USSR.

.....

In Warsaw, Malkinya, Ostroleka there are several thousand German railway workers sent from France, Belgium and Germany, who after the entry of German troops into Soviet territory, they are intended to work in various cities and railway stations ... "

June 6, 1941 (Friday)

The reception began with a conversation with Stalin's economic deputy Voznesensky (5.35-6.35 pm). And then two regular military meetings took place.

The first one (from 18.40 to 20.35) was devoted to military aviation. It was attended by: Malenkov, Zhigarev, Petrov, Head of the Housing Construction Department of the Moscow City Council V.F. Mosolov, Director of Plant No. 752

People's Commissariat for Armaments E. A. Demin, as well as unidentified persons Schenkman and Vostrov. The last four left the meeting 25 minutes earlier (at 20.00), while Malenkov, on the contrary, was late and left at 20.35.

At 20.50 for 5 minutes, People's Commissar for Finance A. G. Zverev came to Stalin. And after it, a second, now purely military, meeting with Timoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin took place (20.35-23.00).

June 7, 1941 (Saturday)

It seems that this day turned out to be more nervous for Stalin than the previous ones. This is indicated by the fact that Beria and Malenkov visited him three times: at 20.45-21.00, at 22.05-22.35 and at 22.40-23.25.

All this time (from 20.45 to 23.35) he had Molotov and other faces briefly appeared:

- Deputy Beria B. 3. Kobulov (20.45-21.00);
- 1st Deputy of the NKID A Ya. Vyshinsky;
- People's Commissar of the Oil Industry I. K. Sedin (21.45-22.50);
- People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov;
- Timoshenko and Zhukov (22.25-22.50).

June 8, 1941 (Sunday)

Day off. Two weeks before the war.

A quote from the book of Marshal I. Kh. Bagramyan "THUS WAS THE WAR" (Kyiv, 1984, p. 65), which at that time

I served as chief of the operations department - deputy chief of staff of the Kyiv Special Military

district: [In early June] *"to the intelligence department of the district information began to come in, one more disturbing than the other.*

Our scout Colonel G. I. Bondarev became almost not the commander's most frequent visitor. We noticed that after each conversation with MP Kir, the diarrhea became more and more gloomy. grounds for enough worries. Bondarev daily informed

*operational department about information; coming from times
personal sources.*

*At the end of the first decade of June, the commander called
Military council, at which the head of the intelligence department
reported everything that he knew ... Now every day, up to*

two hundred echelons with troops and military equipment.

"We have verified information," he reported.

*Bondarev - that the Germans evicted everyone from the border
zone on the territory of occupied Poland
civilians. At the same time, the German commandant's offices
warned the local Polish authorities: if hostilities begin, the
population should not create
panic, otherwise - execution on the spot. The Germans occupied
territory of Poland, all civilian medical institutions for military
hospitals, sent their own
medical staff...*

The commander of the district, General Kirponos, ordered the commanders of the armies to occupy the field positions prepared in the forward zones of the fortified regions (in the "forefield") with small subdivisions of troops. And he reported it to Moscow. And in accordance with the directive from Moscow of the corps of the second the echelons of the district are waiting for an order to move directly to the border. But the order has not yet arrived. Regarding the initiative of the commander, a telegram from Zhukov will arrive in a day with a demand to cancel it. A similar initiative to occupy the foreground was carried out in the Odessa military district. Moscow did not have time to cancel it.

June 9, 1941 (Monday)

Another meeting with the military. First (from 16.00 to 17.00) only with Timoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin. An hour later (at 18.00) Timoshenko and Zhukov returned to Stalin for a big meeting until 23.35, in which,

in addition to them, military and economic
sky leaders:

- Marshal K. E. Voroshilov - Chairman of the Defense Committee under the government;
- Marshal G. I. Kulik - head of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army;

- Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks G.M. Malenkov - present

Witness of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the Main Military Council;

- G. N. Safonov - Deputy Prosecutor of the USSR;
- KA. Voznesensky - head of the State Planning Committee of the USSR.

At 19.40 they were joined by two more: People's Commissar
and the future People's Commissar of the Tank Industry V. A. Malyshev and the
People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry A. I. Shakhurin, Malyshev left
earlier - at 20.40. Apparently, the situation with Stalin's tanks did not bother him.
At 20.40 the head of the Chief

Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army P. F. Zhigarev. Voroshilov, Malenkov
and Zhigarev were the last but one to leave Stalin (at 23.25). The last ones left at
23.35.

June 10, 1941 (Tuesday)

Stalin's reception began late (at 22.15), there were few visitors (seven),
and you can add the phrase: "everyone
The same":

- Molotov (remained until the end of the day at 0.15);
- Mikoyan (22.15-23.20);
- Beria and Malenkov (22.30-0.15);
- Kobulov (22.35-23.05);
- Shakhurin (23.00-0.15);
- Kaganovich (23.25-0.15).

Other events: The General Staff demanded that a withdrawal plan be
urgently worked out in the western military districts and that parts of the fortified
areas (UR) engage in military installations of the UR, and by field troops -
foreground structures.

June 11, 1941 (Wednesday)

Again the reception time started late (at 21.00) and again with a military and military aviation bias. At first, three people came to Stalin - Molotov, Mikoyan and V. N. Merkulov. The first two left at 21.50, Merkulov - at 22.15.

From 9:55 p.m. to 10:55 p.m., Stalin holds an hour-long meeting with the top military officers, consisting of: Timoshenko, Zhukov, Kuznetsov, and two top military commissars: A.I. District P. L. Dibrov. It is possible that, among other issues, the progress of work on the revision of the draft directive of the GUPPKA "On the tasks of political propaganda in the Red Army in the near future" was discussed, which was supposed to send troops to military operations against Germany in order to liberate European countries from its occupation. (The draft directive Malenkov handed over to Stalin for approval on June 20, 1941)

At 23.00 Malen appears in Stalin's office kov, and from 23.05 the next large military aviation meeting begins, in which:

- Zhukov, Petrov, aircraft designer Mikoyan;
- test pilot P.M. Stefanovsky (from 23.15);
- Zhigarev (from 23.20);
- test pilot K. K. Kokkinaki (from 23.35).

Zhukov, Mikoyan and test pilots left at 0.15, the rest from 1.15 to 1.30.

June 12-13, 1941 (Thursday-Friday)

Invalid days. Just over a week before the war.

Other events: On June 12, 1941, with the permission of the government, the people's commissar of defense ordered the military councils of the border districts to begin moving troops from the deep rear closer to the state border.

The actions of the Germans according to the memoirs of Marshal Bagramyan (p. 75): *"General D. S. Pisarevsky, head headquarters of the 5th Army, flew to Kiev ... Pisarevsky reported that the Germans were strengthening their grouping. It is especially alarming that the Nazis began to remove all engineering barriers, set up at the border. Now they're feverish accumulate shells and air bombs, and warehouses put them directly on the ground, which means they don't count for long-term storage. Attacks can be expected any minute... The Chief of Staff of the Army ended his report on the situation with the question: declare a combat alert to the troops covering the state border? .."*

On the same day, a report was received from the chief headquarters of the 26th Army I. S. Varennikov. The colonel reported: "The Germans are preparing the starting position for the offensive."

June 14, 1941 (Saturday)

The reception is late, there are few visitors - five, among them are aviation specialists:

- Malenkov (20.45-22.35);
- Kobulov (20.55-21.00);
- Shakhurin (20.20-22.35);
- his deputy Dementiev (20.20-22.35);
- Khrushchev (23.00-23.20).

Other events: General Zhukov allowed the command of the Odessa Military District to separate the army command (9th Army) and withdraw it to the city of Tiraspol by June 21. In addition, the General Staff ordered the withdrawal of front control (North-Western, Western and South-Western) to field front-line command posts by June 23 (South-Western - by June 25). On that day, the famous "TASS Statement" was published stating that neither Germany was preparing

war against the USSR, nor the USSR is preparing a war against Germany. Relations between the countries are assessed as very friendly and peaceful.

There is a memory of June 14 in the memoirs of the marshal Zhukov (Volume 1 of that edition, pp. 297-298):

"On June 13, S. K. Timoshenko, in my presence, called I. V. Stalin and asked for permission to give instructions on bringing the troops of the border districts into battle

readiness and deployment of the first echelons of cover plans.

"Let's think about it," I. V. Stalin replied.

The next day we both visited JV Stalin and reported to him about the anxious mood and the need to bring the troops to full combat readiness.

- You propose to carry out mobilization in the country, raise troops now and move them to the western borders? This is war! Do you both understand this? No?..

During our conversation with I. V. Stalin, his secretary A. N. Poskrebyshev entered the office and reported that N. S. Khrushchev was calling from Kyiv. I. V. Stalin

picked up the phone. From the answers, we understood that the conversation was about agriculture.

"Okay," they said smiling. V. Stalin.

Apparently, N. S. Khrushchev in rainbow colors reported spoke about good prospects for the harvest ...

We left the Kremlin with a heavy feeling."

Note: Judging by the entries in Stalin's visitor's log in the Kremlin, Timoshenko and Zhukov did not visit him on June 14, while Khrushchev visited him personally. As for the advance of troops to the western border, Timoshenko, according to some reports, gave an order of approximately the same meaning two days earlier. Conclusions are being skipped...

June 15, 1941 (Sunday)

Last pre-war Sunday. Stalin has a day off.

From the memoirs of Marshal Baghramyan: *"On June 15 we received an order to begin on June 17 the nomination of all five ty rifle corps of the second echelon to the border.*

We already had everything prepared for this: we are still in At the beginning of May, by order of Moscow, they carried out significant work - they prepared directives for the corps, conducted reconnaissance of traffic routes and concentration areas. Now all that was left was to give team of performers. We didn't hesitate to do it."

June 16, 1941 (Monday)

Stalin received two - Voznesensky (17.05-17.20) and Khrushchev (17.40-17.55).

June 17, 1941 (Tuesday)

Again, the reception started late. first appeared Molotov (at 20.15) and stayed until its end at 1.50.

From 20.20 to 21.00 Stalin conferred with three representatives of internal affairs and security: Merkulov, Kobulov and Deputy People's Commissar of the State Security for Personnel M. V. Gribov.

At 21.45 Kaganovich came (and stayed until the end at 1.50).

From 22.00 to 22.30 Stalin was visited by General Vatutin, from 22.50 to 23.10 - People's Commissar for Communications of the USSR I. T. Peresypkin. And from 23.10 military aviation specialists come to the office: Shakhurin, Petrov, Yakovlev (at 24.00), Zhigarev (at 0.45). They all stayed until the end of the reception at 1.50.

Other events: German ships began to leave

Soviet ports.

Somewhere these days the command of the Baltic The military district decided to send the families of the commanders away from the border and reported this to Moscow.

June 18, 1941 (Wednesday)

Before the German attack a little more than three days. Stalin talks with military and military aviation leaders, holding two meetings, and the second swarm becomes a continuation and development of the first. But first, Molotov (20.00 - 0.30), then Timoshenko and Zhukov (20.25 - 0.30), Malenkov (20.45 - 0.30), Kobulov (22.25 - 23.00) come to the office. And at 23.10 five appear at once: Zhigarev, Shakhurin, Yakovlev, Petrov and Voroshilov. Apparently, that evening it was decided to postpone the occupation of the front command post by the headquarters of the Kiev Regional Military District from June 25 to June 22 (for the rest, the deadline remained the same - by June 23).

June 19, 1941 (Thursday)

There is no reception in Stalin's Kremlin office, but many events took place that day, indicating the imminent approach of the war.

According to the memoirs of Marshal Baghramyan (p. 81), on the morning of June 19, "a telegram from G.K. Zhukov was received from Moscow stating that the People's Commissar of Defense ordered the creation of a front-line administration and transfer it to Tarnopol (now Ternopol) by June 22. It was ordered to keep it in the *"strictest secrecy, oh than to warn the staff of the district headquarters. We have already thought of everything in advance ... "*

The headquarters of the western military districts received a directive from the People's Commissar of Defense to mask airfields, military units, warehouses, equipment parks and disperse aircraft at field airfields.

The fleets and flotillas received an order from the People's Commissar of the Navy to switch to operational readiness No. 2.

The command of the Leningrad, Baltic and Odessa military districts received an order from the People's Commissar of Defense to work out interaction with the Baltic and Black Sea fleets within two days.

From the memoirs of the former commander of the Soviet naval base on the Finnish peninsula Khanko S. I. Kabanov (garrison strength - 25,000 people) (source - Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov's memoirs "ON THE FLETS BATTLE ALARM". M., 1971, **C .64**): "Late

On the evening of June 19, the Soviet plenipotentiary [ambassador] in Finland S. I. Zotov arrived across the border in Hanko. He said that we should expect the outbreak of war with Germany and Finland... During 20.21 and on the night of June 22 all the forces of the base, by order of the Military Council of the Baltic Fleet, were brought to full combat readiness ness ... "

But this fact is very strange from the point of view of the hypothesis of an "unexpected" German attack. If we take into account the fact that Stalin did not expect him, then the people's commissar of defense (whether he guessed something or not) could not independently ask the ambassador in Finland to go to the commander of the military base. And if he knew and asked without telling Stalin about it, then why didn't he

gave a similar order to everyone else tyam and formations of all western military districts? And since the rest of the units and formations did not receive such an order on June 19, it turns out that the ambassador in Finland was carrying out some kind of special mission on orders from Moscow. For he himself, on personal initiative

tive also could not go to the commander with a warning about the attack, which was not expected in Moscow. The commander of any military unit is in no way subordinate to civilian officials. He obeys only the orders of higher commanders. But the military base in Hanko was in a special position - far from its

them on the territory of a country that may turn out to be an adversary in a war. And if in Moscow they planned to start a war in the near future, then it was absolutely necessary to warn the commander of a distant military base about this. Moreover, radio communication for this purpose

it was dangerous to use. The surest method is to send a messenger with verbal information. And

it is logical that the ambassador did not warn of a German attack, but simply of a war with Germany and Finland. Because it can start in different ways.

And since June 19, a strange story is connected with one very important Decree - on the announcement of mobilization in the USSR since June 23, 1941

As officially recognized, the Decree on mobilization in the USSR was adopted on June 22, but the beginning of mobilization was announced from the next day - June 23. This moment is incomprehensible from the point of view of the normal logic of an unexpected enemy attack. The fact is that mobilization for combat units is usually planned in a matter of days. As mentioned above, according to the memoirs of Marshal Vasilevsky, for example, according to the mobilization plan, the mobilization of the troops of the second echelon of the border districts took from several hours to one day (according to other sources - from three to five days). Moreover, according to normal logic, in the event of an unexpected attack by the enemy, mobilization should be announced immediately. And in June 1941 in the USSR it was postponed for a whole day! Not likely! And no attention was paid to this oddity

who are the authors.

And there is one strange document on this event - a leaflet with the text of the Decree. Her photograph was published in various books about the war, but not a single historian paid much attention to her.

On the one hand, everything seems to be logical and understandable. There is such a photograph in the very famous book "GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR. ENCYCLOPEDIA" (M., 1985, circulation 500,000 copies, p. 452, editor-in-chief of the Danish Army General, professor Kozlov M.M.). Thousands of people have seen her before, including myself, but only

now I accidentally stopped my attention on the date of the Decree and I read it

Moscow Kremlin

June 19, 1941

I sent the news about this fact to Viktor Suvorov, I thought it would be useful to him, this is his topic (however, I did not indicate the name of the source). He answered something:

"I installed a leaflet with the Decree on mobilization [inaudible] - "GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR. ENCYCLOPEDIA, Moscow, 1985. But the picture is so small that it is impossible to see the date. You paid attention to the date, and this is a real discovery. I gave your copy for electronic examination. Result: the first digit is "1", here one hundred percent guarantee. The second digit is "3" with a probability of 13% or "9" with a probability of 87%. In any case, the leaflet was signed for publication before June 20, 1941.

I ask and recommend that you do not give up this business ... "

I tend to count "9" as the second digit, since from The 13th to the 23rd is a long time. "19" number is more logical. But when I let other people look at the Xerox pages, they used to say the number "13". I think this is because the photograph is realized by the dot method and the extra dot smears the number "9", turning it into a "3". But it doesn't matter anymore. The important thing is that the first number is not "2", but "1". But why is the date June 22 given in the presentation of this Decree? Although, on the other hand, it is more correct, as the day of the beginning of aggression against the USSR.

It turns out that leaflets about mobilization were prepared in advance and a decision was made in advance to start mobilization on June 23! Oddly enough, but this small number, in principle, logically explains almost everything. But first it is useful to discuss the situation with this leaflet in general.

Firstly, there is no image of her in the large serious works devoted to that war - neither in the multi-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War" nor in the multi-volume "History of the Second World War". Moreover, there is no mention of this leaflet in the special catalog of the Central Museum of the Revolution of the USSR, which is called "LEAFLETS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF 1941-1945" and was published in Moscow in 1985. For June 22, 1941, there is a leaflet with the text of Molotov's speech.

There is no information about this leaflet in another catalog: "HEROES AND FEATS. SOVIET LEAFLETS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF 1941-1945. (M., 1958, 553 p.).

Strange situation. It's about as if a painting was shown everywhere, for example, Leonard before da Vinci's Mona Lisa, and there would be no information about it in any catalog. That's the question, that paintings begin to be appreciated if the data about them are included in the directories.

But you can see that if the image of the sheets is in other editions, it is enough to look at the date on them. Indeed, such images exist. For example, in the book "SOVIET UKRAINE IN THE YEARS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS..." (in 3 volumes, volume 1) - but the date is blurred! There is also a leaflet in the Ukrainian State Museum of the Great Patriotic War on the banks of the Dnieper. But firstly, the leaflet's paper is suspiciously very white, especially against the background of nearby documents on strongly yellowed paper. And secondly, the signature on it with some line:

*Moscow, Kremlin
June 22, 1941*

During a discussion of this topic on the Internet, I was told the name of another book with a large photo of **THIS** leaflet - "HISTORY OF THE USSR FROM ANCIENT TIMES

MEN TO OUR DAYS", vol. 10. M., 1973, circulation 500,000 copies, p. 21. But the text is heavily edited by hand. Including the date (letters of different heights, different slopes and sizes). It is strange why it was impossible to post just a photo of the document, and not its strong "retouching"? Personally, I have a suspicion that this volume does not present the original leaflet, but a photo of a "blueprint" obtained on a copy machine of those times from a "tracing paper" on which a rough copy was made by hand from the leaflet. And over the years, no one has noticed fakes.

Other versions of the leaflet (and not the text of the Decree) I never found it.

Another oddity is the very fact that leaflets on the announcement of mobilization. What are they needed for? It has already been said above that mobilization should be carried out very quickly - in a few days. Moreover, this period includes not only the arrival of the reserve at the military registration and enlistment offices or assembly points (hours are allotted for this according to the plan), but also their movement to the assigned units, dressing in uniform, receiving weapons, conducting combat rallying (so that crew members, calculations, departments got to know each other and were able to perform combat work), as well as basic training if necessary (for example,

show the "chargers" how to snatch shell cases and throw away excess charges).

How did the Soviet leadership deal with it? June 22, 1941? It decided to postpone the start of mobilization for 1 day. Incredible!

And how could leaflets help? Maybe move did they decide the deadlines precisely because of them, in order to have time to pick them up, multiply them, deliver them and stick them up? But for dinner On June 23, 1941, their relevance and necessity will decrease to zero. It's like posters for a football match, for example, on June 23 at 12.00. At 12.10 on June 23 they

turn into waste paper. And besides, throughout the second half of June 22, 1941, information about the German attack was a constant topic on the radio. Why are flyers needed? And how can you get them?

print, deliver and post up in the remaining half day of June 22?

If you want to use leaflets, then their you need to prepare in advance, but do not specify the date. The text should be general, for example: "*Attention! By decree of [the country's legislature] today*

mobilization announced! And there are no specific dates, from what day to start and on what day the Decree was adopted. "Today!" - that says it all. At the very least, a day

but add it by hand or slap it with a stamp.

Moreover, such an option then existed (available on the Internet at <http://soldat.ru/>).

This is what it says in it:

"ORDER _____ MILITARY COMMISSARY

The Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces announced the mobilization of the Red Army and the Navy

The first day of mobilization _____ 19____ ... "

Printed in advance. All that remains is to slap the name of the military registration and enlistment office and the date of the announcement of mobilization. Why print more and some flyers?

In short, the whole situation with them somehow does not fit fits into the normal rules of reflection of unexpected noah aggression.

But let's imagine that (terrible to say) the Soviet Union was still preparing an attack on Germany, as some researchers assure. In this case, the General Staff had to (obliged) to develop plans in advance. Was something similar done in 1939-1940 in the USSR? Answer: done! And this is openly written in the same memoirs of an employee of the General Staff of Marshal Vasilevsky (which is discussed above).

By the way, there is official confirmation that the deployment of the Red Army in wartime states was indeed planned for the summer of 1941. This is stated in the operational report No. 1 of the General Staff for June 22, 1941, at the end of which the phrase is used : *troops in deployment, forced the units of the Red Army to take the fight in the process of occupying the initial position according to the cover plan*" ("Military History Journal", 1992, No. 8, p. 30). But excuse me, only what should have taken place can be "anticipated". So, in the summer of 1941, the Soviet command planned mobilization! What for? For planned exercises? At the borders with a possible enemy? Did you find another place?

Some researchers give a start date Soviet offensive according to the plan "Thunder" (or "Thunderstorm"?) - July 6, 1941 Mikhail Ivanovich Meltyukhov in his article "VIKTOR Suvorov's MAIN LIE" in the 2008 edition of the collection "FALSE OF VICTOR SUVOROV-2", with documents in hand, clearly showed that the date of July 15 is more realistic. But if this is true, then the deployment of troops with the announcement of mobilization should have passed earlier. It has already been said above about the need for at least 3-5 days for its implementation. But we still need to bring the regiments deployed in wartime states to their starting lines and make more thorough preparations, check equipment, etc. This, too, may take several days. As a result, from the beginning of mobilization to full readiness, it should take from a week to two. If the offensive was planned for July 6, 1941, then the start of mobilization could well have been scheduled for June 23. And knowing the horse

deadlines, you can print leaflets in advance.

But again there is a contradiction. Above already said it was hoped that on the day they were posted, this news would become

No. 1 worldwide. How, then, to explain its cause to the neighbors (the same Germans)?

There can be only one reason - provocations at the border. If by the right time there are no provocations of the second class, then the third can be used.

By the way, when you read numerous descriptions of the pre-war days, Stalin's strong fear of giving the Germans a pretext for provocations is striking. Very, very strange! He was not afraid of the German attacks! He attributed all reports of Soviet intelligence about the date of this event to disinformation. But information about the imminent start of the war came not only from intelligence. At the beginning of June 1941 (according to other sources - May 5) ("BOOK OF HISTORICAL SENSATIONS", M.: Raritet, 1993, p. 54) the head of the foreign department of the OGPU Vladimir Dekanozov was informed by the German ambassador Count von Schulenburg at breakfast in his residence, prefaced by the words that the history of diplomacy has never known such a case! But Stalin did not believe this time either and declared at a meeting of the Politburo: "Disinformation is already spreading at the level of ambassadors." (Information, for example, from the article by Victoria Galuzinskaya "Stalin "surrendered" Sorge?" in the newspaper KIEVSKIE NEWS, No. 44, 10/25/1996.) It turns out that Stalin, categorically denying the large-scale attack by the Germans, was very afraid of some kind of provocation! What does it mean?

Maybe he was afraid not of provocations as such, but of UNTIMELY provocations? Provocations of the 2nd class not according to plan? Then what should have taken place? Third class? Arranged strictly according to plan?

Let's do an experiment. Let us assume that leaflets were printed in advance in the USSR with the beginning of mobilization on 23-06.1941. This means that at least June 22, 1941, on the Soviet-German border should have happened (or been announced)

cations (apparently, the 3rd class). Stalin went to bed late. Falling asleep on the night of June 22, 1941, he should have known that sometime in the morning, perhaps after 7 o'clock, he should be awakened with information about provocations. But they woke up earlier, according to Zhukov - at 3 hours 25 minutes (according to other sources - not earlier than 4.30 in the morning). The Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, called and said that the Germans had started the war, were bombing airfields and had opened fire on the Red Army. And he asked for permission to respond. How should Stalin have reacted?

If he feared an attack, waited and prepared for it, then he would have to immediately agree, and even hurry Zhukov. But, strictly speaking, if he really expected an attack, then he would not have gone to bed at all that night.

If he expected that day not an attack, but about provocations, then he should have thought, and the course of his thoughts could be something like this: *"What happened? What time is it now? Fifth in the morning? They ["provocateurs"] are crazy gone? Maybe someone freaked out and they had to start earlier? But why on such a scale? What other bombings? Forever this Beria [or whoever was the head of the "provocateurs"] arranges excesses! It will be necessary to embed him on the first number! But you can't fall on the Germans! Troops are not deployed!.. Devil! But nothing can be changed! Will have to start*

"game" through diplomatic channels. We urgently need to call Molotov, Malenkov, "besiege" the military ... "

While he was thinking all this, Zhukov, who knew the price of a mine there in such a situation, allegedly again began to ask questions. And Stalin, as it were, answered (judging by the memoirs of G. K. Zhukov himself) ...

Once again I confess that Stalin's reflections came up with, and now let's see how he reacted, according to the marshal, who wrote: *"On repeated*

questions [since Stalin was silent for a long time, finally] he answered: "These are provocative actions of the German military, do not open fire, so as not to unleash more broad actions, tell Poskrebyshev to he summoned Molotov and Malenkov to 5 o'clock. You and Tymoshenko are to come to the meeting." Stalin reaffirmed his idea of provocations by the German military when [I] arrived at the Central Committee. Up to 6 hours 30 minutes he didn't give permission to respond. And only after V. M. Molotov's report that Hitler's the government declared war on the USSR, I. V. Stalin authorized the signing of Directive No. 2, and then with limited action. (The quote is taken from an article by Colonel General of the Reserve Yu. A. Gorkov and Colonel Yu. I. Semina "STRATEGIC MISTAKES OF THE HIGH COMMAND? in VIZH, 1992, No. 8).

Note: according to the "Journal of visitors to Stalin's office in the Kremlin", the first visitors on June 22, 1941 came to him at 5.45.

And the oddities continued. According to the article, by 9 o'clock the General Staff had prepared draft Decrees of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the conduct of general mobilization and the formation of the Headquarters of the High Command. But Stalin, after hearing S. K. Timoshenko (People's Commissar of Defense) and after several consultations, made changes to the draft Decree on mobilization. In particular, he limited the draft age (from 1905 to 1918) and reduced the territories covered by the Decree on mobilization, removing the Central Asian and Transbaikalian military districts, as well as the Far Eastern Front from the list.

The authors of the article explain the decrease in the territory mobilization by the fact that their assigned staff was very useful in the battle near Moscow. Explanation is strange.

First, after the announcement of mobilization on June 23 Until the end of 1941, several more mobilizations were carried out: in August, those liable for military service born in 1890-1904 and conscripts born in 1922 and 1923 were called up. And then the guys born in 1924 in connection with a reduction in the draft age in wartime conditions to 17 years. And the conscripts of 1919-1921 had already been drafted into the Red Army earlier, in 1939-1940. In addition, volunteers of any age were recruited into the militia units. And replace

we note that no one is aware of leaflets on these occasions passes!

Secondly, on June 22, 1941, how could one think about winter battles near Moscow?

Thirdly, who could Stalin consult with? Xia, having before the eyes of all the top military leaders, who prepared the draft Decree on mobilization (obviously, covering the entire territory of the country with immediate entry into force - that is, from June 22, 1941)?

He could consult only with that senior military man who at that time did not hold a large official position, but was privy to all the details of the previous plan. This person could only be Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov, who was gently removed from the post of Chief of the General Staff after the war with Finland, but who was the main author of the plan for the war on the western border (according to Vasilevsky).

And if leaflets about the beginning of mobilization from 23.06. 1941 were indeed prepared in advance, the need for consultation becomes clear.

Shaposhnikov, having the same data about the Red Army as Stalin, apparently decided that there was no point in changing the pre-prepared text, which he advised Stalin, who made the appropriate changes to

draft Decree of 22 June. And he ordered to use the pre-prepared leaflets for their intended purpose. So two versions of one Decree could appear.

June 20, 1941 (Friday)

A big reception day that began at 7:55 pm, when three people came - Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov. All of them remained with Stalin until the end of the reception at 0.45. At 20.15, the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, Mi Koyan, appeared (he left at 0.15). At 20.20 Beria came for the whole evening, at 20.45 - his deputy Merkulov (for 30 minutes). Vyshinsky appeared at 10:00 p.m. and left at 11:20 p.m., before a large military aviation conference. It started at the same 23.20. At first, the following took part in it (together with Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and Beria): aircraft designer Mikoyan, director of aircraft plant No. 1 Tretyakov, Shakhurin, Malenkov, Zhigarev, artillery weapons designer Petrov (the last three came to Stalin at 23.45). The meeting (as well as the reception lying in general) ended at 0.45.

Other events: Malenkov handed over the project to Stalin directives of the GUPPKA "On the tasks of political propaganda in the Red Army in the near future" on the restructuring of propaganda with a bias towards targeting military operations against Germany.

On June 20, the Main Military Council of the Fleet demanded from commanders and political workers "to educate the Red Navy and commanders in the spirit of constant readiness to engage in battle with the enemy."

On the evening of June 20, a part of the created headquarters of the Southwestern Front traveled by train from Kyiv to Ternopil.

From the People's Commissariat of Defense to the headquarters of the Baltic military the military district received a categorical order immediately return all the families of the commanders who were taken away from the border to their old places (later many of them were taken prisoner).

June 21, 1941 (Saturday)

It is more interesting to start the review of this day with the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov about 06/21/41. In his book, he writes that on the evening of that day, a message was received about a German defector, sergeant major, who stated that "German troops were leaving for the starting areas for an offensive that would begin on the morning of June 22." For some reason, Zhukov immediately believed this message and reported to Marshal Timoshenko and Stalin. Stalin offered to visit him in the Kremlin. Further, the marshal writes that he went to the Kremlin together with Timoshenko and General Vatutin. Stalin asked them what to do? They offered to send the directive to the troops and read its draft. However, Stalin suggested that changes be made. Because of this, Zhukov and Vatutin had to rewrite the draft directive in the next room. The marshal has these words in his memoirs: *"Wasting no time, we*

N. F. Vatutin went into another room and quickly drew up a draft directive of the People's Commissar. Back in cabinet, asked permission to report. I. V. Stalin, having listened to the draft directive and himself once again after reading it, he made some corrections and handed it over to the people's commissar for signature. After that, General Vatutin took the directive to the General Staff in order to transfer it to the headquarters of the border districts (by teletype).

So, the main characteristics of this event are as follows

blowing:

- scene: Stalin's Kremlin office;
- time of action: the evening of June 21, 1941;
- characters: Stalin, Marshal Timoshenko, Generals Zhukov, Vatutin and unspecified members of the Polit Bureau.

But now you can return to the log of visitors to Stalin's office and see if the marshal's information agrees with documentary records? On the evening of June 21, Stalin was visited by the following persons:

Molotov	18.27-23.00	Beria	19.05-3.00
Voroshilov	19.05-23.00	Voznesensky	19.05-20.15

Malenkov	19.05-22.20	Zhukov	20.50-22.20
Kuznetsov	19.05-20.15	Budyonny	20.50-22.20
Tymoshenko	19.05-20.15	Mehlis	21.55-22.20
Safonov	19.05-20.15	Beria	22.40-23.00
Tymoshenko	20.50-22.20		

Judging by this list, General Vatutin's leg was not in Stalin's Kremlin office on the evening of June 21. 1941. In other words, Marshal Zhukov refused to truthfully state the meaning of Directive No. 1.

Other events: on this day, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution on the formation of the Southern Front. However, the formation of its administration was entrusted not to the command of the Odessa military district, but to the Moscow one, from which the operational group immediately set off for Vinnitsa.

By the same decree, the army of the reserve of the High Command, advancing to the border of the Dnieper, were united by a single command headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny.

The chief of the General Staff, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, was entrusted with the overall leadership of the Southwestern and Southern fronts, and General of the Army K.A. Meretskov was entrusted with the Northwestern. General Meretskov went by train to Leningrad sometime on the night of June 21-22, so he listened to Molotov's speech on the radio at 12 noon on June 22 on the road. And there are memories of Meretskov himself about how he spent the evening of June 21, 1941 ("IN THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE". M., 1968, p. 209):

"I was summoned to my immediate head of the people's commissar of defense, who was the last days in a particularly tense state. And although I

the reason for his nervous state was understandable, although I saw with my own eyes what was happening on the western border, a layer of the people's commissar entered my consciousness with unusual sharpness and anxiety. S. K. Timoshenko said

Then:

"Perhaps the war will start tomorrow!" You need be as a representative of the High Command in the Leningrad Military District. You know his troops well and will be able to help if necessary.

district leadership. The main thing is not to give in to provocations.

What are my powers in case of armed attacks? I asked.

- Resilience first. Be able to distinguish a real attack from local incidents and prevent they turn into a war. But be on alert. In the event of an attack, you yourself know what to do.

Strange, again the fear of some kind of "provocation"! (And on which it is impossible to immediately open fire!) If the country was preparing only for defense, then any talk about "provocations" is meaningless. The order should be simple and short: "The attacking enemy is destroyed!" Or, for example, such as in the evening

On June 21, the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral Kuznetsov, gave three fleets and two flotillas: "SF, KBF, Black Sea Fleet, PVF, DRF, operational readiness number one immediately. Kuz Netsov.

In the middle of the day on June 21, the first column of cars of the created headquarters of the South-Western Front drove from Kyiv to Ternopil, and in the evening - the second.

June 22, 1941 (Sunday)

Judging by the entries in the journal, something extraordinary happened that no one expected. The reception started unusually early - at 5.45. Five came first: Molotov, Beria, Timoshenko, Zhukov, Mekhlis.

At 7.30 - Malenkov and Vyshinsky. It is Vyshin

The text of the appeal, which Molotov later spoke on the radio, contained the words: "The enemy will be defeated, victory will be ours!"

At 7.55 - Mikoyan.

At 8.00 - Kaganovich and Voroshilov.

At 8.15 - People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov.

At 8.15 the military left the office: Timoshenko, Zhukov, Kuznetsov, Mekhlis.

The rest of the time, until 13.05, many different people appeared in the office and left it - G. Dimitrov, D. Manuilsky, Mikoyan, Kuznetsov, Beria, Malenkov and

other.

At 13.15, for the first time in many days, the former Chief of the General Staff, Marshal B.M., came to Stalin. Shaposhnikov. And at 14.00, three top military men appear at once: Timoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin. At 15.20, People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov joins them, and at

15.30 - Marshal Kulik. At 15.45 Kuznetsov left the office. The final meeting with the military that day ended at 4:00 pm, when Shaposhnikov, Timoshenko, Zhukov, Vatutin and Kulik left Stalin. Molotov, Voroshilov and Beria were the last ones (until 16.45) with Stalin.

The next day (June 23), the reception began even earlier - at 3.20.

The war has begun.

In connection with the importance of the events, it would be useful to compare the actions of the country's top leadership on this day with the memoirs of their participants. But Stalin did not leave memoirs, Timoshenko flatly refused, Vatutin died of a wound in 1944, Shaposhnikov died in 1945. And only Marshal Zhukov, the only one of the active actors in the highest command of June 1941, prepared memoirs, which,

in addition, they went through many editions. But for some reason they suffer from inaccuracies (to put it mildly) regarding June 22, 1941. In particular, the marshal recalls (vol. 2, pp. 9-13):

"At 4:30 am, S. K. Timoshenko and I came to the Kremlin. All summoned members of the Politburo were already assembled. They invited me and the people's commissar to the office ... " (Judging by the "records of visitors", the reception began more than an hour later.)

"At about 9 o'clock in the morning, S. K. Timoshenko called I.V. Stalin and asked permission to come back to The Kremlin to report on the draft Decree of the Presidium Supreme Soviet of the USSR on mobilization and formation of the Headquarters of the High Command, as well as a number of other issues.

A short way from the people's commissariat to the Kremlin by the car of the people's commissar's tires and mine covered on an extremely large speed. First Deputy Chief of the General Staff N. F. Vatutin was with me...

We were met by A. N. Poskrebyshev and immediately saw off to the office of I. V. Stalin. Members of the Politburo were already there. The situation was tense. All were silent..." (Judging by the "records of visitors", Timoshenko and Zhukov were in Stalin's office on June 22 at the following hours: from 5.45 to 8.15 and from 14.00 to 16.00.

As for the "members of the Politburo", their simultaneous number in Stalin's cabinet was not big. In particular, M. I. Kalinin did not visit Stalin's office at all in June, although he was necessarily shown in films dedicated to that time.)

We read the marshal's memoirs further:

"At about 13 o'clock I.V. Stalin called me and said:

—Our front commanders do not have sufficient experience in directing combat operations.

mi troops and, apparently, were somewhat confused. The Politburo has decided to send you to the Southwestern Front in as a representative of the Headquarters of the High Command. We will send Shaposhnikov to the Western Front and Kulik. I called them to me and gave the appropriate instructions. You need to fly immediately to Kyiv and from there, together with Khrushchev, go to the headquarters of the front to Ternopil....

I called home so that they would not wait for me, and minutes 40 was already in the air. I just remembered that Haven't eaten anything since yesterday. The pilots came to the rescue by treating me to strong tea and sandwiches."

(Judging by the "visitor records", Zhukov was in Stalin's Kremlin office from 14.00 to 16.00 at a meeting with other military men (including Shaposhnikov) and could not fly to Kiev earlier
16.30 - i.e. three hours later than he presents in his memoirs.)

Further, Zhukov notes that the headquarters of the South-Western front in Ternopil, he and Khrushchev arrived in cars "late in the evening", after which he spoke with N.F. Vatutin about Directive No. 3 on the offensive, with which he did not agree, but was forced to agree. After that, this directive arrived at the commander of the South-Western Front at about 24 hours. About further actions, the marshal writes as follows:

"As I expected, she provoked a sharp objection chief of staff of the front M. A. Purkaev, who believed that the front did not have the strength and means to carry it out in life.

The current situation was discussed in detail at the Military Council of the front. I suggested to M.P.

*concentration of mechanized corps for delivering a counterattack on the main grouping of armies
"South", which broke through in the Sokal area.*

These data can be compared with the already cited memoirs of Marshal I. Kh. Bagramyan, who was at the same time at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front. Bagramyan gives a different version: after 10 p.m., a new operational directive of the people's commissar of defense (i.e., No. 3) began to arrive at the front headquarters via special communications. As it arrived, he handed it over to the chief of staff of the front (General Purkaev). Then they began to discuss it together with the commander (General Kirponos) and a member of the Military Council Vatutin. The discussion was lengthy, as a result of which General Kirponos proposed to organize a counterattack by mechanized corps. And only after its details were clarified did General Zhukov and Khrushchev arrive at the front headquarters, appointed to replace Vashutin (who, according to the official version, shot himself at the end of June).

From all this we can conclude: if in 1941 Since the Soviet side was really preparing a defense against the strongest enemy, and it was being prepared as it should be according to military theory, then there would be no need to hide and twist the facts. It would suffice to state exactly what happened. But the "newly discovered circumstances" clearly indicate that the preparation was somehow not like that, and that before

it is still undesirable to publicize its details.

In particular, it turned out that it was undesirable to make public the figures for the production of armaments in the USSR for the whole of 1941. For example, in Volume 12 of the History of the Second World War 1939-1945, p. 168, 200 some data are given on the production of the most important types of military products in the USSR and in Germany in 1941-1945, but with a note that the data are given: up to 1941 for the USSR - from July to December; to 1945 for the USSR - from January to August; to 1945 for Germany - from January to April.

**Production of the most important types of military products
in the USSR and in Germany in 1941-1945, thousand pieces**

Country	Year	Small caliber weapons			Large caliber weapons			fight itself years
		Vin trading And carab.	Pisto years, meta bullet	Bullet meta, All	weapons All	Mino meta	tanks and self-propelled guns	
USSR	1941	1567.1	897	106.2	30.2	42.3	4.8	8.2
USSR	1942	4049.0	1506.4	356.1	127.1	230.0	24.4	21.7
USSR	1943	3436.2	2023.6	458.5	130.3	69.4	24.1	29.9
USSR	1944	2450.0	1970.8	439.1	122.4	7.1	29.0	33.2
USSR	1945	637.0	583.4	156.0	72.2	3.0	20.5	19.1
germania	1941	1359.0	325.0	96.2	22.1	4.2	3.8	8.4
germania	1942	1370.2	232.0	117.0	40.5	9.8	6.2	11.6
germania	1943	2275.3	234.3	263.0	73.7	23.0	10.7	19.3
germania	1944	2855.7	228.6	509.4	148.2	33.2	18.3	34.1
germania	1945	665.0	78.0	111.0	27.0	2.8	4.4	7.2

The fact that data for Germany for 1945 are given according to April is understandable. In May, the German military industry simply ceased to exist. But as regards the USSR in 1941, it cannot be said that military products were not produced in the Soviet Union in the first half of 1941. Ignoring these numbers

is not a scientific approach, but refers to "zataso

vyvanie" and to "falsification". And for what purposes this is being done - this is already a question, and a very serious one. Ta Such a situation is possible only if the Red Army implemented some plan of its own, the disclosure of which is still undesirable. Directive No. 1, which was discussed above, was also an element of this plan. But not only the meaning of it

The text indicates the presence of the Soviet plan, and the number of the directive itself indicates its presence - the first number in the middle of the year. This happens only at the beginning of the work of a new control structure - in this case, the Headquarters of the High Command. Officially, it was created on June 23, 1941 under the leadership of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko. The General Staff, headed by General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, became its operational body. Moreover, it was to be created as a command and control body for the headquarters of the fronts, the decision to deploy which was made in Moscow on June 19. And this is already a clear preparation for war. And not for some 1942, but for the next few days. And this is evidenced by the situation with all the directives of June 21 and 22, and not only with the first one.

On that day, three directives were sent to the troops (headquarters of the fronts): at 00.25 at night, at 7.15 in the morning and at 21.15 in the evening. In different sources they are called differently. More specifically, the names are given in the collection "HIDDEN TRUTH OF THE WAR: 1941" (M., 1992, pp. 74-75). The second and third directives are called Headquarters directives No. 2 and No. 3. The first is Directive No. 1 of the High Command. the name of Stavka, and with strange content. According to irrefutable data, a war will begin in a matter of hours, and the Stavka reminds of some provocations, open

to return fire on which it is impossible. At the same time, they are called to meet a possible enemy strike, but, apart from putting the troops on alert and performing a number of activities that require at least a day, permission to conduct hostilities was not given, and the phrase "no other activities *without*

no special order" can be generally considered as a ban on hostilities. Like this understand?

With the help of normal military logic to understand such behavior of the Soviet military command it is forbidden. According to normal logic, upon receipt of irrefutable information about an impending attack, it is necessary, firstly, to make noise along the lines of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and secondly, to urgently raise troops on alert, transfer their mode of life to increased or full combat readiness and bring them to the places of the most probable enemy strikes. And then the military themselves know how to behave if somewhere they say: to suppress or destroy the enemy with return fire (otherwise the enemy will suppress or destroy them). Those who served in the army know this very well. Any training period in the troops begins with the development of one topic: "Rise on alarm" (moreover, in different versions: companies, battalions, regiments or divisions). I can give an example from my own life, how once the commander of the Kantemirovskaya division raised the alarm. According to the action plan for such a case, I, with a group of soldiers, had to run to one of the warehouses and organize the loading of suitable trucks with ammunition. In accordance with the plan, we run to the warehouse, but there is a lock on its gate. I stand, waiting. And three-axle trucks have already begun to drive up to the warehouse. I keep waiting. Suddenly the general appears and asks:

What are you thinking, lieutenant?

"So it's a castle, Comrade General!"

*" And if our brothers bleed and you
do you feel sorry for the penny castle? ...*

- *Crowbar!* I shout to the driver. But then a soldier from the maintenance unit appears from around the corner of the warehouse and opens the gate with trembling hands. My soldiers quickly set up a roller table and began to feed boxes of shells into the back of the first car.
and mines...

"BATTLE ALARM!" - that says it all! What further guidance is needed? The main thing is to have time to bring people, equipment and ammunition to the initial area for movement, and there it will be visible - by the noise of shooting, firing and the roar of engines or by orders
from above, the main of which in wartime is moving to the right place and taking up defense (or preparing for an offensive). And then whoever is lucky: "either you him, or he you." Every soldier of any combat unit should be ready for this.

And now imagine the night of June 22, 1941 in headquarters of one of the western military districts. Headquarters Directive No. 1 finally warned of a possible outbreak of war (which the headquarters had long guessed about), but then, instead of an order to raise a combat alarm and advance in the path of possible enemy strikes, it provides a long list of different events, the strangest of which is

There is a ban on the use of return fire in the case of which the directive warns! (Personally, I
this is how I understand her words: "do not succumb to provocations" and "do not carry out any other events without special instructions.")

For many years, historians only liked to mention this directive as evidence that something was being done to organize the country's defense. But they refused to analyze it in detail. Only recently have more real comments begun to emerge. For example

measures, in the already cited collection "HIDDEN RIGHTS AND WAR: 1941". M., 1992, on p. 59 says:

*"Operational decisions of the military leadership in
The first day of the war was essentially fruitless.
The belated directive [Stavka] of the High Command No. 1 was
half-hearted and indefinite. Putting into effect a plan for covering
the state border, it actually*

*forbade. Directives No. 2 and No. 3 of Stavka also turned out to
be untenable. By this time, the border
the troops were already pinned down or dismembered by the
initial attacks of the enemy, and the second echelons and
reserves of the military districts, due to the low combat capability
could not yet take part in the battles. More
Moreover, an attempt to comply with the requirements of directive no.
3 The stakes on inflicting a retaliatory strike on the enemy, which
did not correspond at all to the actual situation, introduced
disorganization into the combat activities of the headquarters
and troops of the covering armies, almost half
violating their control."*

It was not by chance that I quoted with a commentary not only on Directive No. 1, but also on the other two. The fact is that Directive No. 3 on a broad offensive once again proves that the Soviet High Command to

June 22, 1941 DID NOT CONSIDER the German groupie roving as a very dangerous opponent, which at that time had to be greatly feared. It was only later, in order to justify the huge losses, they began to explain what the strongest army was the Nazi Wehrmacht, how everyone was afraid of it and at any cost tried to delay the start of the war. And where, excuse me, did the Stavka's demand on the evening of June 22 to troops, for example, of the South-Western Front, "encircle and destroy the enemy grouping advancing on the front of Vladi Mir-Volynsky, Krystynopol, by the end of 24-6, capture the Lublin region" (Bagramyan's book , p. 110.)?

If the Wehrmacht was so strong that they were so afraid of it in Moscow, then at Headquarters it was necessary to think not about the offensive, but about strengthening the defense. But it can be seen that the optimism of the situation in Moscow could be caused by overly optimistic first reports from the headquarters of the fronts. This is right. However, the General Staff is OBLIGED to develop its instructions based on ALL sources, including the obligation to collect data on enemy groupings itself, especially on the basis of intelligence information (GRU for what?). Moreover, intelligence reports were received regularly and in advance. But as already shown above, the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense did not take them into account, they did not draw up a detailed picture of the German troops preparing, they did not determine the direction of their main attacks, they did not give instructions to the troops on the places of defense, warehouses with ammunition and property from the threatened areas were not evacuated, the field was not prepared, etc. But at the same time there were some other activities. The troops were deployed, but without taking into account the main attacks of the enemy, warehouses were created, but for some reason in threatened areas, directives

were given, but some confused and not related to the specific task of defense. What does it mean?

This can be understood only in one case - if the Soviet side also implemented some kind of its own military plan. And all the actions and directives of the Soviet High Command until June 22 must be considered only from this point of view. Then a lot

which becomes clear and logical, including Directive No. 1 on the night of June 22. The real sequence of actions is obtained as follows.

On June 19, a decision was made in Moscow to deploy the headquarters of the fronts and the Headquarters of the High Command. From June 23, it is planned to announce mobilization, calculated for 3-5 days. During this time, the number of

missions (especially in the western regions of the USSR) should increase by another 5 million people. This completely covers the Wehrmacht troops. But time is needed to conduct combat rallying and withdraw troops to their starting lines for an offensive. Ultimately, the full deployment of the army should take up to a week and a half. The mobilization leaflets were pre-printed and dated June 19, 1941. But to justify it, you need a reason. Such a reason could be

only military provocations on the border, which should take place exactly on the 22-23rd. But in Moscow they are 100% convinced that the Germans themselves will not attack. Therefore, on June 22-23, there is a need for planned-fictitious provocations of the type carried out before the Soviet-Finnish war.

However, from the morning of June 22, the headquarters of the fronts will begin to function, which are already aware of the imminent start of hostilities. A possible adversary is also known - fascist Germany. And if planned-fictitious provocations are started in conditions when the troops have not yet been fully deployed, then the consequences can really turn out to be grave if the command of the fronts takes the planned provocations for a real attack and moves the armies into battle on a broad front. In addition, the participants in the "provocations" themselves can be shot. Therefore, by the morning of June 22, the headquarters of the fronts should be gently warned so that they would not pay special attention to possible firing on the border. But it is necessary to warn so that those clear ponies

Mali that the provocations are real and all the preparation

Wars are actually carried out according to plan only to "repel possible aggression." Simultaneously

the directive must specify a list of the next activities for the program being implemented. In addition, it must be sent at the very last moment, so that there is a reason for excuses through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

urgent negotiations along whose line were bound to arise. However, they will have to be delayed for the period of mobilization, possibly with its formal cancellation. But during this period the troops will be deployed, and the time for the enemy to prepare his defense will be hopelessly lost.

And only from these positions the meaning of Directive No. 1 becomes completely clear and logical. We can say - ideal, albeit creepy, if you delve into the content of the stated hypothesis. It is hard to agree with such a "biased" selection of facts. Moreover, doubts may arise related to the order of the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral Kuznetsov, to three fleets and two flotillas: "*SF, KBF, Black Sea Fleet, PVF,*

DRF, operational readiness number one immediately.

Kuznetsov. Why was he given away? Does it fit into the proposed sequence of events? I can express my opinion - it fits.

First, the order does not say anything about waiting for someone to attack. Secondly, the navy is an auxiliary structure. At sea, battles for territory are not waged. The fleet is transport communications, duels between enemy ships and coastal defense. And the ships are ready for use if the crews are fully staffed. And there were practically no statements about the insufficient staffing of the fleets; The combat readiness of the fleet was much less connected with mobilization than the ground units. During the war, it was not the infantry that was sent to the ships, but, on the contrary, the sailors went ashore and turned into infantry. In addition, the naval command is less concerned with the control of the situation on land - for this there are commanders of the ground forces. But

if on land the supreme military leadership is up to something very serious, then the navy cannot stand aside. He must be brought into combat.

consistency, which was done. And specific instructions were handed over to the land commanders. But a detailed analysis of the situation with the navy let's put it - the size of the book does not allow, although there were interesting moments. For example, it turns out that On June 21, 1941, the big maneuvers of the Black Sea Fleet, together with units of the Red Army, to carry out the most difficult landing operation ended. But the execution of amphibious assaults makes sense only in the event of an offensive by ground troops. So what are the plans constituted the Soviet high military command for 1941? Defense against the strongest enemy?

However, there is no point in considering the Soviet military plan for the summer of 1941 and its implementation in more detail here; there are many examples in the books of Viktor Suvorov. I can cite only one "touch" related to the directive of Stavka No. 1. In the list of its measures that were proposed to be carried out by the headquarters of the fronts, there is a demand to strengthen air defense:

"d) bring air defense into combat readiness without additional rise of assigned composition; prepare all measures to darken cities and objects."

And this is in the directive, allegedly transmitted in the presence of irrefutable data about the beginning of the war on June 22-23, i.e. in a matter of hours! And how long can it take to strengthen air defense? Under normal conditions - not one day. The Germans, for example, have been working on these issues since May. Here is how this is stated in the already mentioned intelligence report of the ZapOVO dated June 5, 1941:

"Since May 12, exercises have been conducted in the Danzig area air defense with the participation of aircraft, coastal artillery and ships..."

The preparation of all civilian objects is coming to an end

projects to measures P[opposite] V[air] O[harrow] and P[opposite] C[chemical] O[harrow] (darkening, fire fighting measures, degassing chambers etc.)...

Since May 5, blackout has been carried out in the city of Lukov cities. Windows are draped in houses and institutions, and Lighting is only blue...

On May 14, a German general arrived in Byala Podlaska. On May 15, he left for Terespol, from where he again returned to Byala Podlaska. According to the same data, in Byala Podlaska the organization of gas and bombing raids is being carried out. Residents have been ordered to clean up and the adaptation of cellars for shelters and the purchase of opaque paper for windows. An air defense commandant has been assigned to each street, who checks the readiness of shelters and the gathering of the population for meetings, conducted by German air defense officers. Along Drisher Street, most of the residents were evicted to city center. On the doors of the vacated buildings there are inscriptions: "Gases-truenz" (poisonous substances). A similar event was carried out along Varshavskaya Street and is expected to be carried out along Brestskaya street."

On the one hand, this proves that it takes a long time to carry out air defense measures in the front line, and not just a few hours before the start of the war. On the other hand, this shows the fears of the German leadership about the possibility of the Soviet side to carry out retaliatory measures at a time when the Germans were not yet fully prepared for an attack. But the top leadership of the Soviet side put such messages in a folder with the inscription "DISINFORMATION" and did not even try to adequately react. And on the night of June 22, for some reason, it decided to do something similar on its part, but it was already too late.

Only one question remains unclear

repeatedly posed by historians over the past many decades: why did Stalin flatly refuse to believe in a large-scale attack by the Germans? But there is still no clear answer to it. What's the matter? What's stopping you? Is the answer impossible?

I can present my opinion. To begin with, it is useful to know that leaders, especially those in the highest echelons of power, form their opinions on the basis of various kinds of documents. Stalin personally did not go to the warehouses and parks of military units and did not count the amount of equipment. He should have been given REFERENCES! But what if we try to simulate such a certificate on the number of troops and military equipment available to the Wehrmacht and the Red Army as of 21.06. 1941. And it also takes into account the well-known rule that the attacking side must have at least 1.5-fold superiority in total numbers (and 3- or 4-fold superiority in the directions of the main attacks). Such reference may take the form of a table with notes.

REFERENCE
on the presence of troops and basic military equipment on 06/21/1941

	Red Army (rounded numbers)	Germans with satellites on the western border of the USSR			
		Total	% to the Red Army	Quantity required. 1.5 times more than the Red Army	% of availability to the required for the offensive nia
People	5 million	5500 thousand	110	7 500 thousand	73
	10 million		55	15 million	37
tanks	19000	3300	17	28 500	12
	10150		33	15225	22
Aircraft 10000	3500		35	15000	23

Notes:

1) As of January 1941, there were 4,207,000 people in the Red Army. In the spring of the same

In 1941, about 800,000 more people were called up under the pretext of military training. On average, the staffing of divisions was 50%, i.e. after deployment on mobilization (a week or two after its announcement), the size of the Red Army should have been

approximately double.

By the middle of 1941, there were 208 divisions in the German land army. In its active part, there were 3.8 million people, of which 3.3 million were deployed against the Soviet Union. (Source - SOVIET ARCHIVES magazine, 1991, No. 4, article "RKKA ON THE EVE OF THE WAR, NEW DOCUMENTS".)

2) On 06/21/1941, the Red Army had only 22,600 tanks. Of these, 19,000 were serviceable, and 10,150 were near the western borders. Out of a total of 7,800 tanks, there were BT models of all series. And at the western borders, they accounted for about half of the entire group.

The BT gun had a caliber of 45 mm. In terms of its combat qualities, this tank was more powerful than the German tanks T-1, T-II and can be compared with the T-III and T-IV. In addition, near the western borders, the Red Army had 1,475 of the most advanced tanks (T-34 and KV-1), as well as until now

a secret number of slightly outdated real heavy tanks T-35. (Source: Shmelev I.P. "TAN KI BT". M.: 1993; as well as a collection of documents "HIDDEN TRUTH OF THE WAR: 1941, UNKNOWN DOCUMENTS". M.: 1992).

According to the American classification, tanks are divided into three types according to the weight supported by the railway

bridges:

- light - up to 20 tons;
- medium - up to 40 tons;
- heavy - up to 60 tons.

All German tanks, except for the latest modifications of the T-IV, weighed up to 20 tons and were obsolete in all respects.

indicators:

1) engine - gasoline;
2) drive sprocket - in front (cardan shaft under the tower, a consequence - excessive height and excess weight);

3) narrow tracks;

4) thin armor;

5) weak gun.

Of the tank models assembled by the Nazis near the western borders of the USSR, there were:

1404 - T-III and T-IV;

1698 - T-I and T-II, as well as light tanks of Czechoslovak production 35 (t) and 38 (t), "35" and "38" - their year creation.

The T-I did not have a gun, but only a machine gun.

The T-II has a 20 mm cannon.

The Czech tanks were not bad, but the 38(t) had a weak engine and could not tear off the tracks frozen to the ground in winter. The caliber of the gun for 35 (t) and 38 (t) is 37 mm. In 1941, the Germans T-I and T-II tanks in the first line offensives were no longer used, but were used for reconnaissance, security and communications. In fact, they can be attributed to tracked armored cars, and not to tanks.

In other words, the Germans had only 1404 of their tanks (and a certain number of Czech ones) directly to break through the enemy's defenses, but also obsolete and, by their weight, also falling into the category of lungs. In fact, medium, and even more so heavy tanks at that time were not in service with the Wehrmacht!

3) Aircraft of new types (MiG-1, MiG-3, etc.) from the side of the Red Army near the western borders were 1317, which was about 18% of the total number assembled there. The Germans also had obsolete types

aircraft, for example, the Ju-87 attack aircraft, whose landing gear was not retracted in the air (the Soviet soldiers then called them "bast shoes").

Number of aircraft on both sides by type

Types	Soviet	German
Bombers	3888	945
Dive bombers and attack aircraft	317	340 (+60)
Fighters	4989	1036(+93)
Other	723	996
Total	9917	3470

(Source: Kiev magazine "AVIATION AND TIME", 1996, No. 3. Article by Moscow author D. Khazanov "INVASION").

Conclusion: the Germans have not much more light and obsolete tanks than only the latest types available in the Red Army. But there is some advantage in the latest aircraft (about 2 times). And in terms of the total number of troops and equipment, Germany (together with its allies) has from 20 to 40% of the troops required for an offensive against the USSR.

Conclusion: it cannot attack the Soviet Union in 1941!

So who was Stalin supposed to believe? Generals who prepared such certificates? Or who you are raised the alarm because of the concentration of these same 20 to 40% of the required forces near the western borders of the USSR?

History shows that he trusted the authors of the references. And at the same time, he acted somehow in such a way that he forced the Nazis to commit a suicidal attack.

And this already falls under the definition of provocation of the 1st class (however unplanned).

A major step in pushing Hitler to such the decision can be considered the results of the Soviet-German negotiations on November 12-14, 1940 in Berlin. The objectives of the parties to them were revealed in his memoirs by Marshal Vasilevsky, who traveled there. It turns out that *"Hitler tried to involve the Soviet delegation in a dirty game by proposing to discuss a provocative plan division of the world between Germany, Italy, Japan and THE USSR. Rejecting political insinuations, Molotov demanded (?) concrete answers to our questions about Berlin's policy in Central and South-East Europe and Germany's goals in Finland and Romania.* But it was not possible to reach an agreement either at the meeting with Hitler or with Ribbentrop. On November 14, the Soviet delegation left Berlin ("there was no trace left of the pomposity and ostentatious friendliness of the hosts! A cold farewell, a dry exchange of official phrases" are Vasilevsky's memoirs). On December 5, 1940, Hitler approved the plan of attack on the USSR (the "FROM TO" plan), and on December 18, he signed the plan "BARBAROSSA" with a readiness to start a war against the Soviet Union.

18 May 1941

The fact that Hitler was preparing a war with the USSR in 1940 is true. But it turns out that until the last moment he tried to negotiate with Moscow on the division of spheres of influence. However, Stalin was not going to share with anyone. But in this case, it turns out that he wanted to get EVERYTHING! And any agreements in this case can only be temporary. So who provoked whom?

Summarizing the above, one more rule can be deduced: there are no peaceful provocations! Or in other words: the authors of provocations in foreign policy very much desire military action on a local or global scale. It's as true as it isn't

the possibility of, for example, useful computer viruses. Computer viruses are ALWAYS harmful, even if they have only one of their harmless copying functions. And if they don't

feast, then these are no longer viruses.

If both parties concerned are valid

but they want peace, then they sit down at the negotiating table and, using compromises, agree.

Provocations, in principle, ignore the rights of the opposite side and are actions without warning and agreement. And this always presupposes a complication of relations with the threat of the use of military force.

So, let us briefly list some important foreign policy actions, the development and implementation of which Stalin led in the decade preceding the Korean War.

August 1939 - staged a provocation 1st class

the Germans.

November 1939 - the Soviet-Finnish war started with the use of provocation of the 3rd class.

1940 - summer 1941 - provoking the Germans in the 1st class with an attempt to implement their plan (failed).

Autumn 1941 - possible involvement in the complication Japanese-American relations (the famous Operation Snow was a success).

Spring 1942 - a possible military provocation of the Germans in order to make their actions under control (succeeded).

From the beginning of 1943, the fate of Germany was practically a foregone conclusion. *Time* can be devoted to planning the future international situation after the end of war.

From the beginning of 1945 - provoking Turkey territorial claims and the problem of straits.

Simultaneous provocation of the United States to the deterioration of Soviet-American relations (including in relation to the events in Greece).

Since 1946 - provoking the central Chinese government to expand the civil war.

1946 - Provoking Great Britain with claims to Iran.

Since 1947 - provoking the former Western allies to split Germany and Korea.

June-July 1950 - provoking American tsev in Korea in the 1st class (succeeded).

In addition, in May-July 1950, a discussion on linguistics was started in the newspaper PRAVE DA, in which Stalin spoke several times. His speeches then amounted to the pamphlet "MARXISM AND QUESTIONS OF LINGUISTICS", which was immediately declared a genius. But since the mid-1950s, they began to forget about it, and for a long time historians could not understand the reasons for Stalin's appeal to this topic, from which he had previously been far away. And if you read some of his ideas more carefully? For example, the following:

1) Stalin's formula in his pamphlet, in the part concerning the crossing of languages, has in mind the era BEFORE THE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM on a world scale;

2) as regards Stalin's other formula, taken from a speech at the 16th Party Congress, in the part concerning the fusion of languages into one common language, here what is meant is another epoch, namely, the epoch after the victory of socialism ON A WORLDWIDE SCALE, when world imperialism will no longer exist.

Note that these lines were published in the summer of 1950, when the second program of the CPSU(b) had already been completed, and the new one had not yet been adopted. At the same time, Stalin envisaged serious changes in the international situation. Under these conditions, it asks

some kind of programmatic statement, but in such a way that the main goals are said *softly* and non-aggressively. The shell of linguistics was quite suitable for this. But if the Soviet readers did not quite understand the essence of the matter, especially the linguists (where the persecuted and the persecutors changed places), then how should those same "imperialists" react? Quietly wait until they are eliminated? Or somehow answer? An intensification of the arms race and international tension? But this plays into the hands of Stalin! Conclusion: Stalin's language debate

kam - another provocation of the imperialists
first class!

But it can be seen that this is the duty of state leaders - to defend the interests of the country. This is right. But not at the expense of the fate of millions of citizens. And as a result of many years of Stalin's policy of provocations, people died, and by the millions. And I don't think that this is a completely normal method of fighting for peace, for defending the interests of all other people (death at the front is the meaning of life?).

It must also be added to what has been said that all domestic policy was subordinated to Stalin's foreign policy measures. This, too, did not go unnoticed for the interests of individual citizens. We are still facing this. And in the next chapter, I propose to continue our acquaintance with the Stalinist struggle for peace in the Far East. The war in Korea could not start without the preparation of China, during which there were also some provocations. And Japan is not left out.

OTHER "PEACEFUL" STEPS OF THE USSR IN THE FAR EAST

In 1951, another event took place in the Far East, which "worked" to exacerbate international tension. Stalin refused to sign a peace treaty with Japan, thereby maintaining a formal state of war with her. N. S. Khrushchev writes in his memoirs (OGONEK magazine, 1991, April, No. 16, pp. 4-5):

"Americans, you have to give them credit for keeping their word. When the draft peace treaty with Japan was drawn up, then we also had our place there for signature. Our interests were fully provided for, as stipulated in the protocol signed by Roosevelt. It was necessary to sign ... [But Stalin refused to sign it] ... It is completely incomprehensible. I didn't understand it then, and I don't understand it now.

Stalin did not consult and did not consider others, he was overconfident. Especially after the crash. Nazi Germany ... When, after signing peace treaty of our representative, in fact, expelled from Japan, then until the death of Stalin there was absolutely no contact with her. To whom was it profitable? And this happened through our fault. If we had signed an agreement, then we would have started there your embassy...

Naive Nikita Sergeevich! Stalin played such a game, the stakes in which were a million times greater than

Veteran embassy in an independent capitalist

of Japan! And it's one thing to simply not understand, and another thing to try to understand, to put together a big picture from different details.

The signing ceremony of the peace treaty with Japan was scheduled for September 8, 1951 in San Francisco (USA). By this time, the Americans had been fighting in Korea for almost a year. For the war they needed bases in Japan. But since all the fullness of power since 04/28/1952

If it was handed over to the Japanese government, then a legal basis was required for the establishment of American bases, i.e. a separate agreement, which was signed on September 8, 1951 between the USA and Japan (the "Security Treaty"). Stalin "lured" Americans into the war in Korea, Soviet pilots shot down American planes. But apparently that wasn't enough for him. To wage a "big" war, a large theater of operations is also needed. And it must be painstakingly prepared, and for this it is very useful to maintain the state of war with Japan, which will thereby be forced to agree to an American military presence at home. At the same time, the Soviet mass media may claim that Japan is "occupied" by the United States. From these points of view, it is impossible to sign a peace treaty, which was done.

At the end of the same 1951, another interesting event took place in Soviet-Japanese relations. In December, Kiishi Iwamoto, editor-in-chief of the Japanese Kyodo agency, asked Stalin to send New Year's greetings to the Japanese people. Stalin agreed. It was published on January 1, 1952 both in Japan and in the USSR in the Pravda newspaper. Except

moreover, its full or summary is published by many newspapers around the world. In connection with our topic, it is useful to read it in full:

"Soviet leaders do not have such a tradition that the prime minister of a foreign state would turn to people of another state with their wishes. However, the deep sympathy of the peoples of the Soviet Union for the Japanese people, who have fallen into trouble in connection with foreign occupation, forces me to make an exception to the rule and grant your request.

Please convey to the Japanese people what I wish him freedom and happiness, that I wish him complete success in his courageous struggle for the independence of his homeland.

The peoples of the Soviet Union have themselves experienced the horrors of foreign occupation in the past, in which the Japanese imperialists also took part. That's why they fully understand the suffering of the Japanese people, deeply sympathize with him and believe that he will achieve the revival and independence of their homeland in the same way, how did the peoples of the Soviet Union achieve this in their time? Union.

I wish the Japanese workers to free themselves from unemployment and low wages, to eliminate high prices on consumer goods and success in the fight for the preservation of the world.

I wish the Japanese peasants to free themselves from landlessness and lack of land, the elimination of high taxes and success in the struggle for the preservation of peace.

I wish all the Japanese people and their intelligentsia complete victory for the democratic forces of Japan, revitalization and recovery of the economic life of the country, flourishing of national culture, science, art and success in the struggle for peace.

Sincerely, I. Stalin, 1951, December 31.

Logically, this is a strange message. At first, sympathy is expressed about the fact that Japan is occupied by someone. But where in "occupiro

bathroom" Japan own press agency? For example, could something like this happen in Poland in late 1940 or early 1941? It couldn't, it's completely out of the question! There are no national agencies in occupied countries. Or is it not an occupation!

And who should improve the life of the Japanese workers, peasants and intelligentsia? Occupiers? Or should the Japanese themselves arrange the same thing that was done in the Soviet Union?

And who is the "occupier"? To answer this In the next issue of the newspaper Pravda (January 2, 1952), an editorial was published under the heading: "IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE." In her, in particular it says:

"The consequences of the adventurist policy of the US ruling circles are becoming more and more distinct. policy of aggression, preparation and unleashing a new predatory war. Frantic arms race in United States of America and other countries of the aggressive Anglo-American bloc brings unprecedented hardships to the working masses... Particularly the suffering of peoples experiencing the horrors of American occupation in West Germany, Japan and in other countries that have fallen under the yoke of occupation by the American imperialists, the broad masses of the working people are doomed to the torments of unemployment, half-starvation or a hungry existence. The peasantry suffers from landlessness and lack of land, high taxes and other hardships caused by foreign occupation ... "

For a long time, even after Stalin's death, the concept of "ideological attitude" was used in Soviet propaganda. It is quite possible that his refusal to sign a peace treaty with Japan (and the failure to prepare a peace treaty with Germany) was connected with the need to apply such an "ideological attitude": Japan (and West Germany) occupied

Vans by the Americans, the USA is an occupier and an aggressor. At this completely hushed up the reasons due to which
ry Americans ended up in these countries.

Thus, since the summer of 1950, in the Far East, the USSR with one country (Japan) has formally been at war. It contains US troops. In a neighboring country (Korea) a natural war is organized, in which one of the main participants is the same USA, which, moreover, is accused of a policy of aggression. Drawn into the war and China. In other words, since the summer of 1950, international tension in the Far East has been intensifying. Moreover, Soviet propaganda placed all the blame for this on the United States. In reality, the main culprit was the USSR itself. After all, if Korea had not been divided at the Potsdam Conference, then there would have been no war for unification. If there had been no war in Korea and the Soviet Union had signed a peace treaty with Japan, then the appearance of American military bases in it would have been problematic.

By the way, Western and Japanese historians sometimes accused the USSR of pursuing a policy of "bloody division" of other countries and creating local conflicts on this basis. This, for example, was mentioned in the article "Landing on Hokkaido CANCEL!" ("VIZH", No. 3, 1994). But its authors tried to prove the groundlessness of such accusations and cited as an example Stalin's failed attempt to divide Fr. Hokkaido in August 1945: *"... the abandonment of the landing planned in accordance with the plan of war against Japan on about. Hokkaido and its occupation ... was no less convincing evidence that the Soviet state did not seek*

to the "bloody division" of foreign territory, in what way trying to blame some Japanese and Western historians and officials..." Strange conclusion.

For some reason, the authors of the article forgot the division of Korea, which, unlike the Japanese territory, was carried out at the insistence of the USSR!

Moreover, the article on the island of Hokkaido confirms that in the last days of the Potsdam Conference, the line of delimitation of the zones of military operations of the Soviet and American armed forces was agreed upon. And it passed north of the island (but how it was located in Korea is silent in the article).

As mentioned earlier, Stalin's attempt to divide Fr. Hokkaido can be traced in documents - in his correspondence with Truman. Stalin made this proposal for the first time on 08/16/45. In a telegram dated August 18, 1945, the President of the United States refused to change the demarcation line between American and Soviet troops in northern Japan. However, the VIZH article states that the

Stalin gave a stern order to prepare for the landing of Soviet troops on a Japanese island even before the start of hostilities (that is, before 08/09/45).

But the authors of the article write that such actions of Stalin did not contradict the agreements with the allies, since, depending on the situation, the border of the Soviet zone of responsibility could be changed according to agreement with the command of the armed forces of the United States.

Stalin tried to coordinate the problem with Fr. Hokkaido 16-19 August 1945. Truman refused. But on August 20, Stalin CONFIRMED the instruction to prepare the 87th Rifle Corps for participation in the landing on about. Hockey do! And only on August 22, he ordered Marshal Vasilevsky to suspend preparations. And by August 27, he categorically forbade sending troops to the Japanese

ditch.

In the article, this is explained by the strong resistance of the Japanese in South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, which the Soviet troops had to overcome.

And the capture of the northern half of about. Hokkaido was planned to be completed only if the fighting ended by the end of August. In other words, it is possible that Stalin thought to justify the landing in Japan by the combat situation, which required an operational landing, as it were, to the rear of the defending Japanese, who turned out to be Fr. Hokkaido.

Such an explanation could well be plausible. It remains unclear what Stalin thought to do next? Truman refused to change the line. Therefore, the troops would have to withdraw. Such a situation developed in Germany and Austria, where mutual withdrawals of Allied troops took place up to the borders of the agreed demarcation line.

Why did Stalin really want to share Fr. Hokkaido?

It can be assumed that he was not sure about the "necessary" development of events in Korea. And for some reason, he really needed to destabilize the international situation in the Far East in the future. Therefore, to the last opportunity, he apparently tried to organize an additional potential source of tension.

But in the Far East there was another country in which Stalin was more successful in pursuing a policy of division and creating a local conflict on this basis - this is China, in which, by the time the Second World War ended in 1945, there were actually two state formations:

- in the territory controlled by the official Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek, where about 70 % of the country's population lived;

- "liberated" areas ruled by the people's governments headed by the Communist Party of China (CCP) (hereinafter information from "SVE", vol. 5. M.: Voen izdat, 1978, pp. 501-503).

Between the Kuomintang troops and the people

armed forces (since 1947 - the People's Liberation Army - PLA) did not stop hostilities. Since 1945, the armies of the USSR and the USA have been in China. The Soviet Union withdrew its troops by May 3

1946, American troops remained.

The Soviet command placed at the disposal
The PLA captured by the Soviet troops weapons, military equipment and equipment of the former Japanese Kwantung Army (over 3.7 thousand guns, mortars and grenade launchers, 600 tanks, 861 aircraft, about 12 thousand machine guns, more than 2000 vehicles, etc.) . And later on, the USSR supplied the PLA with a significant amount of Soviet-made weapons and military equipment.

In the general course of the civil war in China, which
Soviet historians called it "People's Liberation", two periods stood out. The main content of the first (June 1946-June 1947) is the offensive of the Kuomintang troops and the defense of the PLA, the second (July 1947-December 1949) is the strategic offensive of the PLA troops. By the end of 1949, the liberation of all of mainland China from the power of the central government was largely completed (only Tibet remained). The Kuomintang fled to the island of Taiwan (Formosa) under the protection of the US armed forces. On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed. Friendly relations were established between the USSR and the PRC and a new treaty of friendship and

cooperation.

Why new? It turns out that from June 30 to August 14, 1945, with a break for the Potsdam Conference, negotiations took place in Moscow between the delegations of the USSR and the Republic of China (the government of Chiang Kai-shek). They ended with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Union between the two countries. Chinese

for a long time did not want to recognize independence
bridge of "outer" Mongolia, but then they agreed.

As a result, it turns out that by the end of 1945, the Soviet Union, having become an ally of the official government of China under a treaty, immediately armed its internal opponents with a huge batch of weapons. What is it called according to international rules? Answer: interference in internal affairs. Let's imagine for a moment that they would be dropped from an English plane, on

For example, the Lithuanian rebels had several boxes of ammunition and grenades - that would be a noise to the whole world! How dare these presumptuous imperialists interfere in the internal affairs of the USSR! And in violation of the 1942 Treaty of Friendship!! This is a provocation of a new war!!!

But excuse me, the captured weapons of the millionth Kwantung Army were not a few boxes of ammunition and grenades, there were planes, tanks and heavy guns. And by Soviet standards, it turned out to be quite legal to transfer it to one of the parties to the armed conflict of another state. This was called the "creation of the Manchu revolutionary base", the development of which was the intensification of the civil war in China.

But Soviet propaganda laid the blame for this on the leaders of the Kuomintang and the United States, who allegedly did not want to resolve all disputed issues by peaceful means. But the Kuomintang was the official ruling political organization in China. The USSR had a Treaty of Friendship with him. From him were the representatives of China in the UN Security Council. And the truth was that *"the United States did not want a civil war in China, it was unnecessary and harmful to them."*

*They tried to resolve the conflict
political means, compromise,
through the mediation missions of P. Hurley and J. Marshall*

la. The United States invited to joint participation in this settlement of the Soviet Union. Asked for the same and Nanjing (the capital of the Kuomintang). Washington and Nanjing believed that with the participation of the USSR it would be possible to achieve a peaceful settlement in China in the interests of all Chinese, including communists ... USSR from seemed to motivate this by the principle of non-intervention, but actually relied on unilateral PDA support. Mao Zedong used this for an irreconcilable confrontation by putting forward completely unacceptable to Nanjing and Washington requirements" (pp. 10-12, "DOMATIC HISTORY" magazine No. 4, July-August 1992, article by Andrey Ledovskiy "FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF A HISTORIAN AND DIPLOMAT").

In general, a strange situation developed in Soviet-Chinese relations after 1945. The ministers of foreign affairs of the USSR and Kuomintang China periodically met at the negotiating table of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and China. The USSR and Kuomintang China were not just members of the UN, but also permanent members of the Security Council. There was a Treaty of Friendship between them, according to which the parties undertook

mutually respect sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs. And at the same time, the USSR actively and widely supports the opponent of the Kuomintang in the civil war! Moreover, after the proclamation of the PRC on October 1, 1949, cooperation between Stalin and the communist leadership of China was sharply accelerated. Thus, as early as October 2, 1949, diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and the new China. On October 3, the National Peace Committee was established. On October 5, the Society for Sino-Soviet Friendship was established. And from December 16, 1949 to February 17, 1950, the visit of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China continued to

led by Mao Zedong in the USSR. During it, a new Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and China (PRC) was signed on February 14.

Of course, the goal of the war in China for Stalin was different than in Korea. Stalin, most likely, needed China as a huge source of various resources for the upcoming big war, especially human ones. In addition, Stalin adjusted his age (in December 1949 he turned 70 years old). Apparently, therefore, he had to be less choosy in the means of foreign policy (and domestic too).

But, in addition to the Far East, it was necessary to prepare a theater of military operations (TVD) in Europe. This is discussed in the next chapter.

"PEACE" POLICY OF THE USSR IN EASTERN EUROPE

On the opposite side of the globe, in Europe, Stalin also pursued a certain active policy. First, it was necessary to ensure the coming of the communists to power in the Eastern European countries. Moreover, in such a way that they do only his will (or, in extreme cases, act with his permission). The second task that had to be solved jointly with the former allies was the legal registration of the results of the Second World War.

Much has been written about how the communists came to power in Eastern Europe. This process has been quite successful. But two difficulties arose. The first is widely known - this is the conflict between Stalin and the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito. Historians usually do not pay much attention to the second. Perhaps because it did not last long and was resolved by the summer of 1949. We are talking about a policy NOT DEPENDENT on Stalin, which the leader of Bulgaria, Georgy Dimitrov, tried to pursue. The problem with Tito was the same— independence from Moscow. But to solve it to Stalin until the very

death did not succeed.

In 1991, Y. Girenko's book "STALIN - TITO" (M.: Politizdat) was published, which provides a lot of information about the conflict between them. It turns out that the Yugoslav leadership was the first to disagree with Stalin.

said already in 1945, proposing to reduce salaries that Soviet specialists.

But since 1947, the differences began to intensify. At the beginning of February of that year, agreements were signed between the USSR and Yugoslavia on the creation of two joint stock companies for shipping on the Danube and for civil aviation. Subsequently, the Yugoslav side decided that such mixed societies were detrimental to the economy of an independent Yugoslavia.

04/19/1947 in a conversation with Stalin, one of the Yugoslav leaders - E. Kardel actually post raised the question of the intervention of Soviet advisers in the internal affairs of the country. Stalin, not hiding his displeasure, said sharply: "Specialists are there to be listened to, and not just to sit at you with folded arms."

In the summer of 1947, the government of the FPRYU adopted a decision prohibiting party organizations and state institutions from providing Soviet civilian and military specialists with any information of an economic nature. It was regarded by Stalin as a manifestation of mistrust and hostility towards the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia. During the exchange of views between the leadership of the USSR and the FRRY, the Yugoslav side explained that

Soviet specialists "excessively impose their views", "do not take into account our specifics", "ignore the opinion of the Yugoslav partners, which leads to quarrels and frictions.

From July 30 to August 1, 1947, unannounced Yugoslav-Bulgarian negotiations took place between I. Tito and G. Dimitrov. They agreed on an indefinite treaty between their countries. And on August 2, the fact of the development of such an agreement was made public in the official protocol.

Stalin objected that, in fact, the negotiations themselves,

as well as the duration of the contract. In a letter to Tito on August 12, he wrote that both governments had made a mistake by concluding a pact (indefinite, moreover) before the entry into force of the peace treaty and despite warnings from Moscow. (The fact is that on February 10, 1947, peace treaties were signed in Paris between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and the countries - allies of Germany (Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Finland). They entered into force on September 15, 1947.)

During the peace negotiations, the USSR assisted Yugoslavia in establishing the Yugoslav-Italian border near the city of Trieste. In addition, the Soviet Union also helped in settling the economic and territorial claims of the FPRY against Austria. But the government of Yugoslavia also turned to England for help. When Stalin found out about this, on August 5, 1947

of the year, expressed his dissatisfaction with the "behind-the-scenes negotiations behind the backs of the Soviet government" and expressed bewilderment at the fact that it was not informed about them.

For certain reasons, Stalin could not agree to the independent policy of Yugoslavia. And became take action.

In the summer of 1947, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks sent a letter to the First Secretary of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) W. Gomułka, in which he suggested that the PPR take the initiative to convene a meeting of the communist parties of some European countries to discuss the issue of strengthening ties between them, for example, by the creation of a new International of an information nature (called the "Information Bureau").

The Polish communists, of course, came up with such an initiative. Other parties agreed, but some leaders expressed doubts about the dangerous

the need for a return to obsolete Comintern forms and methods of leadership. Doubts were expressed by K. Gottwald, M. Thorez, P. Togliatti and V. Gomulka. W. Gomulka doubted most of all. (Strange thing: the greatest doubter is the main formal initiator of the event!)

From September 22 to 27, 1947, the first information meeting of representatives of the communist and workers' parties of nine countries took place in the resort town of Szklarska Poręba (Western Poland). It was decided to create an Information Office. On Stalin's telephone advice, the headquarters of the bureau and editorial office of the newspaper For a Lasting Peace, For People's Democracy! Belgrade was elected, although Prague also applied. Yielding to Stalin's persuasion, the delegates of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia criticized the French and Italian

Young communists "in admiration for the parliamentarism, compliance with the Vatican and de Gaullism." In the book by Yu. Girenko, the idea is expressed that Stalin did this on purpose, so that later the Yugoslav communists would not be able to receive help from the French and Italian Communist Parties during the period when Stalin would carry out an attack against the Yugoslavs themselves (provocation of the 1st class!).

But the purpose of the conference was not only preparation for the fight against Tito. D. Volkogonov in the book "TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY" (Kiev: Politizdat Ukrainy, 1990, vol. 2) noted that Stalin's envoy Zhdanov delivered a report "On the International Situation". It formulated the thesis that would become almost central in Soviet propaganda for many years to come - "the division of the world into two opposing camps." This may have been a response to the anti-communist Truman Doctrine. The report also expressed a negative assessment of the "Marshall plan" as a "program for the enslavement of Europe" (participation in which the USSR refused to participate in Paris

27.06-2.07.1947).

In the West, the creation of the Information Bureau was met negatively and was called the Cominform. And later only two such meetings were held: in June 1949 in Hungary and in November 1949 in Romania. April 18, 1956 it was

started up.

After the meeting in Szklarska Poręba, the Yugoslav leadership did not stop its activities independent of Moscow. On November 27, 1947, without agreement with the USSR, Tito visited Bulgaria, where the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was signed. In addition, the Yugoslav economic influence on Alba was increased.

niyu.

In January 1948, Tito (again without consulting the USSR, which immediately led to another crisis between the countries) asked the Albanian leaders to allow one Yugoslav division to deploy in Albania near the city of Korca.

But the Bulgarian Georgy Dimitrov continued to take independent steps. On January 16, 1948, in Bucharest, he signed the Bulgarian-Romanian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. And on January 17, at a press conference, Dimitrov announced the possible creation in the future, when conditions are ripe, of a federation or confederation of the Balkan and Danube countries, with the inclusion of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Greece. In the West, this was immediately regarded as a "malicious Soviet invention."

On January 24 of the same year, Stalin sent a telegram to Dimitrov (and a copy of Tito), in which he explained that the proposal concerning the federation or confederation of the people's democracies was harmful, because "it harms the countries of the new democracy".

and facilitates the struggle of the Anglo-Americans against these countries." Following this, in an effort to prevent further aggravation of relations with Great Britain and the USA, Stalin decided to dissociate himself from this proposal in the press (Pravda, 01/28/1948).

And on February 4, 1948, he instructed the Soviets in Belgrade and Sofia to bring to the attention of I. Tito and G. Dimitrov the following considerations: *"Unsuccessful interview tov. Dimitrov in Sofia gave rise to all sorts of talk about the preparation of an Eastern European bloc with the participation of the USSR.*

On February 10, 1948, a meeting took place in Moscow of the delegations of the Soviet Union (led by Stalin), Bulgaria (with Dimitrov) and Yugoslavia (with Kardel, since Tito pleaded poor health and did not go).

Relationships were sorted out for a long time. When Kardel said that Yugoslavia usually always consulted with the Soviet government, Stalin abruptly cut him off: *"Not true! You don't give advice at all! You don't have it mistakes, but the principle, yes, the principle!"* Molotov, who took the floor, read out a paragraph from the Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty, which stated that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria would act in the spirit of the UN and support any peace initiative against any battle of aggression, no matter from which side it comes. To this, Stalin declared: *"But this is a preventive war! This is the most common Komsomol attack! This*

an ordinary loud phrase that only gives food enemy! And in response to Dimitrov's proposal to discuss already now certain questions of the further development of economic relations, Stalin said : *we will speak with the united Bulgarian-Yugoslav government."*

On March 1, 1948, an extended meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPY took place. It noted that the USSR:

- does not want a strong army of Yugoslavia;

- recruiting agents;
- dictates its own directions for the development of the economy of Yugoslavia, etc.

It came to a proposal to create a federation with Bulgaria.

Josip Tito was against the federation, stating that it would allow Stalin to change the leadership of Yugoslavia to a more obedient one and increase the influence of the NKVD. After the meeting, a message was sent to Moscow and Sofia to the effect that Yugoslavia considered it untimely to create a federation with Bulgaria.

On March 18, 1948, Stalin decided to recall all Soviet specialists from Yugoslavia (including the military). On March 27, 1948, their last group flew to the USSR.

On the same day, March 27, 1948, the first letter of Stalin and Molotov with various accusations was sent to the Central Committee of the CPY. On May 4 of the same year a second letter was sent. His tone was even more categorical.

nym and irreconcilable.

On May 20, 1948, a plenum of the Central Committee of the CPY was held. On It decided not to participate in the meeting of the Information Bureau in Hungary.

On July 29, 1948, the "Resolution of the Information Bureau on the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia" was published. The confrontation between Stalin and Tito took irreconcilable forms. On September 8, 1948, the Pravda newspaper published an article under the heading "Where is the nationalism of the Tito group in Yugoslavia leading?" Its most likely author was Stalin himself. On May 1 of the following year, 1949, the newspaper Pravda announced the publication of the first issue of the newspaper of the Yugoslav opposition "For Socialist Yugoslavia", published in Serbian by the Yugoslav

communist political emigrants living in the USSR. This newspaper became the organ of the Soviet

Union of the opposition Tito "Union of Yugoslav Patriots for the Liberation of Yugoslavia from the fascist yoke of the Tito-Ranković clique and imperialist slavery". Mutual accusations grew like a snowball, the parties no longer chose expressions.

On September 28, 1949, the USSR announced the rupture of the Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation. On October 25, 1949, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs expelled the ambassador of the FPRY, and in November - and attorney go in business.

In November 1949, the resolution of the next meeting of the Information Bureau was published - "The Yugoslav Communist Party is in the power of murderers and spies." It contained a whole set of insinuations and outright lies, as if the Yugoslav leadership had fallen from bourgeois nationalism to fascism, established a fascist-type dictatorship in the country, was a hireling of imperialist reaction, and turned Belgrade into an American center of espionage and anti-communist propaganda. The "fight against the Tito clique" was declared to be the internationalist duty of all communist and workers' parties.

Since the end of 1949, with the formal preservation of diplomatic relations, all ties between the USSR and Yugoslavia were interrupted. And all other countries of Eastern Europe at the beginning of October 1949, within six days, also broke similar agreements with Yugoslavia. On the Yugoslav borders with Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, the situation sharply escalated, border incidents became more frequent. The Yugoslav government proposed to create a special

mixed commissions with these countries, but they refused (from 07/01/1948 to 09/1/1949 there were 219 armed border incidents).

In the autumn of 1949, through the efforts of both sides of the conflict was internationalized, including through

United Nations, where on October 20, 1949 Yugoslavia was elected to a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

The pressure on Yugoslavia during the years of the rupture of relations manifested itself, using the Yugoslav terminology, in "forcing the atmosphere of armed aggression", for which everything was prepared and which at that time was literally "in the air".

After Stalin's death, on June 6, 1953, the Soviet government came up with a proposal to exchange ambassadors. In the USSR, the organization of Yugoslav emigration was disbanded and anti-Yugoslav propaganda was stopped. On May 26, 1955, N. Khrushchev traveled to Belgrade. The conflict was over.

As for the leadership of Bulgaria, headed by Georgy Dimitrov, it did not dare to seriously aggravate relations with the Soviet Union. However, in 1948, Bulgaria concluded treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with Romania (January 16), with the USSR (March 18), with Czechoslovakia (April 23), with Poland (May 29) and Hungary (July 16). All of them were designed for 20 years and they had special articles about non-participation in any actions directed against the other side. The possibility of an attack on one of the sides of Germany or another state was especially noted. In this slu

tea, the parties must provide each other with military and any other assistance (source - "BSE", articles on the sacred Bulgarian... treaties).

All of them were signed either only by Dimitrov, or jointly with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria V. Kolarov.

When reading them, it is precisely the article about the case of attack, primarily by Germany, that catches the eye. Why? Indeed, at that time there was not even a national state on German territory! The country was led by the occupation authorities of the countries that won the Second

world war! Before the creation of the German government, it was necessary to draw up a peace treaty and hold elections. This process dragged on for an indefinite period of time. And in general, things went to the political split of Germany. In addition, neither Bulgaria nor

how many countries with which she signed treaties

ry (Hungary and Romania), did not have common borders with Germany.

Under these conditions, the leaders of Bulgaria could not think about the war with the Germans. And with whom could Bulgaria fight at that time? It bordered on the following countries: Turkey (slightly), Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania. Greece and Turkey had bourgeois governments and no Soviet troops. In other countries

nah, the communists came to power, who only talked about the struggle for peace and the prevention of a new war. But Bulgaria urgently concludes agreements at the end of 1947 and in the first half of the following 1948, precisely with the countries where the communists were victorious. Moreover, a paragraph on actions in the event of war with Germany or anyone else is necessarily introduced into the text of the treaty. As well as an article on not joining any alliances directed against the other side. Why?

One gets the impression that Dimitrov was afraid of something. We read his brief biography (in TSB, 3rd edition, volume 8, 1972): born 06/18/1882, died July 2, 1949, having lived 67 years. From 1934 to 1945 he lived in the USSR. From 1935 to 1943 - General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. In 1937—

1945 - Member of the Soviet Parliament (Supreme Soviet of the USSR). On November 6, 1945 he returned to Bulgaria. From November 1946 - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria. Since December 1948 - General Secretary of the Central Committee of the BKP.

Thus, Stalin's pre-war and military policy was carried out in front of Dimitrov. He was

a witness to the terror of the late 1930s. In particular, were his associates in the Leipzig trial about the burning of the Reichstag repressed? And in Dimitrov's apartment, for some time, "the future Stalinist ruler of Bulgaria Vylko Chervenkov" hid from arrest from arrest (R. Conquest "GREAT TERROR", volume 2, translated from English, Riga: Raxtnieks, 1991, p. 235.)

Dimitrov saw how and whom Stalin sent to the governments of Eastern Europe. And he had to guess about his post-war goals. Moreover, since the beginning of 1945, Stalin began to put forward various demands on Turkey. The USSR and Italy had certain claims. In 1945-1947, with the participation of the Soviet Union, there was a hotbed of tension in Iran. In 1946, in Greece, the communists refused to participate in the elections and embarked on an armed struggle. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Here it suffices to note that in the event of the escalation of conflicts in these countries with the participation of the USSR, Bulgaria could not stand aside, being an obedient ally of the Soviet Union. Dimitrov had to understand the situation, and, apparently, that is why he tried to show independence. But he could not "break away" from Stalin.

It has already been said above that Stalin was dissatisfied with some of Dimitrov's actions. But if we assume that the "great leader" was planning a new war, then the independent Dimitrov generally became very dangerous. Stalin failed to subdue the Yugoslav Tito, and he had to go to a confrontation with Yugoslavia (on the possibility of a military solution to this problem). But Dimitrov also proved to be very unreliable. However, by the will of fate, Stalin managed to cope with this problem quite quickly. We read Dimitrov's biography further: *"He died in Barvikha near Moscow."*

It turns out that he fell ill in early 1949.

And I had to go to bed. However, in a separate biographical essay about him ("GEORGY DIMITROV" (translated from Bulgarian), M., 1973), it is said that even in this state he continued to work, received visitors. But his condition worsened, and on March 7, 1949, he was sent for treatment in the USSR to the Barvikha sanatorium near Moscow,

where he died.

The cause of the disease is "liver, diabetes." And also the fact that he undermined his health in a fascist prison (in 1933). The results of the autopsy were not given. His body was transported to Bulgaria, where the Soviet government delegation headed by K. Voroshilov (who had fallen out of favor with Stalin at that time) also went.

But that is not all. Dimitrov was chairman Bulgarian government. And one of his deputies was the underground hero Traicho Kostov. In December of the same 1949, he and several other former leaders of the country were sentenced to death by firing squad.

However, these were not the only repressions among the new leadership of the "people's democracy" countries. In May 1949 in Albania he was convicted and shot. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Kochi Dzodz. In September of the same year, Foreign Minister Laszlo Raik was convicted and executed in Hungary. (Kostov and Raik were rehabilitated in 1956.)

The next wave of trials took place in 1952. In November, Czechoslovakia condemned (in the words of the Soviet mass media of that time) the "gang of Rudolf Slansky" (the former General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia). In Romania, Vasile Luca, a member of the Politburo of the Romanian Workers' Party, was arrested. It is interesting to note that in connection with his arrest there were attacks on the "traitorous clique of Marcel

Pauker", one of the two main leaders of the Romanian communists before World War II. Moreover, both of them were repressed in the USSR at the end of the 30s (book by R. Conquest, p. 234).

At all these trials, the accused were convicted of belonging to "American and British" agents, "of betrayal in favor of Yugoslavia", Tito, who was declared a spy and a longtime agent of all empires.

realist intelligence agencies conducting subversive activities against the USSR and people's democratic states.

In R. Medvedev's book "THEY SURROUNDED STALIN" (M.: Politizdat, 1990), in the chapter about A. Mikoyan it is said that it was he, on behalf of Stalin, who negotiated with K. Gottwald, insisting on the removal and arrest of R. Slansky. Information about this was published in Czechoslovakia during the "Prague Spring".

By the way, it is possible that not everything is so simple in the fate of Klement Gottwald himself. Here is the data about him from TSB, Volume 7, 1972: born 11/23/1896, died 03/14/1953, lived 57 years. Until 1943 he was one of the leaders of the Communist International. Since 1945, chairman of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. After the liberation of Czechoslovakia, he joined the first government of the National Front in Kosice (04/04/1945) as deputy chairman. In 1946, chairman of the coalition government. After the February events of 1948, he formed a new government, "purged of bourgeois conspirators." On June 14, 1948, Gottwald became the President of the Czechoslovak Republic. He took a leading part in the development of the general line of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia for building socialism in the country, proclaimed at its IX Congress in May 1949.

K. Gottwald survived Stalin by 11 days. Moreover, at the head of the Czechoslovak delegation, he was at his funeral in Moscow. March 11 departed for Prague, and in the morning

died on the 14th. In several March issues of the Pravda newspaper, materials about two mournings were printed simultaneously. The official statement stated that he died on March 14, 1953 at 11:00 am after a short serious illness from acute heart failure (heart collapse).

The information of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak government and the Central Committee of the National Front said: *"The best Soviet and Czechoslovak doctors were at the head of the patient. Heroically, almost last minute, fought death himself, in full the mind of comrade Gottwald. Unfortunately, it was not possible to save the most precious life for us ... "*

And in the medical report, signed by prominent doctors, there are the following words: "... from 9.00 am I was in a deep unconscious state..." .)

As in the case of Dimitrov, no autopsy data cited. And it is not specified whether the initial diagnosis was confirmed or not.

Of course, Stalin could no longer influence the death of Gottwald (in the sense of giving an order). And according to medical data, heart failure can occur at a young age. Unfortunately, there are still very few data for a larger analysis. And one can only note the almost simultaneous end of the fate of the two leaders of the international communist movement. But if the course of the illness of one of them (Stalin) was covered in sufficient detail in the press, then in the report

there are even discrepancies in statements about the death of another. Accident? Or the result of a very strong rush due to some circumstances? There is information that Gottwald was a doctor by education. Let's imagine: a person with a medical education comes to a funeral. He is read a medical report

about death, tell how they treated. He analyzes all this, compares it with how the course of the disease should have proceeded, and also compares it with the appearance of the deceased. And if he does not find any contradictions, then this is one situation, but what if he found and asked a question that was inappropriate for his comrades-in-arms? Or did he not ask, but showed by his behavior that he guessed? How should they have reacted? The hypothesis, of course, is interesting, it explains a lot. However, the problem is too complex and multifaceted. After all, on March 5, 1953, not only the fate of one particular person (JV Stalin) was decided, but the fate of all mankind (in connection with the Groza-2 plan for 1954). And if Stalin's "departure" was "helped" by his comrades-in-arms, and Gottwald noticed this, then their act can be assessed in different ways - either as the actions of ordinary murderers, or as the actions of heroes-conspirators who fought for peace and the life of all mankind. In terms of the survival of all mankind

the death of one or two who stood across the road is not a huge tragedy. But a separate chapter will be devoted to the time after March 5, 1953, and here it is time to return to the events in Eastern Europe and under

draw some conclusions.

In countries where Soviet troops entered, Stalin actively promoted the communists to power and, as the events in Yugoslavia showed, sent a large number of advice ski advisers, who not only pointed to board of economic development, but also tried to link this process with similar events in the USSR. And the attempts of some countries to do something on their own led to a sharply negative reaction from Stalin. Although from the point of view of peaceful construction

their certain independence could not pose a particular threat to the Soviet Union. The threat could be only in one case - if these countries are considered

were given by Stalin as a rear area for future fronts.

I propose to dwell briefly on this idea. In addition to administrative access, the rear area plays a very important role in supplying the army in the field. And an even more enormous role in the preparation of an offensive war. The fact is that after breaking through the enemy defenses, supply distances will increase. And the development of science and technology in the 20th century led to the fact that it is necessary to spend very large resources, amounting to thousands of wagons, to carry out offensives (if, however, one does not touch the atom

weapons, but which at the time in question

still underdeveloped). An example from the Great Patriotic War: for the Belarussian operation in June 1944, over 1,430,000 combat personnel from four fronts were recruited from the Red Army. By the beginning of the operation, it was necessary to accumulate 4-5 rounds of shells and mines. And to transport just one, 13,500 freight cars were required. But, in addition to shells, the fronts also needed other supplies: fuel, lubricants, food, etc. All this resulted in the need to use thousands of wagons!

In this connection, it is much more profitable to deploy (build) new factories in areas closest to future front lines. It may be recalled here that in the 1930s, and especially in the last two years before June 22, 1941, many new military factories in the USSR were built in the western regions. And to the beginning

During the German offensive against them, they managed to bring in a large amount of strategic raw materials (which later mostly came to the Germans). From the point of view of defense, this is, of course, a state crime. But in the event of a successful campaign of the Red Army, it had to go further and further to the west, thus